On Modifications to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020
Abstract
The present study investigates the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation announced by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin during his annual speech addressed to the Federal Assembly on 15 January 2020. The research examines how the amendments may affect the social guarantees of the people of the Russian Federation, what role is dedicated to the bodies in the separation of powers, and why it is important to change the conditions for electing a candidate for Presidency. The approach is interdisciplinary and links Russian legal norms, applicable rules and human behavior. The main methods used in the research are analysis, comparative-legal, historical-legal and formal-legal methods. The study provides a legal and political picture of the context of modifications to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020.
About the Authors
Anna Shashkova
MGIMO University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Professor, Constitutional Law Department
76 Vernadskogo Av., Moscow, 119454
Michel Verlaine
ICN Business School
France
France
Associate Professor, Political Economy Department, Commercial Institute of Nancy (ICN) Business School
86 Sergent Blandan St., CS70148, Nancy, 54003
Ekaterina Kudryashova
Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Head Researcher
34 B. Cheremushkinskaya st., Moscow, 117218
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For citation:
Shashkova A., Verlaine M., Kudryashova E. On Modifications to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020. Russian Law Journal. 2020;8(1):60-83. https://doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2020-8-1-60-83
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