Achieving a Competition Compliance Culture in Russia: Assessing the UK Experience in Compliance Programmes to Deter Cartels

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Cartels, which are considered as the most harmful anticompetitive practice, continue to exist in many sectors of the global economy in spite of the severe sanctions regularly imposed on the cartelists by the competition authorities worldwide. This suggests that the approach to antitrust enforcement requires rethinking, and the necessity to move beyond the traditional enforcement approach, to creating a pro-compliance culture in companies. The paper suggests that robust compliance programmes, voluntarily implemented by companies to prevent infringements of competition law could be considered as one of the major elements of cartel deterrence. The paper reviews the pioneering experience of UK competition authorities in rewarding infringing companies for their efforts to comply with competition law – by reducing fines for committed violations, such as participation in cartels. The paper analyses the UK approach through the prism of its possible application in Russia, where antimonopoly laws continue to actively respond to the development of the best international competition practice, including cartel deterrence. The relative position of officials in the Russian antimonopoly body, the FAS, with respect to advocating antimonopoly compliance in Russia is presented in this work through an interview conducted by the author of this paper. The work formulates a three-step plan, embracing particular measures to develop competition compliance culture in Russia.

About the Author

Anzhela Korzhevskaya
FESCO Transportation Group (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation

Deputy Director of Legal Department, FESCO Transportation Group, LLM in the International Commercial and Competition Law at the University of East Anglia (UK) (29 Serebryanicheskaya emb., Moscow, 109028, Russia


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Supplementary files

For citation: Korzhevskaya A. Achieving a Competition Compliance Culture in Russia: Assessing the UK Experience in Compliance Programmes to Deter Cartels. Russian Law Journal. 2015;3(2):62-96.

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