On the constitutional model of the Russian economy
The article focuses on the analysis of the constitutional model of the Russian economy, including its conceptual underpinnings, fundamental principles, and overall design. Particular attention is paid to the problem of so-called “conflicting values” that are equally recognized by the constitutional foundation of the Russian economy. For example, the values of economic freedom and the usefulness of state regulation, and the importance of supporting competition and guaranteeing of social justice, are discussed as examples of conflicting principles. The authors conclude there is no irresolvable conflict. These equal constitutional values (i.e. the principles of economic freedom and the social nature of the state) create a “corridor of opportunities” which the state’s socioeconomic policy is balancing within in order to contribute to stability and sustainable development. It is noted in the article that the welfare state constitutional model becomes ineffective in modern conditions. In practice, excessive state social commitments lead to the exhaustion of the sources of growth, and to the slowdown and deterioration of human capital. The implementation of the concept of the workfare state is considered as the most promising. Furthermore, the authors show that the idea of the “neutrality” of the Constitutional Court in an assessment of economic regulations facilitates unlimited state expansion into the economy, provokes economic inequality and the decline of guarantees of economic liberties, and, as a result, leads to an economic slowdown.
About the AuthorsSergey Shakhray
Vice-Rector, Professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University
1 Leninskie Gory, Bldg. 13–14, GSP-1, Moscow, 119991, Russia
Leading Researcher, Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences
6/1 Fotievoy St., Moscow, 119333, Russia
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For citation: Shakhray S., Yanik A. On the constitutional model of the Russian economy. Russian Law Journal. 2018;6(2):73-92. https://doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2018-6-2-73-92
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