Preview

Russian Law Journal

Advanced search

What Future for the Eurozone After Karlsruhe?

https://doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2021-9-1-114-137

Full Text:

Abstract

The paper analyzes the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court rendered on 5 May2020 (2 BvR 859/15,2 BvR 980/16,2 BvR2006/15,2 BvR 1651/15), wereby the latter heavily criticized the "democratic" legitimacy of the Public Sector Purchase Program of the European Central Bank (aimed, by purchasing negotiable debt securities issued by governments, public agencies and international institutions located in the euro area, to support the economy of the Member States and to increase the eurozone's inflation rate up to 2%), de facto disapplying the judgment of the CGEU of 11 December 2018, by which that Program had been instead previously "validated." The author places the decision in the context of the long-standing and conflicting relations, on the one hand, between Member States and European institutions and, on the other hand, between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union, outlining the possible repercussions of the decision on a legal, economic, political and institutional level and, ultimately, on the very survival of the eurozone.

About the Author

Albert Henke
University of Milan
Italy

Aggregate Professor of Transnational Commercial Litigation and International Commercial and investment Arbitration

7 via Festa del Perdono, milano, 20122, italy



References

1. Aloisio S. Sul ruolo della Corte Costituzionale nelprocesso costituzionale europeo in La Corte Costituzionale e le Corti d'Europa - Atti del seminario svoltosi a Copanello (CZ) il31 maggio - 1 giugno2002 375 (Paolo Falzea et al. eds., 2003).

2. Cannizzaro E. EU Law and National Constitution: A Pluralist Constitution for a Pluralist Legal Order?: National Report - Italy in 1 F.I.D.E. XX Congress, London, 30 October - 2 November 2002 134 (Gordon Slynn & Mads T. Andenӕs eds., 2003).

3. Claes M. National Identity: Trump Card or up for Negotiation? in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 109 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).

4. Constantinesco V. L'article 5 CEE, de la bonne foi a la loyaute communautaire in Du droit international au droit de l'integration: Liber amicorum Pierre Pescatore 97 (Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987).

5. Frowein J.A. Solange II (BVerfGE 73,339). Constitutional complaint Firma W., 25(1) C.M.L. Rev. 201 (1988).

6. Galetta D.U. Karlsruhe uber alles? Il ragionamento sulprincipio diproporzionalita nella pronunzia del 5 maggio 2020 del BVerfG tedesco e le sue conseguenze, 14 Federalismi.it - Rivista di diritto pubblico italiano, comunitario e comparato 165 (2020). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598873

7. Goldmann M. Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15(2) German L.J. 265 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200002947

8. Hilpold P. Solange I, BverfGE 37,291,29 May 1974; Solange II, BverfGE 73, 339,22 October 1986; Solange III, BverfGE 89, 155, 12 October 1993; and Solange IV, BverfGE 102, 147, 7 June 2000 in Judicial Decisions on the Law of International Organization 170 (Cedric Ryngaert et al., 2016).

9. Komarek J. The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9(3) Eur. Const. L. Rev. 420 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1017/s157401961200123x

10. Leisner W. Der Abwagungsstaat: VerhaltnismaBigkeit als Gerechtigkeit (1997). https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-49007-3

11. Lerche P. Ubermass und Verfassungsrecht: zur Bindung des Gesetzgebers an die Grundsatze der Verhaltnismassigkeit und der Erforderlichkeit (1961).

12. Mayer F.C. Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court's OMT Reference, 15(2) German L.J. 111 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1017/s207183220000287x

13. Smits R. The European Central Bank's Independence and Its Relations with Economic Policy Makers, 31(6) Fordham int'l L.J. 1614 (2017).

14. Taborowski M. Infringement Proceedings and Non-Compliant National Courts, 49(6) C.M.L. Rev. 1881 (2012).

15. Tridimas T. The ECJ and the National Courts: Dialogue, Cooperation, and Instability in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law421 (Damian Chalmers & Anthony Arnull eds., 2015). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199672646.013.12


For citation:


Henke A. What Future for the Eurozone After Karlsruhe? Russian Law Journal. 2021;9(1):114-137. https://doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2021-9-1-114-137

Views: 153


ISSN 2309-8678 (Print)
ISSN 2312-3605 (Online)