CLASSICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A METHOD OF UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENTIAL TEXTS

Abstract

Hermeneutics, as an independent method, has found a special place in the field of human thought. This method, especially in the twentieth century, has presented its achievements to other fields of knowledge, such as philosophy, theology, the social sciences, and the philosophy of science, and has initiated new debates in those fields.

Hermeneutics is divided into two parts: philosophical hermeneutics and methodological hermeneutics, the former of which is mainly identified with an interpreter-centered approach and the latter with an author-centered approach. In the context of this article, the most important questions that exist are: Which type of hermeneutics can be used in jurisprudential texts? And can a relationship be established between the standard method of interpreting jurisprudential texts and hermeneutics?

By proposing the possibility of establishing a relationship between jurisprudential texts and classical hermeneutics, the authors of this article intend to show that, because the use of philosophical hermeneutics leads to different readings of religion and belief influenced by presuppositions and ultimately to relativism, it is not suitable for jurisprudential texts. However, methodological hermeneutics and the accepted method of rules and their observance, which are more dependent on text-centered, author-centered, and methodological hermeneutics, are the most correct ways to interpret jurisprudential texts.