



PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC CULTURE: EFFECTS ON THREAT PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE

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Abstract

The study explores the historical development and current dynamics of Pakistan's strategic culture using historical research, case studies, and content analysis. Key influences include the partition of British India, early state formation, military involvement, and relations with regional and global powers. The paper focuses on Pakistan's approach to maintaining a regional balance of power, deterrent capabilities, diplomacy, and domestic challenges.

Pakistan's strategic culture revolves around four core ideas and is heavily influenced by its relationship with India and the United States. The country seeks to hinder India's global progress and demands territorial fairness in Kashmir, leading to various conflicts and an ongoing proxy struggle. Pakistan has adopted strategies such as exploiting ideological resources in Afghanistan and using proxies under its nuclear shield.

The Pakistan Army holds significant power in national security, foreign policy, and related domestic policies. An analysis of military publications suggests that this strategic culture is enduring and unlikely to change in the near future.

Introduction

The conditions of separation imposed by Britain when in 1947, it helped free the Indian subcontinent from colonial rule., Pakistan was never granted any claim to the disputed area of Kashmir. As a result, Pakistan is a revolutionary state in terms of territorial integrity. That wants to establish sovereignty over the whole region. Pakistan is also revisionist because it wants to prevent India from becoming more powerful in the international system. India, in contrast, is modestly revisionist about its position in the global system but territorially content with the status quo. The Pakistan Military's use of power and other aspects of state power may be affected by Pakistan's emphasis on these revisionist goals. Since 1947, Pakistan and India have been embroiled in an ongoing rivalry. Pakistan launched wars over Kashmir in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1999, all of which it lost, and it continues to wage a proxy conflict in Kashmir to force India to stop. The revisionist agenda of Pakistan has not only cost the state much money; in recent years, it has also negatively impacted the stability of the state and the security of its population. Many terrorist organisations that Pakistan's intelligence services helped to form are still active today. Many of their direct ancestors now attack Pakistan's civilian, armed, and institutions of intelligence as well as its people. Additionally, the pursuit of Kashmir has cost the Pakistani state much in terms of its economy. Despite mounting evidence that Pakistan cannot even slightly accomplish these revisionist objectives persist and is less likely to succeed as the strength gap with India widens. (Fair, 2016)

Pakistan ought to have stopped practising revisionism long ago. After all, "bad strategy will result in the inefficient execution of a state's authority, whereas smart strategy would guarantee that goals are reached. Additionally, failed state-led solutions are believed to almost certainly change or be abandoned. Pakistan is still adamantly revisionist, even though continuing with this course would cost the state more and make it more likely that it will collapse. Game logic suggests that Pakistan should



reach a compromise with India sooner rather than later, given India's rise and Pakistan's collapse in the global structure, since doing so now would be less expensive than waiting until the two countries' power differentials are even greater. (Briskey, 2014)

Much of this perplexing behaviour is explained by the strategic mentality of the army, although not all of it. I concentrate on the military rather than the Pakistani govt or other socio-political structures because they dominate domestic and international policy decision-making and are expected to do so for the foreseeable future. In other words, the military controls the majority of the levers of power that affect the nation's behaviour in the global structure and has the deciding voice in national strategy on important matters of nationwide security, leading to the conclusion that the army's strategic culture is, for all intents and purposes, functionally equivalent to that of Pakistan. (Bloomfield, 2012)

The army's interpretation of threats in terms of ideologies and civilisations is among its most lasting characteristics. The pre-partition "2 nation hypothesis," which holds that Pakistan is the birthplace of Muslims in South Asia, is the foundation of its claim to Kashmir. Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority country in modern India, must link with Pakistan to completely realise the greater aim of partition and the two-nation idea. The popular catchphrase Kashmir, Pakistan Banega captures this. Importantly, the army views its fight with India as civilisational resistance by "Muslim Pakistan" against cunning "Hindu India's" schemes. (Bahadur, 2004)

Four main elements support the Pakistan Army's strategic culture. One recurring element is its steadfast conviction that Pakistan's insecurity and incompleteness were caused by how Britain carried out Raj's split. Second, the army sees Afghanistan as a source of insecurity because of the Afghan state's goals, both independently and in cooperation with India. Thirdly, it accuses India of being adamantly hostile to Pakistan's existence and of attempting to destabilise the state's intellectual foundations, if not the state itself. India would annihilate Pakistan, according to the Pakistani Army. Fourth, the army thinks India wants to dominate the area and impose its will on Pakistan and its neighbours. (Angstrom & Honig, 2012) The army's operationalisation of these strategic ideas and the instruments it has created over time to combat these views are also included in this paper.

The rest of this report is divided into the following sections. The first part explains how strategic culture contributes to understanding Pakistan's stubborn revisionism and the following policies. The four fundamental ideas ingrained in the army's strategic culture are then developed in further depth. In the second part, I go into further detail on the Army's operationalization of these ideas and the methods it employs to manage their paper comes to a close with a consideration of the consequences for American and Indian attempts to deal with the Pakistani threat.

Strategic Culture: Pakistani Strategic thought

Strategic culture proponents contend that the idea may explain the decisions governments make to achieve their national security goals and the goals themselves. In this report, Alastair Iain Johnston's definition, which he adapted from Clifford Geertz's work, is used:

The concept of strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (such as argumentation structures, languages, analogies, and metaphors) that works to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs and by cloaking these conceptions in such a veneer of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uncannily realistic and effective. (Dadze-Arthur, 2017)

The "system of symbols" proposed by Johnston comprises two components. The first relates to the fundamental beliefs that the institution in issue and its constituents have about the strategic atmosphere. These presumptions eliminate ambiguity about the strategic environment and offer crucial information communicated among key players. They also come from "deeply historical origins, not from the contemporary context," which is significant. Depending on how the organisation perceives its strategic environment, the 2nd component of the system of signs is an operational



knowledge of the more effective methods for handling risks. Johnston contends that although it is exceedingly difficult to link a particular behavioural decision to a strategic culture—partially due to the onerous evidentiary requirements—scholars should at least be capable of showing how a strategic culture restricts the alternatives open to the organisation in question. (Johnston, 1995) I address these concerns with the Pakistan Army in the study that follows. My main information sources are decades' worth of academic works written by Pakistani military commanders.

The Strategic Culture of the Pakistan Army: Four Fundamental Elements

In this study, we identified four recurring themes from my thorough reading of Pakistani military literature and officer memoirs.

The persistent perception of Pakistan as an unstable and unfinished nation. 1st and foremost, the army recognises Pakistan as a frail and unfinished nation that resulted from a 1947 fundamentally unjust partitioning process. As a result, it sees partition as a work in progress. Several claims support this first impression. Since the bulk of Raj institutions was left in what is currently India, Pakistan did not inherit them equally. Due to its status as an impoverished, smaller country, Pakistan had to create the machinery of government while also dealing with a humanitarian catastrophe brought on by division that was far worse than what India went through. The military of Pakistan complained that the British planned to divide up the Province of Punjab to give certain districts to India so that it could use them to invade Kashmir with ground troops without any supporting proof. The army holds that deliberate actions leading up to the formal division of the Raj and unforeseen fierce incidents resulting from partition left Pakistan with ill-defined and insecure borders, disabling human capital shortages, an unwinnable security race with India, and insufficient assets to deal with these and other complex issues. (Ali, 2022)

The idea is that Afghanistan contributes to unrest. The concept that the British Raj's most dangerous borders, with Afghanistan, was passed on to the army—but only got a tiny portion of Raj's resources to tackle this danger, is a second key pillar of the army's strategic philosophy. Contrary to common opinion, Pakistan's pursuit of "strategic deepness" started with freedom and was passed down by British safety managers. Pakistan's military has spent most of the country's past trying to instal an Afghan govt that is favourable to Pakistan and opposed to India so that Pakistan may claim political instead of geographical depth in the region. This strategy sought to prevent India from entering Afghanistan because it worried that if given a large presence there, it might hurt Pakistan's interests. Only the army commander of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, General Mirza Aslam Beg, could have imagined strategic complexity as a physical location where Pakistan might station armed forces to repel an Indian invasion. (Heinkel, 2022)

Even while some experts minimise Pakistan's worries about Afghanistan to its wish to limit the presence of India there and thwart any attempts to destabilise Pakistan's western restive border of Pakistan, these fears stem from the Afghan state's conduct in the early ages of the independence of Pakistan. Among other provocations, Afghanistan, for instance, refused the application of Pakistan to join the UN, forbade the Durand-Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, made irridentist assertions on vast swaths of Pakistani area in Baluchistan, the NWFP, and the (F.A.T.A), and supported Baluch and Pashtoon separatists. Pakistani authors, both in and out of service, have credited India for initiating Afghanistan's bravery. This belief that the Afghan and Indian threats are connected, and that Afghanistan has the potential to destabilise Pakistan on its own or with Indian support has been a recurring theme in the Pakistani army and even citizen discourse. (Glenn, 2018)

India re-established its presence in Afghanistan after 2001, under the protection of the US and NATO. Given the pervasiveness of perception of the threat of Pakistan over Afghanistan and its possibility for collaboration with India, it is not unexpected that Pakistan considers "the assertive Indian existence in Afghanistan is forcing Pakistan into a two-front struggle. "It would be unwise to brush these concerns off just because Pakistan needs to gather more solid proof to back up its assertions. (Lavoy, 2005)



The idea that India discards the idea of a two-nation state and wants to rule or obliterate Pakistan. The army's steadfast view that India, which adamantly resisted the theory of two nations, cannot accept Pakistan's being as a Muslim country and thus intends to subjugate or abolish it is the third crucial element of its strategic culture. Some of the first synthesise of this sort of Indian ideas come from Ayub Khan. According to him, India just can't accept "our existence as a fully independent Country's" drawing on Pakistan's experiences with the split. Only a sick explanation can adequately describe the Indian mentality. The Muslim population is deeply despised by Indian politicians. India was determined to make life tough for us from the start. The works of Ayub reveal a conviction that if Pakistan's ideology failed, the state would also crumble. His administration had to actively support this philosophy and maintain its legitimacy inside Pakistan to assure its success and, by extension, the success of Pakistan itself. India's resounding conquest in the 1971 India-Pakistan War added weight to the belief that India wants to weaken, if not destroy, Pakistan. The Pakistan Army continues to be motivated by this perception of India in both its speech and deeds. Lest anyone think that this belief is out of date or irrelevant, In Sep 2016, as resentments were growing between Pakistan and India over Indian harsh strike action in reprisal for Pakistani extremist organisation in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations stated, "army of Pakistan together with our resourceful nation have overcome every threat and will prevent any devious plan against decency and autonomy of Pakistan in the upcoming."(Tanham, 1992)

The idea is that India should be opposed because it is a hegemon. The fourth idea in the strategic culture of the military of Pakistan is the existential danger posed by India, including its direct aggression, its capacity to work with its neighbours, and its ascension in the world order. Ayub Khan once again gave this idea an early voice. In 1967, he said that "India's goal to engage Pakistan or transform her into a satellite" is the cause of all the tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has been engaged in an intense and protracted battle for survival since the day of its independence. All of India's efforts in the area of foreign policy were focused on isolating Pakistan and causing it to fall apart. This similar worry is expressed by later authors. Extremists in India, according to Major Mohammad Aslam Zuberi's opinion from 1971, "still a vision of Akhaund Bharat" (an entire India). Even moderates want Pakistan to become India's satellite because then it would be relegated to the role of an innocent bystander. Major Khalid Mehmud said in a 1985 article that India has a "curious notion of security for South Asia and seeks to enforce its security and financial system onto the whole area. Additionally, it aims to limit its neighbours' alternatives and choices in terms of foreign policy, and it wants them to align their positions with those of India. In 1988, a different author making a similar argument said that "India has aspirations to play a far bigger part than merely being restricted to South Asia." Numerous people in India think their country is intended to play a significant role in the world; some even see it falling just below superpowers and standing together with nations like China. (Umar, 2016)

The ramifications of Indian ambitions concern Pakistan and the army, according to Pakistani defence publications. Pakistan's situation was summed up in a March 1990 article by Lieutenant Colonel Israr Ahmad Ghumman as a tiny state facing "multi-directional dangers to her safety owing to her geo-strategic significance, national programmes, and philosophical attitude." Pakistan continues to be forced to live in a constant state of external clash by the Soviet Union, an expanding ideology, and India, a hegemonic neighbour. While Pakistan, a smaller country, serves as the only awkward roadblock, Ghumman thought India would certainly emerge as the "major regional power." Although this is somewhat consoling, he added that "India is modernising her armed forces. When India's military power is fully developed, Pakistan is likely to face it at a time of her choosing. Pakistan is in danger right now because India has "authoritarian intentions" and sees Pakistan as an obstacle to becoming a regional superpower, according to Ghumman. In Pakistani security discourse, the paired narratives that portray India as a regional power with evil intentions and Pakistan as the only nation to oppose continue. (Khodagholipour, Mohammad Alipour, & Modarres, 2021)



Policy Implications

Attempts by the United States to convince Pakistan to be less risky in the past have mostly failed because they depended on the encouragement that only served to reward Pakistan for its reckless actions. The army has effectively built support among large segments of the Pakistani population, and these beliefs about security are strongly engrained inside the institution. To change Pakistan's decision to use nonstate actors, Pakistan will need to consider the costs and benefits of doing so. (Fair, 2016)

Managing and operationalising the threats

The first part of this section shows how Pakistan implements the four security beliefs firmly ingrained in the strategic mindset of the army. The second part of this section describes the instruments that the military has created to deal with these challenges.

Pakistan is an insecure nation.

The Pakistan Army used two strategies to implement their fears related to the Partition. The army must first protect Pakistan's political and geographical borders. The second need is to "complete" the partition process, which entails capturing Kashmir and delivering on the pledge of the theory of two-nation. It is crucial to realise that the formula of two-nation was not only a component of a plan to create a sovereign Pakistan; instead, this idea still serves as a solid intellectual foundation for modern Pakistan despite the abuse it has received. The two-nation formula is still referred to in the professional publications of the Pakistan Army as a crucial component of the so-called Pakistani ideology, which the Pakistan Army stands up for. Although Zia-ul-Haq's attempts to impose Islam are sometimes cited as the reason for this idea's popularity, its significance stretches back further. General Ayub Khan, the first military chief of Pakistan, said in his book that man's greatest desire is for an idea for which he should be able to give his life. We have Islamic doctrine as such. We fought for Pakistan based on it, and after we had it, we failed to conduct our lives in line with it. The fundamental cause is that we needed to provide a clear and concise definition of that philosophy. He spends a whole chapter explaining how he views Islam as a national and political philosophy for Pakistan. (Muhammad & Qureshi, 2021) Khan believed that relying on Islam would help Pakistan's state overcome its many flaws, which resulted from the nation's divided ethnic ambitions and the people who, sometimes without their consent, were ensnared therein. In 1960, he provided the following explanation of Islam's role:

Before 1947, our nationalism was more conceptual than it was geographical. Before then, we had at least eleven different provincial allegiances which were Muslims on an ideological level, Indians on a territorial level, and Muslims on a local one. But when Pakistan unexpectedly became a reality, we, gathered from every nook and cranny of the enormous Indian subcontinent, were given the difficult job of uniting all of our historical, geographical, and local allegiances into one big fair greatness for the new state of Pakistan. (M. A. Khan & Friends, 1967)

To be that "one huge allegiance," Islam was to be. Khan believed that if this philosophy failed, the Pakistani state would follow suit. His administration vigorously pushed his dream of Islam as a domestic philosophy. It strove to maintain its legality inside Pakistan to assure the success of this philosophy and, subsequently of Pakistan itself. Notably, every successive military ruler, including Agha Mohamad Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq, and even Pervaiz Musharaff, would use numerous allusions to Islam to defend their governments and related policies. (Sayeed, 1968)

According to several authors in military journals in Pakistan, this philosophy has various tactical advantages, including strengthening nationwide character, which attracts better candidates to the army, generating better "Muslim" militaries who would be better equipped to combat the nation's several Hindu enemies, and motivating citizen soldiers to protect the nation's philosophical and physical borders. The two-nation theory, Islam, and the ideology of Pakistan are all used by authors in Pakistan's professional journals to support the military's continued domination over Pakistan's inner and outer matters as well as the public's appetite for an endless war with India. This is significant



because only the military has maintained a pure promise to Islam. Additionally, these writers refer to all of Pakistan's conflicts with India as "protective jihads," which indicates that all of Pakistan's battles with India have been defended and that India is unwavering in its pursuit of Pakistan's destruction. (Ahmed, 2014)

India is an unstoppable enemy, according to the army's narrative that is spread across Pakistani culture. Pakistan's struggle against jihad is not only the responsibility of its army; rather, it "is a holy obligation" that "is mandatory for all men, women, and children." The whole country must put up a concerted, all-encompassing effort via its Armed Forces. Numerous Pakistani defence authors go to considerable lengths to place Pakistan's conflict with India into a broader context of Islamic conflicts. In other words, the Pakistan Army is protecting Islam itself, not simply its narrow interests. According to some writers, educating troops on the principles of Islam will improve fighter morale and better equip warriors for the countless fights that lay ahead. (Brasher, 2022)

The army's employment of non-state actors in different ways, which is its main weapon for capturing Kashmir and carrying out the promise of division, is strengthened by the way it has instrumentalized Islam. As is widely recognised, Pakistan has employed Islamist militants in Afghanistan since the late 1950s and in India since 1947. The nation's defence periodicals showed an early emphasis on the effectiveness of guerrilla combat. Incongruously, Pakistan developed its concern in this kind of combat while training alongside American troops, who were eager to use Pakistani combatants to help them carry out counterinsurgency operations. With regards to defensive and offensive actions against India, the importance of penetrating targets, the necessity to form a people's army, and the usefulness of a people's war were just a few of the notions that Pakistani defence authors concentrated on during the 1960s. (Heuser & Shamir, 2016)

By 1971, defence analysts were publicly tying Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons to its revisionist objectives. The creation of a fundamental nuclear deterrent, according to Zuberi, was the greatest method to counter Indian hegemonic plans. Such publications were rather uncommon until the war of 1971 and India's nuclear device explosion in 1974. In the ages that tracked, Pakistan defence writers started making the argument that the country now had more options to use low-intensity combat with more impunity due to the nuclear context. A Pakistani nuclear weapon, according to Stephen Cohen's observation from 1984, "would offer the canopy beneath which Pakistan might reopen the Kashmir problem in addition to neutralising a presumed Indian nuclear force." There are countless instances of similar thought in Pakistan's defence literature as well. Anwari advised Pakistan to create nuclear weapons and delivery systems in a piece from 1988 so that they could "evade being confronted with a *fait accompli*" by India. In addition, he recommended that India should be made aware of Pakistan's capability for "guerrilla warfare" as part of its deterrence strategy. The nuclear explosions of 1998, according to Major General Asif Duraiz Akhtar, "have provided a sense of balance in the area [and] have placed the traditional all-out war concept on hold," in the 2k version of the Pakistan Military Green Book. According to him, "this position opens the door for low amount combat or the war with specific objectives confined to the boundaries of quarrelled territories, such as Indian-held Kashmir and Siachin." This limited war concept is expanded upon under the nuclear umbrella by Brigadier Muhammad Afzal, who states: "Pakistan's military plans to use guerrilla warfare and nuclear deterrence against India as the cornerstones of its restricted war strategy, while also keeping the option open to conduct huge restricted conventional activities for both offence and defence." Afzal warns Pakistan to pursue low-intensity warfare cautiously to avoid going over the "tolerance level of the Indians" while also "preventing Indians from reaching Kashmiris' level of tolerance." He acknowledges that India has its redlines. (Sondhaus, 2006)

We now know that Pakistan probably had a primitive nuclear device created or was on the verge of doing so when Anwari suggested that Pakistan build nuclear weapons. Regardless of the capabilities Pakistan had, the idea of ambiguity appeared to inspire Pakistani defence experts more than any other enabling concept. When he said "that ambiguity is the core of deterrence" in the late 1980s,



General Zia-ul-Haq himself explained this. In a similar vein, General Beg said that "state[s] of uncertainty and ambiguity...serv[e] as[a] significant deterrent." What Paul Kapur refers to as the "instability-instability conundrum" defines the India-Pakistan security conflict and enables Pakistan to depend on non-state actors to undertake operations in India with licence centres on the cultivation of this ambiguity, and therefore strategic instability. (Lavoy, 2005)

The development of so-called battlefield nuclear weapons is Pakistan's most recent invention. To create "preventive outcomes that are predicated on the dread of nuclear war," says Zulfiqar Khan, a senior expert in the Defence Department of Pakistan, Pakistan is introducing planned nuclear armaments and placing them along its boundaries with India. This will provide Pakistan with the ability to escalate tensions with India, maybe preventing a crisis altogether or, if required, escalating the fight, and winning it. Khan argues that given the Conventional Indian Armed Forces, Pakistan should emphasise on preserving the balancing of horror with the right plan rather than participating in a conventional military number game. In addition, "any openness [in the nuclear policy of Pakistan] would only impair the capacity of Pakistan to counter India's assessment of the "Cold Start Strategy" or limited war thoughtful, to its cost." This also adds to the instability-instability conundrum proposed by Kapur. Greater strategic instability benefits Pakistan and gives it complete impunity to involve in destabilising actions at lesser levels of the clash range. (Sondhaus, 2006)

Instability is brought on by Afghanistan

Pakistan has historically depended on the strategy of strategic depth to handle its concerns about Afghan stubbornness and Indo-Afghan conspiracy to destabilise Pakistan. This strategy has often indicated political depth rather than physical depth, as was briefly mentioned above. Pakistan has pursued this idea using methods that, in many ways, are similar to the governmental systems created by the British at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Afghanistan, the British alternated between an aggressive forward strategy and a "tight border policy" that was more inwardly oriented. The latter concentrated on protecting Raj's frontiers while the former included more overt military engagement. The design of this system included several concentric buffers. The Amu Darya served as a physical barrier between British and Russian interests, with Afghanistan serving as a buffer. Another barrier separating Afghanistan from the supposedly established Pashtun regions of the NWFP is the FATA. Following its independence, Pakistan mostly kept this tactic, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, rather than North-West Frontier Province, was only recently legally adopted. However, Pakistan has kept the FATA governance system from the colonial period because it offers the state—and the military specifically—many benefits. For a long time, FATA has housed training facilities from which terrorists could easily conduct operations in Afghanistan or go to Kashmir or other locations in India. (Tanham, 1992)

Political Islam and Islamic militancy were two more methods Pakistan utilised to control the politics in Afghanistan. The Islamist political groups Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ullema-e-Islam were Pakistan's main allies. They still are today. These organisations eventually joined forces with the army to create, spread, and enforce Pakistani ideology both domestically and overseas. By 1960, Pakistani Islamist groups had become the main adversaries of the Afghan Communists after being pushed to "follow a forward strategy of finding ethical friends in Afghanistan" by the nation's intelligence services functioning under the direction of the army. (I. Khan, 2006)

As already said, since 1948, when Afghanistan rejected Pakistan's membership in the UN, there have been strained ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Pakistan's army and even civil leaders, who were both devoted to an Islamic worldview, were frightened by the shift of Afghanistan toward the US and the acts of the communist People of Afghanistan's Democratic Party. By 1973, the perspective of Pakistan on the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated. Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew his cousin, King Zahir Shah, in July of that year. He then launched a severe crackdown on Islamists and a more aggressive modernization effort, and many of them fled to Pakistan or Iran. By backing the Baluch rebellion, opposing the Durand Line, and backup Pashtoons in Pakistan who were



advocating for a larger Pashtun stan, Daoud Khan enraged Pakistan, which was ruled by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan's civilian dictator). (I. Khan, 2007)

Bhutto gave the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan the command to oversee clandestine operations in Afghanistan in 1973 after becoming weary of Daoud's pranks. The Islamist groups in Afghanistan who resisted Daud Khan's liberalising government and his attempts to drive them out were the foundation of Bhutto's aggressive foreign policy. Strategical factors influenced the decision to rally Afghan Islamists; these individuals rejected Kabul's claims on Pakistani territory and favourable relations with India. In FATA's North and South Waziristan, Pakistan set up training facilities for them the same year. These Pashtun-dominated organisations were not only a virtual black hole where the press was unable to function, but they were also advantageously situated on the boundary of the eastern provinces of Paktia, Logar, and Patika in Afghanistan. In addition to having a sizable military presence in Razmak (in South Waziristan), Pakistan also has soldiers stationed in Mohmand Agency in FATA. The Afghans were to be organised and trained by the NWFP units of the Frontier Corps, a fighter group whose employees hail from F.A.T.A but whose officers are supported by the Pakistan Army. The inspector general of the unit, then brigadier Naserulah Khaan Babarr, was given overall command of the operation. (Fair, 2016)

Several Islamist uprisings in Afghanistan were supported by Pakistan. Even though Daoud Khan quickly put an end to these disturbances, he used them as justification to imprison even moderate Islamists, which caused more Islamists to escape to Pakistan. To maintain these operations as clandestine as possible, Pakistan recruited Afghan Islamists for the Frontier Corps and trained them with help from the I.S.I and the military's elite Special Services Group. Pakistan's military forces trained some 5,000 terrorists to oppose the Daoud Khan dictatorship between 1973 and 1977. As soon as the U.S. had made it over the Amu Darya, the main Islamist organization that would serve as the backbone of the anti-Soviet jihad had already been founded by Zia-ul- Haq army and the ISI. In 1978, Pakistan trained and aided seven Afghan opposition militias after initially supporting fifty. This helped improve relations between Afghan and Pakistani Islamist groups. For almost a year after the Soviet attack, Pakistan "continued to help the Afghan opposition, giving it with meagre supplies out of its weak assets." According to official Pakistani rhetoric, the Mujahideen would be battling for the country's sovereignty and safety. Pakistan "accepted the...option to safeguard her domestic interest and to defend a key principle" by offering "secret help to the Mujahideen," according to General Khalid Mahmud Arif, deputy chief of army staff under Zia-ul- Haq. (Muhammad & Qureshi, 2021)

Such plots are becoming commonplace in Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan. Pakistan has historically favoured Islamists to carry out its agenda because it thinks that they would be less forceful in refusing the Durand Line as the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan and also more sympathetic to its strategic worries over India's existence. In contrast, Pakistan has historically shied away from supporting non-Islamist ethnic groups via financial aid out of concern that doing so might have negative effects on its fractured Pashtun minority, which has long nursed a variety of complaints against the state. This explains Pakistan's belief that under partial Taliban authority, Afghanistan would be less hostile to Pakistani interests than it has been during the early 1990s. (Bajpai, 2014) The main lesson to be learned from the above explanation is that its views of Pakistan about Afghanistan as a danger and the methods it has devised to deal with them are not new or simply reducible to India.

Pakistan's existence and India's opposition to it, as well as the two-nation theory

By maintaining public support for an endless civil conflict, the Pakistan Military primarily operationalizes the notion that India wants to ruin Pakistan. It should be highlighted that the army directly profits from this notion and actively works to perpetuate the idea among the general population of Pakistan that India steadfastly opposes and seeks to destroy Pakistan. After all, if there were no clash between the two civilizations or ideologies, there may be room for peace between the two countries. In such a situation, the Pakistan Army would struggle to defend its strong conventional



position and make the case that it is the institution most able to ensure the security and well-being of Pakistanis. (Heinkel, 2022)

To tackle this fundamental concern about India's intentions, Pakistan has developed a variety of ideological strategies. To start, it characterises every fight with India as an act of "defence" or even "defensive jihad." Given that Pakistanis have free access to material from which they may discover that Pakistan started the conflicts in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1999, it is pretty amazing that Pakistan can maintain this lie. Additionally, the military has fostered the idea that these battles were fought not just to safeguard Pakistan but also to protect the very foundation of Islam. Pakistan often uses terms from the Islamic language to give these conflicts this significance. When fighting the kufar (non-believers), for instance, combatants are ghazis. Whether they come back dead or alive, if they perish in war. India, therefore, is not merely a hostile nation; it also stands for a philosophical and even spiritual adversary that must be fought despite everything. (Akram & Naqvi)

The Military of Pakistan Belief That It Must Defy India despite everything The Pakistani Military will only be defeated when it is unable to fight against India. This indicates that Pakistan is ready to take significant threats to its ties with India since the army would lose if it does nothing. The two strategies the army devised to carry out these objectives—training terrorists and fostering jihad under its nuclear umbrella—have been extensively covered above. This group of choices is particularly appealing since it is reasonably priced, effective, and provides reasonable rejection. The expense of hiring activists is a small portion of Pakistan's approximately \$7 billion annual defence budget. For this reason, Pakistan has also used paramilitary and regular personnel that are dressed as insurgents. Even the most effective Indian defences cannot stop every strike, and the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan makes a harsh Indian response to even the most heinous offence quite improbable. (Briskey, 2014)

Pakistan also threatens nations like the United States with nuclear weapons to keep it from being completely shut off from outside funding. In reality, American concerns about extremists gaining nuclear armaments, materials, or knowledge are made worse by Pakistan's flirtation with tactical nuclear weapons. Although it is doubtful that this tactic would force India to make reductions, it does offer Pakistan a tactful victory. The world community urges both India and Pakistan to strive toward peace after each flare-up, giving Pakistan the advantage both at home and overseas by enforcing a fictitious parity between the 2 borders. These foreign declarations are then used by the Pakistani Army to gain internal support for its strategies. (Ali, 2022)

Conclusions and Consequences

The debate that has come before demonstrates the tenacity of the Pakistani Military's strategic cultural views, some of which date back to before partition. Not that they haven't changed throughout time—far from it. One might argue that the development of nuclear weapons, or at the very least the development of nuclear projection, significantly altered Pakistan's dependence on non-state actors. The combination of Pakistan's nonstate actor policy and its nuclear deterrence ideas has produced a strategy that is very hard to counter without taking a significant danger. Similarly, Pakistan's worries about India rapidly merged with its assessments of the Afghan danger.

There is virtually limited possibility for Pakistani reformation because of these strategic cultural views. The conventional American strategy toward the nation has included financial and military aid, purportedly motivated by the justification that such support may make Pakistan senses lesser insecure and so end its hostilities with Afghanistan and India. This will enable Pakistan to defeat the jihadi deputies and reverse its irresponsible production strategy. However, such hope is unfounded. Pakistan has both practical and ideological concerns regarding India and Afghanistan. The conceptual worries about Pakistan's environment cannot be addressed by taking away its practical causes of unease, and doing so even praises Pakistan for the actions it has taken to deal with these imagined dangers.



It is unlikely that Pakistan would act differently even if it were genuinely run by civilians for the reasons I mentioned above, for the simplest cause that the military has successfully established that its fundamental tactical views and the means to control them are shared by common Pakistanis. This suggests that Pakistan's revisionism toward India in Kashmir and elsewhere would not necessarily end under a more truly democratic system.

If even a small percentage of these results are true, it poses a severe problem for policymakers: how can the U.S., India, or other concerned gatherings convince Pakistan not to use jihadist terrorists operating under its nuclear umbrella as its primary foreign policy tool? Economic and security support are common strategies used by policymakers, but they seldom result in significant change and may even encourage Pakistan to maintain its existing set of behaviours. What potential policy alternatives result from this analysis?

First and foremost, it's crucial to realise that Pakistan today has no reason to refrain from deploying Islamist terrorism in the context of its increasing nuclear arsenal. The country also has no real reason to stop developing dangerous nuclear technology, such as nuclear weapons for use in combat, since doing so would make it more expensive for India to participate in a conflict and would insulate Pakistan from the repercussions of its actions. Therefore, the international community has a dual challenge: getting Pakistan to stop using Islamist extremists as foreign policy pawns and freeing the world from the nuclear pressure circle of Pakistan.

Though a thorough analysis of a compelling movement that may accomplish these overlapping goals is beyond the purview of this article, there are a few possibilities. These choices are predicated on two notions. The first is that, contrary to popular belief, Pakistan is a secure state and is not likely to fall. The second premise is that China will behave similarly to how it did during the conflict between Pakistan with India in 1965, 1971, and 1999 if there is a confrontation between India and Pakistan.

First, the US has to get out of Pakistan's nuclear control loop. The U.S. government should assign Pakistan the duty of safeguarding its nuclear resources and technology instead of bearing the obligation of stopping production to state or nonstate entities. Washington needs to issue a public proclamation that holds Pakistan accountable for any event involving non-state actors and its nuclear arsenal. The "nuclear signature" of Pakistan is widely recognised, which puts the world community in an excellent position to recognise potential Pakistani participation. The United States administration should also make it plain to Pakistan that if it decides to use nuclear weapons first against an enemy, that enemy would not be left to fend for itself. As it did with Iran, Washington should also think about adopting steps to undermine Pakistan's programme. Sanctions like those that rendered Iran unviable and forced Tehran to the bargaining table could also be considered. If left to its own devices, Pakistan has never been and never will be a responsible nuclear state. because it has become used to using its programme to compel the rest of the world to support the country by instilling the notion that Pakistan is too hazardous to fail.

2nd, the United States must stop encouraging Pakistan to create "excellent jihadi assets" in the battle against "terrorists of the Pakistani state." If there are bombers in Pakistan who need to be murdered, Washington will continue paying Pakistan to do it. This is a straightforward asset-banking strategy. Washington should instead encourage the nation to stop using Islamist terrorism as a weapon for foreign policy. This is indeed simpler said than done. To do this, the US govt needs to cease paying Pakistan's internal expenses to get rid of domestic terrorists. Pakistan shouldn't get paid for carrying out obligations that belong to sovereign governments. Washington should also cease providing Pakistan with strategic weaponry. It ought to provide a limited range of tools that have been useful in counterterrorism and pacification operations. None of these sites ought to be very useful in the battle against India. In addition, Pakistan could get military training from the United States in other fields that directly relate to home security, such as disaster assistance. Should it permit the US to do so and should the US be able to offer significant support to these organisations, the United States



should continue to be prepared to train Pakistani security forces in police and counterinsurgency techniques as well as in other ways to help Pakistan's dysfunctional justice system.

Thirdly, it must be made plain by Washington that it will label Pakistan a country supporter of violence. Such a proclamation would enact broad, terrible consequences. The United States should give Pakistan a deadline for taking action against the numerous extremist organisations it currently backs to prevent such a result. The first such step is stopping direct assistance for these organisations and limiting their ability to recruit new members; eventually, Washington should compel the removal of the remaining members. This will be a lengthy undertaking, much like any programme for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, even if Pakistan is willing to execute it. Tens of thousands of activists, if not more, have received training in Pakistan. However, and Pakistan remains to keenly rear, nurture, assist, and organise supposed jihadis for national objectives, the United States shouldn't contribute financially to these initiatives.

If Pakistan doesn't change its ways, the US will need to create disincentives and the political will to use them. It must be prepared to go after specific people who financially support terrorist organisations and individuals. This entails criminal prosecution on a global scale, account designation and capture by the Treasury department of the US, as well as visa rejections. Both civilian and military leaders from Pakistan love taking their families to the US for vacations, holidays, and educational chances. Such harmful inducements may be facilitated by two UN instruments. First, all nations are required under UN Security Resolution 1373, passed in 2001, to stop and stifle terrorists' capacity to gather support, enlist new members, and carry out further terrorist actions. Because it is a Chapter VII resolution, the UN or one of its member states may use force against any state that does not comply. Following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which Pakistan funded, the US and China worked together to shield Pakistan from the sanctions that UNSCR 1373 called for. A second law is UNSCR 1267, which forbids travel, bans the opening of bank accounts, and forbids the possession of weapons for anyone deemed to be supporting Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organisations. Because these people possess governmental protection, as Pakistan does, the third deprivation cannot be implemented. The individuals mentioned should be of operative relevance, such as being crucial in transporting money or employing troops for radical actions, to profit the most from these designations. The US will need to use diplomacy to compel China to provide an explanation for why it protects terrorists given that China may fight back against such attempts.

Fourth, notwithstanding Pakistan's repeated failures to uphold its obligations, the US should be prepared to reassess all types of bilateral financial assistance and the stress it puts on multilateral institutions like the IMF. As a result of Pakistan's reliance on these sources of aid, the US and its allies should put aside their shared hesitation to impose sanctions. Pakistan has worked to create the perception that it is too hazardous to fail, yet it is more secure than people realise.

5th, even if the U.S.' risk appetite is too less to explore the aforementioned possibilities, it may nevertheless somewhat reduce Pakistan's desire for terrorist follies by denying it the main reward it seeks: increased world attention to Kashmir. In official U.S. comments that call for a "peaceful settlement of unresolved problems, including Kashmir," Pakistan is rewarded for its misdeeds while India is treated as an equal aggressor. Pakistani terrorism has injured India. The US shows either a profound historical misunderstanding of the problems or a desire to appease Pakistan at the expense of facts, law, and history by recognising Kashmir as a disputed region. Even worse, it encourages Pakistan to keep using terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India. Washington should refrain from even mentioning Kashmir in its many remarks with and about Pakistan the historical reality. For the sheer cause that such rhetoric may be seen as validating the claim of Pakistan that it is looking for peace from India, it should refrain from saying anything that encourages India to engage with Pakistan on the matter. While it would be better if the United States used forceful language to place the blame for the crisis squarely on Pakistan, a compromise may be as simple as deleting it entirely. This



strategy serves U.S. objectives by deterring Pakistani terrorism by denying Pakistan of this much-wanted remuneration. Pakistan is also particularly sensitive to these types of signals.

In general, the United States National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, the different intelligence services, and other interested parties should think about changing the country's official stance on the Kashmir conflict. It could be a period for the American administration to declare its assistance for the Line of Control becoming a global border. Such a posture would enable Pakistan to keep the land it now governs while requiring India to give up all claims to Kashmir, which is governed by Pakistan. With the expense of administration and the extent of possible threats only expected to increase in the future, policymakers in both capitals are left with the disagreeable chore of dealing with this problem. This is because Washington lacks the political will to accept a bigger threat and consider an alternative strategy that penalises Islamabad for its actions.

The United States administration must renounce its stale policy tactics to Pakistan given the lasting character of the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army. The risks are just too great to continue with the current course of action while hoping for different results. It's time to take a fresh stance on Pakistan.

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