

EVALUATING POPULAR LEADERS' RESILIENCE AND CHALLENGES": COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 1989 AND 2022 VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN PAKISTAN:

¹DR. SUMAIRA GUL, ²HINA BAHADAR, ³DR SHAISTA TAJ,

¹lecturer, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar.

²Lecturer, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar.

³Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar.

Abstract:

No confidence motions are parliamentary processes that give the legislature a way to criticize the administration and force a change of leadership or fresh elections. They are frequently regarded as signs of political unrest and weakened democratic institutions, particularly in emerging Democracies. They can, however, also act as representational and accountability structures, which would improve democratic culture of the state. Through a comparison of the occurrences of vote of no confidence in 1989 and 2022, this research article will try to investigate about the political scenario under which no confidence motion was started in both of the eras. Furthermore this study sheds insight on how these motions shaped Pakistan's political stability and democratic consolidation through an analysis of historical context, political dynamics, and its effects for the future governance. For researchers and policymakers interested in Pakistani politics, the findings offer useful insights into parliamentary mechanisms and their effects on democratic regimes.

Key words: *Parliamentary, Democracy, Politics, No-Confidence, Administration, Leadership.*

Research Questions:

1. What were the primary causes due to which No-Confidence motions were started in both of the scenarios under the study?
2. What were the consequences of the No Confidence motions on the democratic consolidation process in Pakistan?

Objectives of the study:

1. To examine how no-confidence motions affected the Pakistani political stability in the years 1989, and 2022.
2. To investigate the triggers for no confidence motions in each of the incidents under study.
3. To evaluate the results and effects of the motions of no confidence in terms of modifications to the structure of the government and political power.
4. To investigate how public opinion and popular backing affect the success or failure of motions of no confidence.
5. To look into how various political parties and other stakeholders reacted to each episode's motion of no confidence.

Research Methodology:

Research Design:

Comparative analysis: To examine how no-confidence motions affect Pakistan's political stability and democratic consolidation, the study utilizes a comparative research design. We'll look at and contrast the episodes from 1989 and 2022 to find patterns and other connections.

Data Collection:

Government documents, legislative debates, official papers, and speeches will be gathered to gain understanding of the political dynamics and historical context of the no confidence resolutions. Academic research papers, scholarly articles, books, news items, and significant literature on democratic consolidation and parliamentary systems will be assessed in order to create a theoretical framework and perform comparative analysis.



Data analysis:

Qualitative analysis: To uncover major themes, patterns, and trends pertaining to political stability and democratic consolidation, the collected data will be qualitatively evaluated using thematic analysis.

Comparative analysis: Taking into account variables including party affiliations, popular opinion, and outside influences, a comparative method will be used to investigate similarities, differences, and patterns among the events of the year 1989 and 2022.

Contextual Analysis: Analyzing each episode's historical, political, and socioeconomic background can help us better grasp its particular dynamics and how they affect the consolidation of democracy and political stability.

Introduction:

A motion of no confidence is by the opposition or any other individual or group to remove a ruling body from office because the leader has not carried out his duties or made bad judgments that will negatively affect other members. The parliamentary motion demonstrates whether the head of state still has faith in them or not. In some jurisdictions, A minister must resign if their ministry, or the prime minister, receives a no-confidence vote. If the motion to place the prime minister under no confidence is accepted it will also be proposed for all other ministers. There are several ways in which this process may vary amongst parliaments. No confidence motions typically have a lower probability of success on their own, but they can be used by the opposition as a trick to exert stress on the government. It might be advantageous for the government if the issue is not more serious or justifies a vote of no confidence. A motion of confidence can be introduced by the administration to stop members of its own party from rebelling. No confidence motions are considered powerful political mechanisms within parliamentary systems that provide the legislative body with the ability to remove a government deemed ineffective or unsatisfactory. These motions have the potential to significantly impact political stability and shape the process of democratic consolidation within a country. Understanding the influence of no confidence motions on political stability and democratic consolidation is crucial for analyzing the functioning of democratic systems. In this research paper, we aim to examine the influence of no confidence motions on political stability and democratic consolidation in Pakistan through a comparative analysis of the episodes that occurred in 1989, and 2022 (Hazan, 2018).

To understand the democratic consolidation after no confidence motion we first have to understand the constitutional status of this motion. According to the 1973 constitution of Pakistan Article 91(4) states that "The Prime Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the National Assembly." The same constitution is giving a proper procedure for the removal of the elected prime minister and according to Article 95(1), the Prime Minister may be the target of a motion for a vote of no-confidence that is proposed by at least 20% of the National Assembly's membership. After that, in accordance with Article 95(2) of the Constitution, the resolution must be put to a vote "after three days" and "no later than seven days" following the day it was introduced in the National Assembly. And during this time, in accordance with Article 95(4) of the Constitution, "The Prime Minister shall cease to hold office" if such a motion "is passed by majority of the total membership of the National Assembly." The one exception to this rule is stipulated in Article 95(3) of the Constitution, which specifies that no-confidence motions "shall not be moved in the National Assembly while the National Assembly is considering demands for grants submitted to it in the Annual Budget Statement." (Rasool, 2022)

History of No Confidence Motion in Pakistan: All Electoral College members may be subject to a vote of no confidence under the Pakistani Constitution. The Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate are all affected by these resolutions, as are the provincial and federal Speakers and Deputy Speakers. In all cases—aside from those involving the speaker and deputy speakers—A vote of no confidence needs the support of at least 20% of the elected members. A motion is only deemed successful when it wins a majority of votes when it is presented on the assembly platform (International, 2010).

The process for bringing a motion against the prime minister is outlined in article 95 of the Constitution of 1973. According to the article, a resolution must be introduced with the support of at least 20% of the MNAs. The lower house of the parliament must not vote for less than three days or for more than seven days following the motion's presentation. If the resolution is approved by a majority of the House, the Prime Minister will step down after the vote (Pakistan, 1973 Constitution).

No Confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto 1989:

Benazir Bhutto worked to form an allied administration in the Center following the 1988 election. at the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan's request. The PPP achieved its objective to form a coalition government with coalition partners at the national level and in three provinces, with the exception of Punjab, after obtaining 94 seats out of 217 in the National Assembly. *Islami Jamhuri Ittihad* (IJI), a coalition of diverse parties headed by the Pakistan Muslim League, was successful in forming government in Punjab (Mahmood, 2003). Due to the fact that Punjab had already been taken over by the IJI, Benazir Bhutto's new government was incredibly divided. Regional politicians from Sindh and Baluchistan who pushed for provincial autonomy viewed Benazir Bhutto as fragile. She was forced to compromise on a number of her principles and political objectives as a result of these situations, which led to her being elected prime minister with an uneven mandate in Parliament. (Sirohey, 2000). The establishment of a "troika" was also made possible after the Zia's tragic death, and the pact reaffirmed the authority of the military and other political controllers (Aziz, 2009)

Being a Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had a lot of issues as after a decade of military rule, she was the first woman to serve as the head of a Muslim nation's civilian administration. The unstable majority of the prime minister and her reliance on the army as a stabilizing force have diverted focus and energy away from urgent national and regional challenges. The economy has been allowed to drift, and the poor and middle class are both suffering as a result of the economic instability. The prime minister's state visit to the United States to address the joint session of congress was not well received by the opposition to the government. Ethnic minorities in Pakistan have persisted in campaigning for changes that would better reflect their concerns and secure their future. ANP was dominated by Pakhtoons, the Baluchistan National Alliance was in control of Baloch people and the Muslim League had control of Punjab. After a two and a half hour debate, a motion of no confidence was placed to a vote on November 1st, 1989. With 107 of the required 119 votes, the opposition falls twelve votes shy of its aim (Ziring, 1990).

Benazir charged the president, the commander in chief of the army, and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with plotting to topple the government prior to the vote of no confidence. At the time, this was referred to as a political statement, but 24 years later, intelligence personnel acknowledged before higher courts that they had engaged in political maneuvering. Former IB director general Masood Khan Khattak asserted that non-political forces were behind the vote in a case involving the theft of Intelligence Bureau secret money during 1989 that was considered by a three-member Supreme Court panel in February 2013. He identified the guys who wished to overthrow the Benazir government as quickly as possible as President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and army head Gen Mirza Aslam Baig (Aziz, 2016).

Political conflict with previous Zia loyalists as well as allegations of corruption and inefficiency have impeded Benazir government. Although the Harvard-educated Bhutto, the first woman to rule a country with a majority of Muslims, is well-liked in the US and Western Europe, she has had trouble gaining widespread support in Pakistan because she is associated with her father's contentious rule and the local interests of Sind, the southern province where her family has owned sizable amounts of land. In Punjab Province, the most populated and richest part of the country and one that is run by the opposition, Bhutto's government has clashed with business people and political figures. She has also engaged in conflict with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who operates under a constitution with broad powers and constitutional Authority (Coll, 1989).

On January 28, 1989, by-elections were held for seven provincial assemblies and fourteen national assembly seats. A person may run for more than one seat in the legislature under Pakistan's electoral system, but if they are successful, they must retire from all but one of them. This is the reason why there had to be by-elections. Candidates who won the general elections in November from more than



one constituency had to choose one and quit from the others in order to contest again in the by-elections. The PPP was extremely unsatisfied with the election results. Each of the fourteen seats in the national legislature was won by the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), based in Sindh, and the Awami National Party (ANP), located in the NWFP. The PPP received five seats, the IJI seven, and one seat separately. In total, the PPP gained three seats above what it had lost. It was disappointing that it was unable to make any new gains in the Punjab, a stronghold of its enemies, the IJI, and its leader, Nawaz. Pakistan's center-right ruling party, which enjoys a strong position of power, is frequently anticipated to do well and win support in by-elections by making a range of promises of favors. Therefore, the fact that the PPP, which was the ruling party, gained fewer than the IJI, was seen as a serious defeat (Sekine, 2014).

The central government made decisions at the beginning of 1989 that hurt its reputation. The center has a tradition of designating its own personnel to important positions in the provincial administrations. But the provincial government is consulted before doing anything. The Bhutto administration named one person as the Punjab's chief secretary and another as the inspector general of police without first informing Nawaz Sharif. These appointments were rejected by Nawaz Sharif, who then sent them back to Islamabad. Additionally, he threatened to fire a sizable number of additional federal employees holding posts in the Punjabi government and replace them with Punjabi civil servants. Nawaz Sharif won after a protracted argument during which the central administration retreated. People viewed the Bhutto administration as being both ineffective and weak (Sekine, 2014).

In south Asia, it was typical for a strong prime minister to consolidate executive power and exploit his or her position as a form of patronage. Many observers felt that the alternative civilian government that replaced Zia Ul Haq was corrupt and shattered the ideals of democracy. After more than a decade of military administration, Benazir Bhutto, a civilian prime minister, was well aware that she needed to maintain military backing. It was widely believed that Benazir's administration benefited from the significant military support. The argument used to support the accusation of corruption was that Benazir allegedly filled Sui Gas, a significant government firm, with thousands of her preferred personnel, regardless of merit (Malik, 2010).

The division of public tolls used for people's labor programs, the distribution of the Zakat Fund, the provincial authority's creation of an independent bank, and the power generating authority are the topics that have caused tension between the federal government and the provinces of Punjab and Baluchistan. Constituent organizations including the Economic Coordination Committee, Council of Common Interest, and a brand-new entity called the Provincial Coordination Committee (PCC) were all established to resolve these difficulties. PCC was born out of a desire to establish a venue that would offer chances for settling disputes and containing the tension they frequently cause. The political government's efforts were depleted by the split between the center and the provinces, particularly Punjab. The federal government ceased providing railway wagons to *Ittefaq Foundary*, controlled by the Sharif family, in response to objections from the Punjab government regarding the program's modalities. This cost the government exchequer 31 million rupees in lost taxes. (Akhtar, n.d)

November 1, 1989 marked the beginning of the house's hearing. First, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoy, the leader of the opposition, was given permission to speak about the motion of no confidence. The opposition leader raised numerous objections, claims, and questions. He questioned whether the current administration had been successful in implementing wise policy changes over the course of the previous year, whether they had been able to frame those changes with a long-term perspective, and if their successes were only gestures of praise or whether they showed a deficit. (Iqbal, 2023) Chaudhary Abdul Ghafoor presented the motion to the National Assembly on October 26, 1989. Before the motion was introduced, Speaker National Assembly addressed the forum, perceiving that the nation had already suffered under Martial Law, which had been in effect for around eleven years. He said that the country had fought hard for this House and that if it was successful, democracy would flourish. For the sake of its continuity and significance, the House had to establish precedents (Assembly, 1989).



He made the motion in accordance with Article 95(1) and National Assembly Rule 22. To challenge the Bhutto administration, the opposition required 119 votes. After a protracted discussion, the proposal was put to a vote. The opposition received just 107 of the necessary 119 votes, falling twelve votes shy of its aim. At least 30 potential supporters of the motion decided not to attend, some of whom claimed to have been bought off. The motion was defeated by a 12-vote majority. As the debate began, it was evident that the opposition had failed to persuade significant parliamentary blocs that had been leaning toward a change of government, including 10 members of Ms. Bhutto's People's Party from her own province of Sindh. (Times N. Y, 2022)

Vote of no Confidence against Imran Khan: For a nation like Pakistan, Imran Khan's travel to the chambers of parliament is exceptional. The majority of Pakistan's political leaders have emerged from the military, a small group of commercial tycoons, or Pakistan's landed elites (the *jagirdars*), who were once tyrants turned "democrats." In 1997, Khan and the PTI ran for office in their first general elections. The well-known former cricket star-turned-philanthropist founded the PTI, a minor party, in 1996. Despite being a national hero due to his sporting prowess and the establishment of a significant cancer hospital, Khan was only able to win one seat in the 2002 election. It wasn't until 2011 that he planned the nation's first significant rally, which gathered a record-breakingly sizable throng fired up by his anti-corruption agenda. With assistance from the military, particularly its Inter-Services Intelligence agency, this display of power was made feasible (Bokhari, 2022).

Pakistan held general elections on July 25, 2018, and PTI garnered the majority of seats in the center. The party maintained its dominance in KP, the PPP kept control of Sindh, and the newly founded Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) rose to prominence in Balochistan. In Punjab, the PML-N won the most seats; nevertheless, the PTI formed its government after a number of independent MPs switched to the group. Even though they took an oath, the PML-N claimed that the elections were fixed. No party had enough MNAs to form a government, but PTI emerged as a prominent player, therefore Imran Khan started negotiating with independents and minor parties to form a coalition. The Government now includes nine independent members as well as MQM Pakistan, PML-Q, BAP, GDA, AML, and JWP. On the other hand, the "Grand Opposition Alliance"—which included the PML-N, PPP, MMA, and ANP—planned to sit on the opposition benches. However, Shahbaz Sharif's words in support of the late President Asif Ali Zardari led the PPP to withdraw its support for him as prime minister. The opposition declared that they will introduce a motion of no confidence on March 3, 2022, and they gave its coalition the name Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). The resolution was signed by more than 80 MNAs from the PPP, PML-N, JUI, ANP, Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNPM), and other parties as the opposition's attempts to topple the PTI-led government grew more fervent. The leader of the opposition, Shahbaz Sharif, claimed that the speaker of the House had lost the support of the chamber, that there was political unrest and uncertainty across the nation, and that foreign policy had completely failed.

After the PDM convinced the PPP to call early elections if they were successful in overthrowing the PTI government, the deadlock between the opposition parties over the no-trust motion ended. The PTI-led administration completed its five-year constitutional term as the PPP had insisted, and the MQM and PML-Q did not consent to earlier elections. However, a PML-N leader named Ahsan Iqbal stated on March 5, 2022, that a deal won't come along for PTI allies that they could refuse (Tahir, 2022).

In an effort to have Khan removed from power, opposition party representatives presented a resolution against him in the National Assembly on March 8, 2022. They said that Khan's purported hybrid regime had inadequate leadership, politically victimized its opponents, mismanaged the economy, and mishandled foreign policy. These elements are said to have also played a role in Khan's disagreement with the Pakistani military establishment, which had remained his government's most important ally. (Kermani, 2022).

Khan claimed to have a diplomatic cable from the US government that was dated March 7th and contained a "threat" from the US government that stated their desire to have Khan removed from office and threatened Pakistan with being "forgiven" if the motion against him was successful. (Syed, 2022). Khan's foreign policies and visit to Russia reportedly enraged the US (Al Jazeera 2022). Khan



asserted that he had written proof that the US was instigating a "foreign conspiracy" to depose him and install a new administration. The US government denied these allegations (Geo tv, 2022).

On April 3, 2022, the deputy speaker, Qasim Khan Suri, unilaterally dismissed the motion of no confidence on the grounds of "foreign interference" without putting it to a vote in the National Assembly. The opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said that his party would appeal the decision to Pakistan's Supreme Court: "Our attorneys are on their way to Supreme Court, We demand that all institutions respect, defend, and uphold the Pakistani constitution," he added (Haider,2022)..

When the resolution was defeated, Khan urged President Arif Alvi to dismiss the National Assembly and convene fresh general elections, using his position as prime minister to accomplish this. The Supreme Court took Suo Moto notice of the resulting constitutional catastrophes. (Bhatti, 2022). The deputy speaker of the National Assembly, had taken an "unconstitutional" decision that the opposition leaders had demanded be reviewed. The Supreme Court ruled on a 5-to-1 basis that the National Assembly's subsequent dissolution and the deputy speaker's decision to reject the motion were illegal, enabling the no-confidence vote to proceed. Khan lost the office as a consequence of the no-confidence motion being approved by the National Assembly on April 10 with a majority of 174 votes out of 342 (The News, 2022 April 03) (France24,2022 April 03).

Analysis: Impacts of No Confidence Motion on democratic consolidation of Pakistan.

From the above mentioned data we will analyze the democratic consolidation of Pakistan after No-Confidence Motion of 1989 and 2022.

Benazir Bhutto No-Confidence Analysis: The structure of the government and the dynamics of political power in Pakistan were significantly impacted by the motions of no confidence against Benazir Bhutto in 1989. The opposition parties, particularly the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a coalition of conservative parties, who disapproved of Bhutto's administration and its policies, proposed several resolutions of no confidence. She and the legitimacy of her government were directly attacked by the no-confidence motions.

Government instability: In Pakistan, the no-confidence motions significantly increased political turbulence and uncertainty. Focusing on governance and the implementation of policies became challenging as the government considered losing the vote of confidence. Benazir Bhutto's authority was undermined and her capacity to run the country efficiently was hampered by the persistent prospect of being forced out of office.

Erosion of Political Power: A loss of faith in Benazir Bhutto's leadership was evident in the motions of no confidence, not just among opposition parties but also within her own coalition. There were rifts within the ruling coalition as a result of certain members of her party and coalition partners starting to distance themselves from her government. This decline in political influence made it more difficult for Bhutto to enact important laws and reforms.

Impact on Policy Implementation: Political deadlock resulting from the motions of no confidence made it challenging for the government to successfully carry out its plans. Policy efforts were placed on hold as the government concentrated on maintaining its political position, which caused a halt in governance and development programs. This had an effect on the nation's overall economic and social development.

People Perception and Legitimacy: The no-confidence motions caused the people to question the legitimacy of Bhutto's government. Some believed that her government was incapable of preserving a stable political climate and was weak and incompetent. Public confidence in the administration was eroded by the appearance of a government in crisis, which made it more difficult for the administration to rule.

Opposition got strength: No-confidence motions brought the opposition parties together in opposition to the administration and strengthened their unity. The opposition's coordinated efforts to overthrow Bhutto's rule demonstrated its commitment to change the political environment. As a result, the opposition was in a stronger position and had more influence over choices and policies.

Future Governance Implications: The motions of no confidence in 1989 had a long-lasting impact on Pakistan's political climate. Even though Bhutto survived the no-confidence vote, her administration

deteriorated. Eventually, in 1990, pressure from the opposition forced new elections, which culminated in the overthrow of Bhutto's government and the establishment of a new one headed by the IJI.

No-Confidence for the year 2022 analysis:

Political Instability: No confidence motion against Imran Khan not only created a political unrest throughout the country but the law and order situation also deteriorated. People staged mass demonstration. On March 18, a ferocious mob that included two PTI members invaded the state palace of the Sindh government in Islamabad, where about twenty rebel lawmakers had sought refuge. Police in Sindh stopped the mob from attacking the dissidents.

Internal division: political unrest not only disturbed the intra party system but impacted interparty coalition among its own member. The motion of no confidence brought disclosure of party internal conflicts. Some prominent Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaf members quit party membership on the basis of certain confrontation with the party leadership.

Impacts on Policy Directions: A motion of no confidence had cast doubt on the party's positions and judgments. There were disagreements among PTI groups over the course that the party should take, resulting in discussions and debates about the party's future agenda.

Impact on Institutions: The motion of no confidence had a larger effects on how the party is governed and its policies are implemented. It is obvious now that the party should take closer look at its internal procedure which make it vulnerable to the no confidence motion.

Impacts on Economy: Pakistan's ability to sustain its economy in the post-Imran world is faced with enormous difficulties. Shehbaz Sharif's PML-N-led administration is up against a significant hurdle as a result of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) demand for an increase in energy costs. The government of the allies took political ramifications of the decision about the increase in fuel prices into consideration. The PML-N, the main political party in the new administration, doesn't want to enter the polls carrying the weight of unpopular decisions over energy costs.

Foreign Policy Implications: Overall, the situation indicates that Pakistan's foreign policy, not simply its democracy, has entered a period of turmoil and that its proximity to one of the new global groups—the United States and the West, or China and Russia—will increase.

REFERENCES:

- [1] Akhter, M. J. (n.d). *Politics of Reconciliation and Accommodation: A Study of Benazir Bhutto's First Era of Democratic Government 1988-1990* <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/Currentissue>.
- [2] Assembly, N. (1989, October 26). *National Assembly Debates*. 1830. Islamabad: National Assembly Secretariat.
- [3] Al Jazeera. (2022, April 9). *Pakistan PM Imran Khan gone after losing no-confidence vote*. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/9/pakistan-prime-minister-imran-khan-no-confidence-vote>.
- [4] Aziz, S. (2009). *Between dreams and realities: Some milestones in Pakistan's history*. Karachi: Oxford University Press
- [5] Aziz, S. (2016, December 18). *A Leaf From History: Benazir's Angels*. Daily Dawn. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1302495>
- [6] Bokhari Kamran. (2022, april 4). *The Never-Ending Regime Changes in Pakistan*. newlines institute for strategy and policy.
- [7] Bhatti, H. (2022, April 3). *All orders and actions initiated by PM, president subject to court order: SC*. Daily Dawn. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.dawn.com/news/1683235>.
- [8] Business Standard. (2022, March 31). *Threat letter from US, says Pak PM Imran Khan says in slip of tongue*. Retrieved from [URL] https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/threat-letter-from-us-says-pak-pm-imran-khan-says-in-slip-of-tongue-122033101557_1.html
- [9] Coll, S. (1989, October 25). *Bhutto, opponents organize for no-confidence motion*. The Washington post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/10/25/bhutto-opponents-organize-for-no-confidence-motion/b4f2a746-8e8f-4d71-af03-0fa1a5d37617/>
- [10] France 24. (2022, April 3). *Pakistan's PM Khan Calls for fresh elections after no-confidence vote blocked*. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220403-beleagured-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-faces-no-confidence-vote>.

- 
- [11] Geo tv. (2022, March 08). No-trust move submitted for Pakistan's betterment: Shahbaz. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.geo.tv/latest/403796-zardari-shahbaz-and-fazl-to-address-press-conference-after-submitting-no-confidence-motion>
- [12] Geo tv. (2022, April 04). PM Imran Khan discloses name of US official who sent 'threat letter'. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.geo.tv/latest/409421-pm-imran-khan-discloses-the-name-of-us-official-who-sent-threat-letter>.
- [13] Hazan, R. Y. (2018). *Government-Opposition Dynamics and the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence*. Paper presented at the 22-25 August 2018 General Conference, Hamburg.
- [14] Haider, K., Qayum, K., & Mangi, F. (2022, April 3). Khan Throws Pakistan Into Chaos With Disputed Call for Election. Bloomberg. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-03/pakistan-scraps-khan-confidence-vote-citing-foreign-interference#xj4y7vzkq>.
- [15] International, T. N. (2010, December 19). Three speakers removed by opposition in past
- [16] Iqbal, H., Shahzad, M. N., Ali, U., Aslam, S., & Asif, M. (2023). No Confidence Politics In Pakistan: A Historical Analysis. *Journal of Positive School Psychology*, 7(1), 869-881. Retrieved from <http://journalppw.com>
- [17] Kermani, S. (2022, April 9). Imran Khan: What led to charismatic Pakistan PM's downfall. BBC News. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61047736>.
- [18] Malik, A. (2010). *Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology (Illustrated, Reprint)*. Routledge.
- [19] Malik, A., & Satti, W. (2022, April 10). Opposition prepares draft for no trust motion against PTI govt, The News International, Retrieved from: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/938274-opposition-prepares-draftfor-no-trust-motion-against-govt-sources>.
- [20] Mehmood, S. (2003). *Pakistan: Political roots and developments*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- [21] Pakistan, G. o. (1973). *Constitution of Pakistan*. Article 95(1). Islamabad: National Assembly Secretariat
- [22] Rasool, S. (2022, March 13). No confidence motion. *The Nation*. <https://nation.com.pk/13-Mar-2022/no-confidence-motion>.
- [23] Sekine, K. (2014). *Benazir Bhutto: Her political struggle in Pakistan (Master's thesis)*. University of Massachusetts Amherst. Retrieved from <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cqi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3593&context=theses>
- [24] Syed, B. S. (2022, April 8). 'Cablegate' lands Foreign Service in knotty predicament. *Daily Dawn*. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.dawn.com/news/1683975>.
- [25] Sirohey, I. A. (2000). *Truth never retires*. Lahore: Jang Publishers.
- [26] Shahzad, A. (2022, March 8). Pakistani opposition moves no-confidence motion to seek PM Khan's ouster. Reuters. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistani-opposition-rallies-press-pm-khan-resign-2022-03-08/>.
- [27] Times, N. Y. (2022, April 6). Bhutto Survives as No-Confidence Vote Falls Short. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/02/world/bhutto-survives-as-noconfidence-vote-falls-short.htm>
- [28] The News. (2022, April 03). CJP Bandial takes notice of today's NA proceedings. Retrieved from [URL] <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/947099-dissolution-of-assembly-sc-takes-suo-motu-notice-of-political-crisis-in-country>.
- [29] Tahir, Z. (2022, April 10). PTI allies will get 'an offer they can't refuse. Retrieved from Dawn News: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1678513>.
- [30] Ziring, L. (1990). Pakistan in 1989: The Politics of Stalemate. *Asian Survey*, 30(2), 126-135.