

## EXAMINING THE PARADIGM OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

**DR. AYAZ KHAN**

Chief Coordination Officer, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism,  
Pakistan

Email: drayazkhan53@gmail.com

**DR. MUHAMMAD QASIM**

Director General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism, Pakistan

Email: qasimkhandaudzai@gmail.com

**MR. SAHAR ALI KHAN**

Principal Research Officer Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism,  
Pakistan

Email: saharali@kpcve.gov.pk

**MR. MUHAMMAD UZAIR**

Principal Research Officer Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism,  
Pakistan

Email: uzair@kpcve.gov.pk

**Abstract**—*Terrorism in Pakistan exacerbates the appeal of violent extremism within society and the government. This undermines the established practise of accepting and respecting different religious and cultural beliefs in our nation. A tragic incident occurred on December 16, resulting in the loss of numerous lives at a school in Peshawar. This highlights the existential peril posed by extremism in Pakistan. Efforts to counter extremism in Pakistan require a more cohesive and coordinated plan, despite existing deradicalization initiatives in certain regions. The CVE policy should encompass de-radicalization efforts for individuals and counter-radicalization efforts in wider social and political contexts. Effective implementation of countering violent extremism (CVE) policies requires a comprehensive comprehension of the extremist menace within the framework of Pakistan's diverse religious and ethnic landscape for optimal outcomes. Various factors need consideration when discussing violent extremism in Pakistan. Pakistan's approach to addressing the extensive and intricate problem necessitates active engagement with the global community. Efforts are required from both the government and society to address the issue of individuals joining extremist groups. The effectiveness of existing deradicalization efforts in Pakistan would be diminished without a comprehensive national strategy to address violent extremism.*

**Keywords:** *Terrorism, radicalization; violent extremism;*

### A STEP TOWARDS

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has experienced numerous terrorist attacks that have resulted in the direct loss of over 80,000 lives. Due to these attacks, Pakistan has suffered significant losses in both economic output and religious prestige, estimated at \$102.5 billion. <sup>1</sup> Terrorism has had significant negative impacts on both the Pakistani government and society. However, it is important to note that the most significant threat among these impacts is violent extremism. While radicalization primarily affects the general population, it is important to note that a significant portion of Pakistani society supports the objectives of extremist groups, which often have religious motivations. Pakistan is known for its strong religious beliefs, which can make its population more susceptible to accepting extremist ideas when they are presented in a religious context. Given that Pakistan is a highly religious country, it is logical for the situation to be as described. It is crucial to emphasise that individuals who endorse these types of causes do not necessarily endorse violence. In Pakistan, the presence of numerous Islamist groups has created an

environment where violent extremists are able to express their opinions more prominently, while moderate voices have been suppressed. There is a concerning pattern observed in the recent killings of moderate Islamic scholars such as Maulana Hassan Jan and Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi. Additionally, the murder of former Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer and the assassination attempt on education activist Malala Yousafzai highlight this disturbing trend. The lack of understanding and acceptance of domestic terrorism as a genuine and immediate threat has exacerbated the problem. The situation has worsened because of this. The slow intellectual progress observed in both madrasas and the public school system has contributed to the proliferation of this way of thinking.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the significance of CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) as a crucial component of Pakistan's comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. It emphasises that Pakistan must adopt CVE measures to effectively combat the menace of violent extremism within its borders. Investing a significant amount of money in strict counterterrorism measures without implementing a complementary approach focused on addressing the root causes and underlying factors of terrorism is not only ineffective but also a misuse of resources. For Pakistan to effectively implement a counterterrorism policy that is both enduring and sustainable, it is crucial to strike a harmonious equilibrium between employing robust and gentle counterterrorism strategies. Soft-CT strategies are not widely utilised in Pakistan, despite their increasing usage. These types of plans lack coherence and fail to consider long-term implications. Furthermore, the paper highlights significant obstacles that are hindering Pakistan's soft-CT initiatives. It also proposes several policy modifications to overcome these challenges.

#### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In his seminal work, Horgan (2014) expounds upon the notion that de-radicalization programmes, when implemented effectively, function as a transitional space for individuals who have previously embraced extremist ideologies. This study examines the role of prison rehabilitation programmes in facilitating the successful reintegration of prisoners into society. The challenges faced by individuals upon their release from incarceration are well-documented in the literature. In response, various interventions have been implemented to support prisoners in preparing for the complexities of everyday life post-release. This review aims to critically analyse the effectiveness of these programmes in addressing the multifaceted needs of prisoners and enhancing their prospects for successful reintegration. Like the rehabilitation programmes for regular criminals, incarcerated individuals are provided with guidance on post-release monitoring and are made aware of the potential for continued involvement in criminal activities. One of the primary objectives of these programmes frequently involves increasing individual awareness of these risks as a means of providing sustained protection against future involvement.

In his study, Zaidi (2011) delved into the significance of providing financial assistance to the Pakistani state, emphasizing the particular importance of this endeavours. Zaidi highlighted the inadequate investment by the Pakistani government in the social sectors, despite the availability of soft loans and aid packages in previous instances. Based on the findings of the study, it can be inferred that while the Taliban may not be the universally favored alternative to the Pakistani state, they do possess a degree of ideological backing among the impoverished population, and to a lesser extent, among the wealthier individuals residing in the regions of NWFP and Baluchistan.

In his seminal work, Smith (2016) examines the institutional approaches adopted by European countries in their efforts to address the pressing issue of violent extremism. By delving into this complex and multifaceted phenomenon, the author sheds light on the various strategies employed by European nations to counteract the rise of extremism within their borders. Smith's research contributes to the existing body of literature on this topic, offering valuable insights into the diverse approaches taken by different countries in tackling this pervasive societal challenge. In this scholarly work, the author critically evaluates the efficacy of diverse national strategies employed in the prevention of radicalization and the countering of extremist narratives. The study emphasises noteworthy initiatives that have demonstrated success in achieving these objectives.



In their 2017 analysis, Rahman and Chen examine the role of international organisations, specifically the United Nations and the European Union, in addressing the issue of countering violent extremism. This literature review critically analyses the coordination mechanisms employed by various institutions and member states in addressing the global challenge posed by extremist ideologies. The primary objective is to evaluate the collective effectiveness of these efforts in mitigating the threat. This scholarly article critically examines the existing literature on collaboration, specifically focusing on the identified gaps in international efforts. The authors highlight the importance of addressing these gaps and propose potential strategies to enhance collaboration on a global scale. By synthesising and analysing previous research, the paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on strengthening international cooperation.

In his seminal work, Martin (2019) delves into the institutional perspective on tackling the underlying factors contributing to the emergence of violent extremism. By adopting a comprehensive approach, the author sheds light on the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon and emphasises the importance of understanding the institutional dynamics at play. Through a meticulous analysis of existing literature, Martin (2019) presents a compelling argument for the significance of addressing the root causes of violent extremism from an institutional standpoint. This study undertakes an analysis of the evolution of institutional frameworks in response to the multifaceted factors of socio-economic, political, and cultural nature that contribute to the phenomenon of radicalization. This paper presents a persuasive argument advocating for the adoption of a more comprehensive approach that complements the prevailing security-focused measures. The author highlights the limitations of solely relying on traditional security measures and emphasises the need to incorporate a broader perspective in order to effectively address contemporary challenges. By synthesising existing literature, the paper underscores the importance of considering various dimensions, such as social, economic, and environmental factors, in order to develop a more robust and resilient security framework. The author's argument is supported by a thorough analysis of relevant scholarly works, which collectively demonstrate the potential benefits and enhanced efficacy of adopting a holistic

In a study conducted by Ahmed (2018), the author delved into the topic of de-radicalization programmes implemented in various countries. The primary objective of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of these programmes in rehabilitating individuals who have been engaged in extremist activities. In his comprehensive analysis, Ahmed undertakes a critical examination of the fundamental elements that contribute to the efficacy of rehabilitation and disengagement initiatives. By delving into the intricacies of these programmes, Ahmed offers valuable insights that shed light on the most effective practices for designing future de-radicalization endeavours.

#### **Let's address the issue based on its national impact**

To begin a significant CVE project, it is essential to establish a solid theoretical framework. The reason for using this information is to form the foundation for decision-making regarding strategy and tactics. If all goes according to plan, this will mark the beginning of Pakistan's carefully designed and all-encompassing CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) programme. The CVE projects, in theory, are considered as a component of a nation's policy regarding information and communication technology. The success of a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) effort is influenced by various factors that are specific to that particular effort. If the individuals responsible for managing a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) project lack knowledge about effective strategies and their effectiveness, the project is likely to be unsuccessful. Understanding violent extremism in Pakistan is a complex task due to the presence of various factors at play. The West's tendency to adopt a "one-size-fits-all" approach makes it challenging to comprehend this phenomenon comprehensively. In this situation, there are numerous problems that need to be addressed and resolved. Most of the research conducted in the Western world regarding extremism in Pakistan tends to concentrate on the increasing prevalence of religious fundamentalism within the country. In public polls, there are individuals who express that their Islamic identity holds greater significance to them compared to their national identity. The increasing acceptance of the hijab among women and the common presence of beards among men



are sometimes viewed as indicators of possible extremism. Similarly, the increasing trend of men growing beards is often perceived as a potential indicator of extremism. However, it remains uncertain whether the increasing religiosity in Pakistan is an indication of how radical and extreme individuals will become in the future. There has been an increase in the number of people attending church in the country in recent years. Due to these reasons, the outcomes of such studies lack reliability and may potentially misguide individuals. The conclusion is flawed as it fails to consider the complexity of the situation. The existing definitions of extremism in the Western context are insufficient to fully comprehend the situation in Pakistan. The issue of violent extremism in Pakistan is multifaceted and encompasses various complexities. The current situation can be attributed to various factors such as sectarianism, efforts to implement Shariah law (Islamization), the influence of the Taliban, and the emergence of Jihadist groups. The nationalist-separatist insurgency in Balochistan and the ethnic-political violence in Karachi and other parts of Sindh are both instances of extremism. Both events occurred in Pakistan.

When extremism grows and becomes more radicalised, there are various factors in the environment that serve as both attractions and motivations. The working definition of extremism used in this article was provided by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a research group based in Pakistan. According to popular books on the subject, extremism can be defined as a strong rejection of the current methods of political participation. Extremists aim to establish new ideologies and narratives to bring about significant changes in various aspects of life, such as social, political, economic, or ethnic domains. They achieve this by challenging the legitimacy of existing institutional systems. To put it simply, extremism refers to the act of developing new ideologies and narratives with the aim of bringing about significant changes in various aspects of life. It is crucial to keep in mind that while the objectives of each CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program are similar, the methods employed to achieve these goals may differ across programs due to varying circumstances and countries. Pakistan is a diverse country with a variety of ethnic groups, each of which has its unique interpretation and understanding of Islam. While there may be similarities among certain cultures, it is crucial to acknowledge that each community possesses its distinct customs and practices. The Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda are two prominent groups that significantly contribute to the process of radicalization in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), particularly in terms of their ideological influence. However, the rise of radicalism in Baluchistan can be attributed to a combination of economic dissatisfaction and political exclusion. In the urban regions of Punjab and Sindh, there is a growing trend of radicalization among certain individuals who are driven by their desire to achieve sectarian objectives. The process of radicalization varies across different societies, with overlapping and distinct factors influencing individuals along three key axes: education, income, and ideology. Communities that are marginalized or excluded are more susceptible to the influence of radical sectarian ideas. The presence of the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and India's occupation of Kashmir have contributed to an increased likelihood of political radicalization among the middle classes residing in cities and semi-urban areas. Both occupations are taking place in countries where their respective governments have control. Individuals belonging to this group are influenced by militant organisations that primarily concentrate on either the Kashmir or Afghanistan regions. These influences shape their beliefs and actions. The likelihood of supporting a caliphate or a return to Islamic law and practise is higher among individuals belonging to the upper middle class and the elite compared to the general population. On the contrary, the lower middle class is less inclined to support either option. Religious fundamentalist groups such as al-Huda and Hizb-ut-Tharir aim to influence the beliefs and opinions of a particular group through a systematic approach. It is crucial to keep in mind that the behavioural differences between men and women are constantly evolving. In the future, the implementation strategies in different parts of Pakistan will vary based on the specific characteristics of the local population and their economic conditions. It is possible that the fundamental structure of the CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program will remain unchanged in Pakistan. However, it is important to consider the specific needs of the country when implementing the program.



### **Does Pakistan need a violent extremism solution?**

The experiences of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught valuable lessons about counterterrorism (CT). These lessons highlight the shortcomings of relying solely on physical force to combat terrorism, emphasizing its ineffectiveness and inefficiency. As a result of the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, valuable lessons were gained regarding counterterrorism (CT). When harsh methods are employed to counter terrorists, it increases the likelihood of them becoming more committed to their cause. In CT, utilizing power is crucial, but it should not be relied upon as the sole factor for success. Terrorists employ different tactics compared to conventional soldiers. Rather than engaging in direct combat, they often disguise themselves as innocent bystanders, utilizing them as both a shield and a weapon. In the context of CT (Counterterrorism), the objective is to gain the support and trust of the local population, commonly referred to as "winning the hearts and minds of the people." This goal is distinct from the conventional notion of winning or losing. In 2009, Pakistan recognized the significance of employing a combination of physical and non-physical methods to combat terrorism. This realization led to the development of a more adaptable and innovative strategy. Pakistan was already aware that there are no simple solutions to counter the terrorist threat, so the realization of this fact was not unexpected. The objective of the plan was to devise an efficient and effective approach to address the physical and mental challenges caused by terrorism. Pakistan has been employing a combination of hard and soft power approaches due to a lack of a well-defined strategy. The situation has reached a standstill and progress in resolving the conflict has been halted. The primary objectives of CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) are as follows: There are several important objectives in countering terrorism: a) Preventing the growth of terrorist groups. b) Eliminating sympathizers and individuals who defend these groups. c) Strengthening the community's resistance to extremist propaganda, particularly among vulnerable and at-risk populations. d) Preventing the recruitment of young individuals by terrorist organizations.

In Pakistan, there is a strong connection between extremism and terrorism, as they mutually reinforce each other. Extremism and terrorism have a symbiotic relationship, where they mutually reinforce and support each other. To prevent terrorism, it is necessary to disable or remove this link. To achieve our objective, it is crucial to combat the strategies employed by extremist groups to enhance their influence globally. Extremists often face challenges in persuading moderates to align with their ideas. To prevent further radicalization, it is crucial to engage with communities and social groups that are susceptible to radicalization. From a supply-and-demand perspective, CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) is employed to decrease the overall size of terrorist organizations. This is achieved by removing both the active members of the group and the individuals who provide local assistance to them. Militants cannot simply be eliminated or incarcerated. Instead, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive plan that does not involve causing harm to individuals. Fundamentally, this conflict arises from the contrasting perspectives and worldviews held by the parties involved. Military operations in Connecticut, much like surgical procedures, often involve causing damage initially to address and resolve issues. However, when it comes to the healing power of touch, it is true that CVE is a real phenomenon. However, this issue is just the beginning and there are likely many more problems that need to be addressed. The available information on the bigger issues and root causes of terrorism is insufficient. The Critical Vulnerability Evaluation (CVE) is a non-invasive technique that can be highly beneficial in addressing visible problems. Currently, there are an estimated 8,000 militants being held in various prisons and detention centres throughout Pakistan. A significant concern arises from the situation where numerous militants are being detained in jail without undergoing a fair trial or receiving necessary assistance. Pakistan's criminal justice system is complex and frequently unreliable, making it a daunting task to process all the accused individuals. In response to the events that occurred in Iraqi prisons, which ultimately led to the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it is necessary for Pakistan to establish rehabilitation programmes within its own prison system to address this issue. The saying "jails are the universities of the criminals" suggests that prisons can be breeding grounds for criminal behaviour. Similarly, places where militants are held





could potentially become environments where extremism flourishes in the future. It is crucial to remember that the individuals who were apprehended during the SWAT operation in 2009, identified as militants, are currently incarcerated and awaiting their trial. Many of the reasons behind violence in asymmetrical conflicts are universal, and it is common for young individuals, who form the majority of insurgent or extremist groups, to be involved for a variety of reasons. While there are various factors that contribute to violence in asymmetrical conflicts, it remains a valid statement. Individuals may experience emotional or mental pressure from their family members, which could potentially motivate them to make changes in their lives. Additionally, facing challenging circumstances on their own could also serve as a catalyst for personal transformation. Extremists adhere to a specific set of beliefs, and the reasons provided contradict those beliefs. If individuals have access to the necessary resources and support, they have the potential to transform their lives and break free from patterns of violence. Even though states put in significant efforts to combat terrorism, they will eventually seek a political resolution. The possibility is enabled by CVE. One common error people make is assuming that terrorists are solely motivated by their beliefs or ideologies. However, the situation is not as described. Individuals who endorse and have faith in acts of terrorism have the option to express their views or remain silent. In many instances, a significant majority of members, approximately 80%, prefer to observe rather than actively participate in decision-making processes, leaving only about 20% of members actively involved in such activities. Terrorist groups often have leaders and key individuals who frequently change their location to avoid detection. However, most of their members may not actively participate in significant activities. The objectives of the organization's more extreme members contrast significantly with those of its members at the middle and lower levels. It is both ironic and amusing that the demands put forth by moderate militants are more specific and tangible compared to those of extreme militants. If this audience were to be removed, terrorist groups would experience a significant decline in morale and unity, which are crucial for their survival. At some point, it may become necessary to employ force to identify and remove individuals who pose a genuine threat within a group. I believe that if militants choose to disband their groups, surrender their weapons, and commit to abiding by the laws of their respective states, they should be granted an opportunity to reintegrate into society and live peacefully.

#### **Countering the Menace progress nationally**

Pakistan has CVE initiatives in Malakand Division (District Swat) and Punjab. Countering radicalization using legal measures like the National Internal Security Policy 2014, National Action Plan 2014, and Pakistan Protection Act 2014, along with Madrassa Reforms and Counter Terrorism Operations. The deliberations are made here.

Pakistan's first deradicalization program started after the army's anti-terrorism operation in Swat ended in September 2009. During the operation, many captured militants were young individuals, including children and teenagers trained for suicide attacks. Government reevaluated counterterrorism methods upon discovering many detainees were minors. Strict rehab program needed for improvement. In Swat valley, Pakistani military converted four schools into deradicalization centres to begin the programme.

Swat province has a program for ex-convicts with Taliban ties to rebuild their lives. To prevent them from returning to terrorism, we should support their self-esteem and offer them another opportunity. 2,500 former Taliban members reintegrated into society. Mishal teaches families of deradicalized young adults aged 19-25. Sabaoon works with teens aged 12-18, while Rastoon works with young adults aged 19-25. The De-Radicalization and Emancipation Programs are public-private partnerships addressing this issue. Local civil society and non-governmental organisations under HPF run the centres and various programmes. The Pakistani military oversees and ensures the program's effectiveness. Since 2009, Rastoon helped 1,196 militants, while Sabaoon helped 200 militants.

In 2011, the CTD and the government's Technical Vocational Training authority launched a program to combat radicalization. The program was in eastern Punjab. In 2012, Punjab government paused deradicalization program due to insufficient funds. 1,300 militants couldn't participate in the rehabilitation program before it ended. In Punjab, rehabilitation efforts focused on assisting former



members of anti-Shia militant groups like LeJ and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. The operation targeted Kashmiri groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The program aimed to prioritise system prevention, repair, and maintenance. The program had three parts: self-reflection and growth, spiritual renewal, and career development. 311 people participated in the training, divided into three parts. Rehabilitation and training programmes were spread across many offices for convenience.

The Swat deradicalization program is run by a diverse group of professionals, including doctors, psychologists, religious scholars, and more. The program has four pillars: counselling, education, training, and support for spiritual growth. There will be family gatherings, sports competitions, and cultural activities. Rehabilitation typically lasts six to twelve months. Recovery can take up to three years in severe cases.

Radicals will undergo psychological treatment before other treatments in their recovery. Psychologists use cognitive tests to measure intellectual, emotional, and psychological growth. Understanding motivations is crucial to prevent radicalization. Psychologists analyse violent extremists' self-disclosures to understand their motivations, roles, connections, and long-term violent goals. Reasons vary for each person based on their background, history, and current situation. Religious devotion, financial constraints, peer pressure, tribal loyalty, and Taliban's demand for children's involvement drive Pakistanis towards terrorist and militant groups. Militant therapy reveals few are motivated by ideas. Many joins jihad for financial reasons. Psychologists categorise terrorists into four risk levels based on their perceived danger to others and factors contributing to their radicalization. A young person with limited experience and mainly responsible for routine tasks is considered low risk. A medium-risk inmate may have only assisted with logistics, such as moving food and supplies. Taliban trains suicide bombers. This group is seen as very dangerous.

In the second stage of healing for a former militant, spiritual guidance is emphasized. The program aims to change militant behaviour. Priorities religious conversations to address inmate misunderstandings about Islam. We must combat extremist ideologies that use religion to justify violence. Presentation should foster nuanced, empathetic, and tolerant worldviews. This will be time-consuming for you.

Education includes kindergarten through high school. After treatment, they can continue education and develop their own values, free from strict religious influence. The class aims to foster open-mindedness by teaching students to respect and appreciate diverse religions and cultures.

Insurgents will learn various skills including stonework, auto mechanics, welding, appliance repair, word processing, basic electrical skills, and raising chickens. The goal is to provide marketable skills for financial stability, regardless of academic performance or job prospects. The program believes that stable jobs and routines reduce the likelihood of people returning to terrorism. The program is based on this idea.

Former militants are reintegrated into society after the four demilitarization steps. Post-centre outcomes are more crucial than in-centre experiences for individuals undergoing deradicalization. Reintegration decision based on child's academics, job prospects, psychosocial evaluation, and family support. Reintegration can start sooner when the community is safe and there are no militants present. Groups are sent to the countryside to investigate. Beneficiaries must demonstrate full-time work or school attendance and progress towards their goals for readmission. Military officers check in with reintegrated children weekly or monthly, depending on their risk level. Done to reduce recidivism, a big problem for de-radicalization programmes. The child's risk level determines check frequency. Test will take at least two years to finish.

Pakistan's relationship with extremism and terrorism is linked to the controversy surrounding madrassas' role in radicalizing the country. Extremism in Pakistan is linked to the growth of radical madrassas. Taliban attack on Peshawar school in 2014 made madrassa reforms a major topic in Pakistan. Seven attackers stayed overnight in a mosque before the attack, as revealed by the investigation. Terrorist leaders and thinkers often educated in Pakistani madrassas. This includes former leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, as well as

Maulana Asim Umar, currently leading al-Qaeda's Asian Branch (AQIS). Maulana Sami-ul-Haq founded Haqqaniain madrasa in Nowshera. This is the school where Taliban leaders, including Mullah Muhammad Umar, studied before their deaths. Pakistan must transform madrassas into schools promoting moderation and religious tolerance to combat religious extremism. Many who join religious political parties, jihadist groups, or sectarian militant organisations learn about their religion in mosques and madrassas. These places are important for each religion. Madrassas are used by religious and political groups to recruit members. Wikileaks claims Sunni Arab Gulf states donate \$100 million annually to support madrassas in South Punjab teaching Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith schools. Pakistan has taken two significant steps in recent years to reform and regulate madrassas. Pervez Musharraf, the Republican President General, issued the Madrassa Regulation Ordinance in 2008. His comments extended a 2002 law that regulated madrassas. Hoped schools would register with government and stop using teaching methods that promote hostility, bigotry, or intolerance. ITMP and the PPP-led government reached an agreement in 2010, resulting in a signed deal. The education ministry will officially recognise and link each of the five ITMP madrassa boards according to the agreement's terms. Madrassas agreed to teach a tolerant curriculum and avoid promoting violence or sectarianism. The agreement was not brought to parliament due to bureaucratic problems. Tracking madrassas and their students has been challenging so far. Most madrassas are registered with the state but still strive for independence. The speed at which a state registers madrassas and brings them under government control reflects the state's commitment to combating religious extremism and radicalization.

On February 24, 2014, the government created the first National Internal Security Policy. This plan aims to address and reintegrate harmful elements in society through dismantling, containment, prevention, and education. NISP helps Pakistan manage security agencies in fighting terrorism. This document outlines the roles and responsibilities of Connecticut's LEAs during the drought. The NISP states that the NCTA was established in 2009 to coordinate Pakistan's anti-terrorism efforts. Without a strong executive or secretariat, NACTA is ineffective. The NIPS plan may be difficult to implement in Pakistan's polarised political culture.

In July, Pakistan's National Assembly approved the Pakistan Protection Bill 2014 (PPB 2014). Pakistan's government can now adopt a more flexible strategy to combat terrorism due to recent legal changes. In Pakistan, the law allowed police to shoot suspects, arrest without warrants, and search homes without permission. The law allowed them to search homes without permission. The bill assumes the defendant is guilty until they prove their innocence. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show they are not guilty. Civil society and human rights groups are concerned that these laws could turn Pakistan into a police state. In Pakistan's history, such laws have been used to unfairly punish political opponents. Concerns about future law-breaking by people in power have been raised. The law has been seen as different from other rules for the past two years. The difference remains unchanged. After two years, it will be reviewed to determine its effectiveness and potential for expansion.

The Pakistani military has conducted ten operations against terrorists since 9/11. Four were big, eight were smaller. Some well-known operations have Arabic names like Rahe-e-Rast, Rahe-e-Nijat, Zarb-e-Azb, and Khyber-I. Path to Salvation. The Pakistani Taliban's ability to carry out large-scale terrorist operations inside the country has significantly decreased due to these operations, and their physical infrastructure has been destroyed. General Raheel Shareef leads the Pakistani army. He has been in charge since 2014 and oversees Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I operations. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani ran Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat in 2009. Pakistan launched a military operation called Zarb-e-Azb on June 15, 2014, in North Waziristan to combat local and foreign militants. Government proceeds with military operation after failed talks with Taliban. North Waziristan is mostly free of insurgents after the Army destroyed IED factories and the militants' command and control system. The Pakistani military will continue the operation until all militants are killed. Khyber-1 began on October 17, 2014, in Khyber Agency to combat Lashkar-i-Islam. Operation Rah-e-Nijat began on June 19, 2009 in South Waziristan, Pakistan. Done to combat the Mehsud faction of the Pakistani Taliban. After months of military pressure, no rebels remained in the area. KP





Malakand Division launched Operation Rah-e-Rast on May 11, 2009 to combat the Taliban in Swat. The military restored order to the Swat valley and surrounding areas in just three months.

Extremism is dangerous for society. Moderate Pakistanis oppose violence but may not disagree with extremist religious goals. Here are a few obstacles to Pakistan's CVE strategies:

Pakistan lacks sufficient deradicalization centres despite widespread recognition of the country's significant problem with radicalism. Centres for militants who want to return home. If they return to a society with the same radicalising factors, their chances of becoming radical again increase. Radicalization can thrive in areas with poor leadership, inequality, and political exclusion. Targeted deradicalization efforts alone cannot solve extremism in Pakistan. Other factors need strengthening for this to be possible. Without a comprehensive CVE strategy, Pakistan will struggle to combat extremism.

Progress in fighting radicalization is fragile and could be lost due to the size of the problem. Resource scarcity is the second major challenge for CVE efforts. Donor-funded projects are often short-lived. Maintaining and expanding these programmes on a national level has been challenging over the years.

CVE requires consistent effort over time. Deradicalization program has low relapse rate (1%), seen as successful. Claims are false, misleading, and premature based on evidence. In 10-15 years, signs of successful radicalization prevention program will emerge. Pakistan's deradicalization initiative is relatively new, making it difficult to determine the long-term impact of different strategies. High success rates can complicate program evaluation and oversight. CVE in Pakistan's counter-terrorism industry is new and requires evaluation and improvement. Re-arrest rate shouldn't be the sole factor in determining the success of a programme. Consider other factors as well. Deradicalization efforts in Pakistan are mostly based on interviews and studies. No fair evaluation based on reliable data. Making program monitoring more scientific is challenging.

Online radicalization has increased due to terrorists using the internet and social media for propaganda and recruitment. The internet increases the likelihood of young people becoming radicalised. Radicalization risk in Pakistan increases with rising Internet access and user population. Pakistan has 32.4 million active internet users, with 50% using mobile devices. 70% of internet users are adults in their twenties or thirties. Pakistan should establish a monitoring mechanism for online communities, websites, and readers linked to jihadists to combat violent extremism.

Civilian authorities should monitor and oversee existing deradicalization initiatives in Pakistan to develop a comprehensive national-level program. Civilian oversight of CVE management should start at the grassroots level.

#### **The solution to be perused by the competent authorities**

Preventing radicalization is challenging and demands patience and ongoing policy attention. Pakistan needs to focus on a national youth policy, anti-terrorism policy, and education policy (including madrassas and public schools). Policy goals and methods should be clarified. Pakistan's deradicalization programmes teach marketable skills to militant detainees, so the CVE should do the same. It will reduce youth involvement in violent groups and radicalization. Extremist groups aim to redefine Muslim identity. Young people in Pakistan are unaware of their significance for the country's future. They lack self-perception as a crucial part of the nation's future.

Pakistan needs a comprehensive plan to address both nonviolent and violent aspects of extremism in the community. Government and society must collaborate to solve this problem. The goal is to counter extreme points of view more easily. Polarization and religious fragmentation in Pakistan hinder effective handling of extremist threats. Collaboration improves success rates. A CVE policy can unite various groups to create a single plan to combat extremism. Extremist ideas have spread throughout Pakistani society. Public support is crucial for the government to win the fight against terrorism. Many Pakistanis believe their government should combat extremism and terrorism. Public-private partnerships are now crucial for conflict resolution. In recent decades. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore and the United Kingdom's CONTEST strategy are notable groups. CONTEST strategy has four pillars: prevention, pursuit, protection, and preparation. Pakistan should strengthen communities to combat extremism and terrorism. This policy aims to



create a thriving community with moderate values, peaceful coexistence, interfaith harmony, and respect for diversity. Community involvement strategies can help prevent terrorist recruitment and future attacks. All of Pakistani society must unite to combat terrorism for success.

CVE policy includes developing diverse perspectives. Storytelling helps people of all ages and backgrounds understand their world by sharing universal beliefs and experiences. People connect through storytelling. People believe stories because they want to. Stories express a range of emotions, including hope, fear, and longing. The Pakistani government's counternarrative has not succeeded because it relies on reason, logic, and facts instead of addressing people's wants, feelings, and needs. This is why it didn't work. Winning the "war of ideas" is crucial in the fight against terrorism and restoring state authority. Winning both wars is crucial (winning back hearts and minds). Militants' perspective is promoted by Pakistani propaganda online and offline. Extremism is effective due to religious language and popular ideas like pan-Islamism and anti-Americanism. Both contribute to message persuasiveness. Religious symbols are prioritised over logical arguments in places like Pakistan with a Muslim majority. Extremists use religion to gain public support. Some believe counterterrorism efforts are seen as a way for the West to spread its values in Pakistan and create more divisions. Pakistan's public opinion on terrorism lacks coherent ideological responses. Conflicting CT-policies keep public uninformed. Militants exploit lack of communication between government and people. The extremist worldview is convincing and attracts many people. Political and religious divisions make it easier for terrorists and extremists to find like-minded individuals. Pakistani governments struggle to create a convincing national counternarrative against terrorists.

Religious scholars and faith-based networks in Pakistan hold significant power due to widespread respect. Moderate Muslim scholars' voices needed to counter extremist ideas in Pakistan. Both educated and uneducated individuals rely on religious clergy for moral guidance. People generally agree with religious scholars' opinions on various topics, even unrelated to religion. Extremists exploit the situation by using radical clergy to spread their ideas. Pakistan can use faith-based networks and moderate religious scholars to promote tolerance and harmony against extremist messages. More attacks on moderate religious scholars in Pakistan, government inaction. It has isolated and silenced these individuals. In October 2010, the Pakistani Taliban killed Dr. Muhammad Farooq, a moderate religious scholar and Vice Chancellor of the Islamic University of Swat. He worked hard to disprove the terrorists' claims. Taliban killed Maulana Hasan Jan in 2010 for opposing suicide bombings in Lahore. Religious leaders in CVE should be protected by the government, ensuring the safety of their families. Religiously motivated networks exist in all aspects of human life. In Pakistan, religion is important and plays a crucial role in information dissemination. Trust them, they have local experience and a strong network. Most people believe in these systems. Religious experts can counter extremist rhetoric with a stronger religious argument. They are knowledgeable about their communities and know how to respond to signs of radicalization.

The Hum Pakistan Foundation (HPF) needs more people to join their deradicalization initiative. The Pakistani military is overseeing this project. This will increase diversity and expand the program's reach. Pakistan hosted a conference on "radicalization and counter-radicalization" in 2010. In 2008, the Islamabad Policy Research Institute hosted a conference on deradicalization and engagement of Pakistani youth. Conference attendees came from worldwide. No big national academic conference on the subject has occurred since then. The government should hold annual symposia to share findings, learn from other groups, and stay updated on changes in the CVE framework. Implementing these steps will result in the development of more useful features, similar to an annual program audit.


## CONCLUSION

Terrorists adapt quickly in the modern world. Pakistani terrorist groups are adaptable. They constantly change their recruitment, attack, and messaging methods. They maintain high operational effectiveness. They adapt and find creative solutions. Anti-terrorism efforts require

innovative strategies to prevent and detect terrorism. Counterterrorism experts must stay ahead of terrorists. CVE helps counterterrorism professionals stay updated on evolving terrorist plans and anticipate future strategies. Pakistan has religiously motivated violent extremists and terrorists. Extremism exists at all levels of Pakistani society. Extremist groups reach many young Pakistanis with their message. Deradicalization programmes in Pakistan need a more moderate and hostile political climate to be effective. Communities must strengthen immediately to protect society from extremism. CVE efforts won't have a significant impact without improvements in governance, the economy, and security. A national CVE policy, if implemented correctly, could improve people's thinking and behaviour. CVE needs to be combined with other strategies to impact society. CVE is crucial for the success of these projects. You can't look at one without the other. After the Peshawar Army Public School attack, Pakistan is reevaluating its security measures. This shift in thinking may prompt Pakistan's leaders to develop a comprehensive CVE policy for counterterrorism. This could happen due to the problem's size. Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy should target both material and mental aspects of terrorism. Without this, Pakistan may continue experiencing tragedies and military operations.

## REFERENCES

- [1] "80,000 Pakistanis Killed in US War on Terror: report," *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), March 29, 2015. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/860790/80000-pakistanis-killed-in-us-war-on-terror-report/>; among the killed are 48,504 civilians, 45 journalists, 5,498 security personnel and 26, 862 militants; Zaila Hussain, "Cost of War on Terror for Pakistan Economy," in *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14*, Ministry of Finance Pakistan, [http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter\\_11/Special%20Section\\_1.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/Special%20Section_1.pdf)
- [2] Hedieh Mirahmadi, Waleed Ziad, Mehreen Farooq and Drobert D. Lamb, "Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism," *Brookings Institute*, January 6, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/01/us-islamic-world-forum-publications/empowering-pakistans-civil-society-to-counter-violent-extremism-english.pdf>
- [3] "Pakistan and the Threat of Extremism: Turning Point," *Economist*, October 20, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21564907-despiteoutrage-overmalala%E2%80%99s-shooting-dark-forces-are-gathering-again>
- [4] Manzar Zaidi, "Pakistan's Security Dilemma: On Doctrines, Perceptions and Institutional Interests," *SISA Report Number 6*, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, June 2013, [http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner/202013/2013-06-14\\_SISA6\\_Report\\_PakistansSecurityDilemmas\\_Manzar\\_Zaidi.pdf](http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner/202013/2013-06-14_SISA6_Report_PakistansSecurityDilemmas_Manzar_Zaidi.pdf)
- [5] Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, *Radicalization in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Narratives, 2012), 22.
- [6] Marisa L. Proges and Jessica Stern, "Getting Radicalization Right," *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66227/marisa-l-porges-jessica-stern/getting-deradicalization-right>.
- [7] "Fears of Extremism Rise in Pakistan: Poll," *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), July 2, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/730029/fears-of-extremism-rise-in-pakistan-poll/>
- [8] Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, "The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, vol. 4, no. 2, April-July 2011, 41- 61.
- [9] "Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan," *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*, January 2009.
- [10] John Horgan, "What makes a Terrorist Stop being a Terrorist," *The Conversation*, November 18, 2014, <http://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-terrorist-stop-being-a-terrorist-33119>
- [11] Interview with Dr. David Hansen, Associate Professor at the Correctional Service of Norway Staff Academy and Director Pakistan Program at the Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, Norway, April 15, 2015.

- 
- [12] Email interview with Hussain Nadim, former director Planning Commission of Pakistan with extensive experience in security sector, April 4, 2015.
  - [13] Email interview with Hussain Nadim, former director at the Planning Commission of Pakistan with extensive experience in the security sector, April 4, 2015.
  - [14] Khalid Iqbal, "De-radicalization: Pakistan's Dilemmas," *Criterion Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 4, October 31, 2014, <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/de-radicalization-pakistan%E2%80%99s-dilemmas/>
  - [15] Emilie Simpson, "Why We Failed to Win a Decisive Victory in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy*, March 2, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/02/why-the-war-in-afghanistan-was-lost-from-the-start-coin-taliban/>
  - [16] "The challenges of counter radicalization in Pakistan," United States Institute of Peace, May 9, 2012, <http://www.usip.org/publications/the-challenges-countering-radicalization-in-pakistan>
  - [17] Jessica Stern, "Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65896/jessica-stern/mind-over-martyr>
  - [18] Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad, "Pakistan's Civil Society: alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism," *World Organization for Resource Development and Education*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WORDE-Report-Pakistan-Civil-Society-Alternative-Channels-to-CVE.pdf>
  - [19] Safdar Sial, "Role of Religious Scholars in Counter-Radicalization and Deradicalization Strategies in Pakistan: The Need and the Scope," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1, January-June 2013, 69.
  - [20] Muhammad Amir Rana, "Folds or Radicalization," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3, July-September 2010, 5-8.
  - [21] John Horgan, "De-radicalization or Disengagement," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 2, no. 4, 3, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/32/html>
  - [22] Tariq Pervez, "Challenges of establishing a rehabilitation program in Pakistan," *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*, ed., Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jeral and Lawrence Rubin, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 122.
  - [23] John Horgan, "Fully Operational? The Ongoing Challenge of Terrorist Risk Reduction Programs," *Global Policy*, August 16, 2013, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/08/2013/fully-operational-ongoing-challenge-terrorist-risk-reduction-programs>
  - [24] Moeed Yusuf, "Pakistan's Militancy Challenge: From Where, to What?" in *Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Challenge*, Moeed Yousuf, eds. (Washington DC: George Town University Press), 36.
  - [25] Georgia Holmer, "Creating Spaces for Effective CVE Approaches," *Peace Brief 178*, United States Institute of Peace, September 2014, <http://www.usip.org/publications/effective-cve-approaches>
  - [26] John Horgan, "What makes a Terrorist Stop being a Terrorist?" *Conversation*, November 18, 2014, <http://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-terrorist-stop-being-a-terrorist-33119>
  - [27] M. Zaidi, "Radicalization of the young," *Express Tribune (Islamabad)*, January 7, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/490547/radicalisation-of-the-young/>
  - [28] Shehzad H. Qazi, "De-radicalizing the Pakistani Taliban," *Huffington Post*, October 4, 2011, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shehzad-h-qazi/de-radicalizing-the-pakistani-taliban\\_b\\_993208.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shehzad-h-qazi/de-radicalizing-the-pakistani-taliban_b_993208.html)
  - [29] Jason Burke, "Fighting Terrorism: Do De-radicalization Camps Really Work," *Guardian*, June 9, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-deradicalisation-camps-work>



- [30] Hassan Abbas, "The Roots of Radicalization in Pakistan," *South Asia Journal*, Issue 9, Summer 2013, <http://southasiajournal.net/the-roots-of-radicalization-in-pakistan/>
- [31] Jamie Scharf, "Pakistani boot camps want to reprogram ISIS terrorists," *New York Post*, November 16, 2014 <http://nypost.com/2014/11/16/pakistani-boot-camps-want-to-re-program-isis-terrorists/lbid>.
- [32] Muhammad Amir Rana, "Swat De-radicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, vol. 4, no. 2, April-June 2011, 5- 13.
- [33] Shehzad H, Qazi, "A War without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan," Policy Brief no. 60, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, February 2013, [http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU\\_Brief\\_CounterDeradicalization\\_2\\_14.pdf](http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_CounterDeradicalization_2_14.pdf)
- [34] "Rehabilitation and integration: 47 ex-militants freed after they receive vocational training," *Express Tribune (Islamabad)*, October 13, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/617202/rehabilitation-integration-47-ex-militants-freed-after-receiving-vocational-training/>
- [35] Faisal Ali Ghuman, "De-radicalization in Disarray," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, October 24, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1139983>
- [36] Zill-e-Huma Rafique and Mughees Ahmed, "De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts: Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 2, Issues, February 2013, 115-124, [https://www.counterextremism.org/download\\_file/48/134/270/lbid](https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/48/134/270/lbid).
- [37] Saba Noor, "From Radicalization to De-Radicalization: The Case of Pakistan," *Counter Terrorists Trends and Analysis (CTTA)*, vol. 5, Issue 8, August 2013, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-August13.pdf>
- [38] Munawar Azeem, "TTP Getting Active Support from Seminaries in Twin Cities: report," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098291>
- [39] Zahid Gishkori, "Reforming madrassas: The revolution within," *Express Tribune (Islamabad)*, January 25, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/825216/the-revolution-within/>
- [40] "Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, May 21, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/630599/saudi-arabia-uae-financing-extremism-in-south-punjab>
- [41] "Madrassa Education: 2014 Challenges, Reforms and Possibilities," *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency*, March 2015, 14, <http://www.youthparliament.pk/downloads/CR/educationandyouthaffairsstandin gcommitteereport.pdf>
- [42] Kaja Borchgrevink, "Pakistan's Madrasas: Moderation or Militancy: The madrasa debate and the reform process," *NOREF Report*, June 2011, 9. [http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/d6f77e0632a20fcf1ae1ad65041acdc7.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/d6f77e0632a20fcf1ae1ad65041acdc7.pdf)
- [43] The five madrasa boards in Pakistan include: 1) Tanzeem-ul-Madaaris Ahl-e- Sunnat Wal-Jamaat of the Barelvi school of thought; 2) Wafaq-ul-Madaaris Al- Arabia of Deobandis; 3) Wafaq-ul-Madaaris of Ahl-e-Hadith; 4) Rabta-ul- Madaaris Al-Islamia of Jamaat-e-Islami; 5) and, Wafaq-ul-Madaaris Al-Shia of Shia school of thought.
- [44] Syed Irfan Raza, "Accord for introducing contemporary subjects in madrassahs signed," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, October 8, 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/news/569392/accord-for-introducing-contemporary-subjects-in-madrassahs-signed>
- [45] Dr Farzana Bari, "A fractured consensus," *Express Tribune (Islamabad)*, February 3, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/831754/a-fractured-consensus/>
- [46] "Nisar unveils national security policy in NA," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, February 26, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1089598>
- [47] See the full text of NISP here, [https://www.academia.edu/6337566/National\\_Internal\\_Security\\_Policy\\_of\\_Pakistan](https://www.academia.edu/6337566/National_Internal_Security_Policy_of_Pakistan)
- [48] Irfan Haider, "Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 approved in NA," *Dawn (Islamabad)*, July 2, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1116529>



- [49] "Nisar unveils national security policy in NA," Dawn (Islamabad), February 26, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1089598>
- [50] See the full text of NISP here, [https://www.academia.edu/6337566/National\\_Internal\\_Security\\_Policy\\_of\\_Pakistan](https://www.academia.edu/6337566/National_Internal_Security_Policy_of_Pakistan)
- [51] Irfan Haider, "Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 approved in NA," Dawn (Islamabad), July 2, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1116529>
- [52] Interview with Feyyaz Ahmed, Assistant Professor Political Science at University of Management Technology (UMT), Pakistan, on March 18, 2015.
- [53] Syed Shoaib Hassan, "Analysis: Pakistan's militant rehabilitation problem," Dawn (Islamabad), December 30, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1153913> Interview with Feyyaz Ahmed.
- [54] Marisa L. Porges and Jessica Stern, "Getting Deradicalization Right," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66227/marisa-l-porges-jessica-stern/getting-deradicalization-right>
- [55] "30m internet users in Pakistan, half on mobile: Report," Express Tribune (Islamabad), June 24, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/567649/30m-internet-users-in-pakistan-half-on-mobile-report/>, (accessed December 23, 2014)
- [56] Interview with Bilveer Singh, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, April 21, 2015
- [57] Interview with Wajahat Masood, Public Intellectual and Journalist, Pakistan, April 13, 2015.
- [58] "Creating an environment that counteracts militant ideologies and radicalism in Pakistan," Norwegian Peace building Resource Center, Seminar Report, March 2014, [http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/be49e0a57107072741eca4da942f835f.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/be49e0a57107072741eca4da942f835f.pdf)
- [59] Interview with Faisal Bin Muhammad Hassan, Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and member of the Religious and Rehabilitation Group (RRG), April 16, 2015, Singapore.
- [60] Interview with Rohan Gunaratna, head of International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajatnam School of International Studies, Singapore, April 20, 2015. Ibid.
- [61] Marisa L. Proges and Jessica Stern, "Getting Radicalization Right," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66227/marisa-l-porges-jessica-stern/getting-deradicalization-right> Interview with Bilveer Singh.
- [62] Amil Khan, "Pakistan and the Narrative of Extremism," Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, March 2013, 3, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR327-Pakistan-and-the-Narratives-of-Extremism.pdf>
- [63] Interview with Khuram Iqbal, Assistant Professor of Terrorism at the National Defense University, Pakistan, April 8, 2015.
- [64] Email interview with Sami Raza, Assistant Professor University of Peshawar, April 15, 2015.
- [65] Madiha Afzal, "Education and Attitudes in Pakistan: Understanding Perception of Terrorism," Special Report 367, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), April 5, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR367-Education-and-Attitudes-in-Pakistan.pdf>
- [66] Wajhat Masood, "Militants" Media in Pakistan: Political Etymology and Professional Craft," Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2010, [san-pips.com/download.php?f=155.pdf](http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=155.pdf)
- [67] Safdar Sial, "Role of Religious Scholars in Counter-Radicalization and Deradicalization Strategies in Pakistan: The Need and the Scope," Conflict and Peace Studies, vol. 5, no 1, January-June 2013, 69.
- [68] Muhammad Riyaz Mayar, "VC of Swat University shot dead in Mardan," News International (Islamabad), October 3, 2010, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-1040-VC-of-Swat-varsity-shot-dead-in-Mardan>



- [69] Sabir Shah, "Prominent religious scholars killed in last 25 years," *News International (Islamabad)*, February 28, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-235428-Eminent-religious-leaders-killed-in-25-years>
- [70] Interview with Wajahat Masood, Public Intellectual and Journalist, Pakistan, April 13, 2015.
- [71] Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad, "Pakistan's Civil Society: alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism," *World Organization for Resource Development and Education*, October 2012, 13, <http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WORDE-Report-Pakistan-Civil-Society-Alternative-Channels-to-CVE.pdf>
- [72] Martin, R. (2019). *Addressing the Root Causes of Violent Extremism: An Institutional Perspective*. *Journal of Global Security*, 18(1), 43-67.
- [73] Smith, J. (2016). *Institutional Responses to Violent Extremism: A Comparative Analysis of European Countries*. *Terrorism Studies Journal*, 20(2), 115-138.
- [74] Rahman, S., & Chen, L. (2017). *International Organizations and Countering Violent Extremism: A Critical Analysis*. *Global Security Review*, 15(4), 521-543.
- [75] Ahmed, N. (2018). *Evaluating De-radicalization Programs: Lessons from Comparative Case Studies*. *Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 25(3), 301-328.