

TRACING BACK THE CAUSES OF THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC STATE (NII) REBELLION IN WEST JAVA, ACEH, AND SOUTH SULAWESI (1949-1965)

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Abstract - The scientists who study the causes of the upheaval of Darul Islam (Islamic State of Indonesia /NII), there is one aspect that has not been stated clearly, in the form of the *zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) in the upheaval. This paper shows that the atmosphere of revolution as tension, anticolonialism, uncertainty, suspicion, and hard life, accompanied by violence became the *zeitgeist* of the upheaval of NII Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo (West Java), Muhammad Daud Beureueh (Aceh), and Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar (South Sulawesi). This mentality was intertwined with Indonesia's ideological politics, *volksgeist* (spirit of the nation) at that time. Local socio-cultural structures also played a role in generating upheaval. Each upheaval had its own differences, related to the dynamics at their respective local levels, including the end of the uprising. Kartosuwiryo surrendered to the Republic of Indonesia and was sentenced to death, Daud Beureueh chose the path of peace, and Qahhar Mudzakkar was killed in an ambush. Upheavals such as NII were a *sine qua non*-situation in the Republic of Indonesia at that time.

Keywords: Darul Islam, *zeitgeist*, *volksgeist*, Islamic state, revolution

INTRODUCTION

Darul Islam or officially the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII)¹ was one of the leading upheavals at the beginning of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia (RI). Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo proclaimed it in Cisampang village, Kawedanan Cisayong, Tasikmalaya on August 7, 1949. Since then, the upheaval has spread to Central Java, Aceh, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. In addition to the West Java NII led by Kartosuwiryo, the other two prominent are the NII in Aceh (Teungku Daud Beureuh), and South Sulawesi (Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar).² Some scientists reveal the causes of its turbulence. Cornelis van Dijk (1981) and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1990) cite local factors as the main cause, while Chiara Formichi (2012) emphasizes the ideology of the Islamic state.

But the three have not revealed another aspect clearly, namely the role of the political atmosphere in Indonesia towards upheaval. Therefore, this paper will discuss (1) the birth of NII related to the atmosphere of Indonesia before and during the rebellion, by including (2) the dynamics of the interaction of the three NII figures with their environment, and (3) as Azyumardi Azra's concern for Formichi's work (2014: 182), "... [T]he idea, movement, struggle and attempt at the formation of such a political unit usually fails."

In the early days of its independence, the Indonesian government was full of dynamics. The government had to deal with the first Dutch military aggression (1947 and 1948), as well as internal turmoil in the form of elite debates, and a cabinet that fell and fell. There were also upheavals such as Merapi Merbabu Complex (MMC) (1947), the Madiun affair (September 1948), and of course NII. For van Dijk, the emergence of NII was caused by the reorganization of the army (RERA) as well as differences in views within the military, conflicts with the Center, and changes in agrarian structure (van Dijk, 1981: 340-396). Although each upheaval does not appear simultaneously, it is intertwined with the other. As for Sjamsuddin (NII Aceh), the upheaval occurred because of fears that the Zuma (elite who were not clerics) lost their role because the Centre included outsiders into the Acehnese government; the concern of the ulama Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA) against the arrival of new morality and values that

¹ Usually referred to as Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) but this paper will use the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), due to Kartosuwiryo's statement, that his movement is officially called the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII, *Sing Explanation at the Proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia*).

² It is usually known as Kahar Muzakkar. But this paper uses Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, following Anhar Gonggong in *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: From Patriot to Rebel* (1992).

are contrary to Islam, as well as the conflict between PUSA and the Center. The conflict between PUSA and uleebalang (upstream/priyai Aceh) is only a secondary factor (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 347).

Hiroko HoriKoshi criticised van Dijk. He considered van Dijk's inability to see religion as the epistemological basis of human action, causing him to be reluctant to include Islam as an important factor in upheaval (Horikoshi, 1984: 816). Years later Formichi revised van Dijk's conclusions, pointing to Islamic political ideology as a major factor. He said Kartosuwiryo was influenced by Abu A'la al-Maududi (Pakistan), the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), and the like (Formichi, 2012: 63). There are also factors anticolonialism, internal military conflicts, and nationalist-Islamic vs. nationalist-secular political conflicts (Formichi, 2012: 203-205).

THEORY AND METHOD

Anthony Giddens' structuration theory and Georg Wilhelm Hegel's *zeitgeist* and *volksgeist* theories were used to answer these research questions. Giddens suggests that individuals change structures by utilizing existing structures. The structure is in the form of prevailing values, customs, as well as systems, roles and social institutions of the community. The structure is divided into two; Resources and rules. Resources can be social structures, capital, and others. While rules can be in the form of customs, religion, as well as state law. In the case of Darul Islam, the most important rule is religion, as a factor forming the movement, in addition to dissatisfaction as the door to its emergence (Horikoshi, 1984: 816). By grounding resources and rules, individuals (agents) act to change the structure of their society. The agent acts in his daily life (daily life conduct). That's where agents learn from the structure while using it to change the structure. The effort is related to the context of space (geographical, socio-cultural) and time (epoch). Throughout these two contexts, the agent learns (perceives and understands) all the structures and events present in them. Therefore, structuration theory is useful in historical studies focusing on space and time (diachronic) (Giddens, 1984).

Giddens' theory of structure is useful in this study, as it can explain aspects of social history more fully. "Structuration theory can also help the researcher to take into account the internal firm perspective and the broader social history." (Toland & Yoong, 2010: 6). In fact, both van Dijk (1981), Sjamsuddin (1990), and Formichi (2012) have alluded to 'structure' in viewing upheaval. The NII rebellion can indeed be seen as an attempt to change the 'structure', namely the Indonesian Republik government. Despite the variety of views, the work of these researchers has contributed to understanding the events of the NII upheaval.

Georg Wilhelm Hegel's ideas about the *zeitgeist* and *volksgeist* enriched Giddens' structuration. *Zeitgeist* (economical of the age/time), is the spirit of the times/spirit of the times attached to the similarity of mentality/thoughts of people (individuals) at a certain period. The development of human consciousness in history is related to the *zeitgeist* (Hegel, 2001: 88). While *volksgeist* (spirit of people/nation) or spirit/spirit of the nation, is a view/mind / mental attitude possessed by all individuals in the same nation (Hegel, 2001: 89-90). For Hegel, the *volksgeist* was the main concern in understanding history (Hegel, 2001: 83-84). The consciousness of the individual in a historical setting contains the *volksgeist* because part of a particular nation, as well as (when the country in which it is in development) contains the *zeitgeist*. Individuals in history are sons of nations, as well as children of the times (Hegel, 2001: 6: 8). *Zeitgeist* and *volksgeist*, connect with Giddens's structuring. Both are present in the category of rules that guide agents in changing the structure. *Volksgeist* is related to space (social), while *zeitgeist* is related to time.

This research uses historical methods, successively in the form of source collection (heuristics), source criticism (external and internal), interpretation, and historical writing (historiography). Primary sources used include documents related to events and contemporaries, writings of rebel leaders, and the like. Secondary sources are other works that contain NII issues.

The Face of the Indonesian Revolution

The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 led Japan to surrender to the Allies in World War II on August 14. Japan's promise to liberate Indonesia, which had begun with BPUPKI, was cancelled. Japan, which lost the war, no longer had the right to make important decisions, including the independence of Indonesia. While the Allies as winners had not yet entered Indonesia, a vacuum of power was created. This situation the Indonesian nation took advantage of by proclaiming Indonesia on August 17, 1945. The government structure was built the next day suddenly and quickly, considering the opening of opportunities for the Dutch to re-colonize.

The proclamation brought the Indonesian nation to independence, free from foreign control, in the form of rapid anticolonial change. His spirit is expressed in the text of the Proclamation, concerning the

careful transfer of power in the shortest possible time. This was the face of the National Revolution (Hatta, 1982: 454), a symbol of strength that followed the overthrow of foreign powers in Indonesia (Kahin, 1952 [1959]: 138). The old social structures that were once part of the colonial collapsed, replaced with new, more egalitarian ones.

His mentality is recorded in language, for example, the popularization of the word "saudara", meaning 'brother' in the old Jakarta dialect. 'Dude' replaced 'tuan' or 'sinyo', also applied to commoners. 'Dude' corresponds to the 'citizen' of the French Revolution, or 'comrade' of the Russian Revolution which means togetherness and equality (Kahin, 1952 [1959]: 138-139). "A dinner in a restaurant addressed the waiter as "saudara", a cabinet minister or the humblest Indonesian peasant addressed President Soekarno as "Karno" (Kahin, 1952 [1959]: 139).

The government runs with modest capital. The fate of Indonesia is not like countries that were liberated by colonialists, which already had a nationality, state system, and an intact army, and then became independent. While the structure of the Indonesian government is only perfunctory (Simatupang, 1988: 73). In 1946, the presidential system changed to parliamentarian with the prime minister as its executive, to protect President Sukarno whom the Dutch reproached as a Japanese collaborator, thus becoming a target for Indonesian independence (Hatta, 1982: 480).

In addition to the recognition of sovereignty, the Government faced an economic crisis left by Japan. Compared to 1937, in 1948-1949, food productivity decreased by 10%, while the population increased from 70 million to 73 million. Rice production in Java dropped from 2,270 thousand tons to 2,080 thousand tons. Rice imports increased from 257 thousand tons (1948) to 300 thousand tons (1949) (World Food Situation, 1949: 26-27). Economic activity was not yet significant (Feith & Castles, 1988: xix), the state budget was unable to meet the needs of the government, so Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet in July 1947 decided to trade opium (Chemist and Druggist, 1949: 557), in order to finance officials and delegates of negotiations (ANRI, Djogdja Documenten, no. 230). Finance Minister A. A. Maramis led it until the mid-1950s (Cribb, 1988; Cribb in Kahin et.al, 1985: 198-199). Economic pressure made it easy for the people to bet their lives against the Dutch and the natives who supported them (traditional elites and officials who were once part of the colonial government), indigenous representatives of the old order (Kahin et.al, 1985: 12). Life is difficult, making the revolution can turn to the left or in another direction (Onghokham, 1983: 147). People can also act cruelly, as in the NII upheaval.

The administration of colonial administration of Pineland's bestuur was hierarchical from Governor Jendral to controleur, replaced by a centralized bureaucracy with a hierarchical pattern of regents-sub-districts. Staffing is rationalized, the corrupt are removed, and the professional is retained (Hatta, 1953: 16). Therefore, the Government was forced to use some people from the colonial structure as employees, because of their expertise. The anti-colonial society did not like it. Conflict with administrative personnel is inevitable (Kahin et.al, 1985: 15-16). Society has strong control. In Sumatra, the Centre had almost no control over appointing provincial officials (especially in 1945-1946). Local governments respond more to community pressure, rather than orders from the Centre. The centre itself prefers to increase its control over the people, rather than building control over its own government (Reid, 1974: 122-123).

The dynamics in viewing how to fight for independence also occur within the elite. There are at least three groups of opinions: those who regard war as the only way (100% independence), those who want diplomacy to avoid people's casualties, and those who choose both simultaneously, because armed struggle supports diplomacy (Kahin et.al, 1985: 14-15; Simatupang, 1988: 74-75). There were four important agreements throughout 1945-1949, namely Linggarjati (January 17, 1948), Renville (January 17, 1948), Roem-Royen (May 7, 1949) and the Round Table Conference (KMB) (August 23, 1949). Turmoil was also present in formulating the course of the National Revolution. In 1946, Tan Malaka et al came into conflict with other elites, leading to an attempt to kidnap Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin on 27 June 1946, and an attempted coup d'état on 3 July (Hatta, 1982: 488-489; Kahin [1952] 1959: 190; Anderson, 1972: 370-402).

In 1948, the Indonesian army (Angkatan War Republik Indonesia/United States / APRIS) numbered 350,000 personnel, plus 470,000 personnel of the Bureau of Struggle (Laskar) (Nasution, 1968: 130). Army leadership overlapped because Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin formed TNI Masjarakat (labour) in addition to the regular TNI in early August 1947 (Kahin, [1952] 1959: 261). Amir also formed a Special Navy led by nine admirals of his followers (Hatta, 1982: 527). The government could not afford to finance that much military, especially when Indonesia's territory narrowed due to the Renville agreement. Therefore, Hatta made the Army Rationalization and Reorganization (RERA) program in March 1948. The army was cut to 160,000 personnel, the Masjarakat TNI was liquidated (Kahin, [1952] 1959: 262-265). As

many as 100,000 soldiers were fished into the community, who had no jobs seconded in carpentry and crafts for the needs of the community. However, most ex-militaries despise the profession (Hatta, 1982: 528).

Some soldiers who were unable to enter APRIS were instigated by the issue that the Government's treatment as 'discarded was discarded'. They also considered RERA to weaken the Republican army (Hatta, 1953). One of KMB's decisions made ex-KNIL enter APRIS on January 21, 1950 (National Committee for Commemorating the XXX Independence Day of the Republic of Indonesia, 1981: 19). Some laskar rejected it and were suspicious of ex-KNIL loyalty to Indonesia (Onghokham, 1983: 151). These dynamics seeded opposition to the central Government, ranging from protests to upheaval.

The politics of the Republic of Indonesia in the era of 1945-1960s was ideological, with three major ideologies: nationalism, Islamism, and communism. All three mobilized the people against the colonialists, both in the period of independence and in the early days of Indonesian independence (Parna, 1950: 64, Dewantara, 1952). By the end of 1948, there were already Masyumi parties and the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party/PSII (Islam); Murba and the Indonesian Communist Party/PKI4 (communism); Indonesian Socialist Party/PSI (centre left); Indonesian National Party / PNI and Partai Indonesia Raya (secular nationalism). There was even the NII as a non-party force (Kahin, [1952] 1959: 304-331; Kahin, in Holland, et.al, 1953: 75-110; Anderson, 1972: 202-230; Aidit, 1955: 7). Each group builds a bridge between the leader and his ideology and the mass of supporters who are also equally ideological (Kahin, [1952] 1959: 304-305).

The role of ideology already exists in the era of ethical politics. The Pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh adopted by PSII has spread in the Malay-Nusantara world since the late 19th century (Hurgronje, 1899), which set in motion the upheavals of Muslim societies (Reid, 1974: 223-245). This ideology differed from the Pan-Islamism of the Ottoman caliph, Abdul Hamid II (caliphate). Al-Afghani did not want an empire, but rather a unity of Muslims based on creed and culture (Stoddart, 1966: 73), while the form of government could be in the form of a nation-state. Sukarno recognized al-Afghani as a pioneer figure of Islamic nationalism (Sukarno, 1959: 8). While the communism of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin was promoted by the ISDV (later became the PKI). Followed by secular nationalism promoted by the Indonesian Association (later co-formed PNI) (Dewantara, 1952: 66-68). All three brought the spirit of *Persa tua bangsa* (Dewantara, 1952; van Dijk, 2007: 33-35) and anticolonialism (HAMKA, [1946] 1952: 64; Sukarno, 1959: 10-116). This spirit crystallized during the Japanese occupation, thus fostering a determination to be independent or die against the invaders. This mentality was an important factor in the dynamics of Indonesian politics from 1945 to the 1960s (Anderson, 1972; Simatupang, 1988: 73).

Indonesian political elites seek answers to various Indonesian problems in their respective ideologies (Feith & Castles, 1988: xlv). They fought each other in state polemics. Ideological clashes already existed in the session of the Committee for the Preparatory to Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) in 1945. At that time, the intergroup agreed on Pancasila as the basis of the state. Although Piagam Jakarta was abolished, for Islamic groups religion animates Pancasila (Bahar et, al. 1992). Ideological debates again occurred at the Constituent Assembly which presented the basis of the state (Feith & Castles, 1988). All of them are the characteristics of Indonesian politics and ethics, the frenetic political ideology (Feith & Castles, 1988: xix). At that time Indonesian politics was never stable (Azra, 2014: 182).

Ideology is also present in the military. At that time military and politics were inseparable. Generally, Laskar was born under the auspices of ideological parties (Anderson, 1972: 230). Being a member of an army is almost automatically a member of a particular party. Hezbollah and Sabilillah whose Islamic ideology were born from Masyumi (Cribb & Kahin, 2004: 176; 262; 380; Anderson, 1972: 26). While Marxist warriors include Barisan Banteng (Tan Malaka) and Pesindo, secular nationalists such

³ Ibnu Parna, leader of the Indonesian Communist Force (ACOMA)), which later merged into the PKI. Ibnu also represented the PKI in the Constituent Assembly in 1955-1959.

⁴ PKI It rose and sank from the 1920s to the 1950s. Founded on May 23, 1920, the PKI had become a banned party, disbanding into several parties. Artai small, then re-formed. DN Aidit saw that the PKI after Indonesian independence was a continuation of the old PKI (Aidit, 1955: 7)

⁵ Circle Hadramaut brought pan-Islamism in the land of Betawi at the end of the 19th century. Some of his prominent figures existlah Sayid Ali Bin Shahab, Sayid Abdul Kadir Aidarus, Sayid Sahl bin Sahl, Sayid Abdullah bin Alwi al-Attas, and Sayid Muhammad bin Abdurrahman Salaibiyah. (Hurgronje, 1904).

⁶ For Sukarno, cooperationma Islamism with other ideologies is possible. He cited Maulana Muhammad Ali's pan-Islamic cooperation and Gandhi's nationalism in India (Sukarno, 1959: 5).

as Barisan Vanguard (PNI) (Anderson, 1972: 232-268; Onghokham, 151). There was a polarization of the army based on right-centre-left ideology, there was also the domination of radical groups at the beginning of the physical revolution (Kartodirdjo, in Lucas, [1989] 2004: v-vi). The desire of young people to enter the army is more to defend independence (idealistic), rather than a professional career (pragmatic). They are more obedient to their commanders (patrons), than to the government (Crouch, [1978] 2007: 25-27).

The role of ideology, though only among its elite,⁷ was seen in the 1948 Madiun affair. According to Muso of the PKI, the fall of Amir's Cabinet endangered the national revolution, because the bourgeoisie controlled the government. Muso rejected Linggarjati and Renville's decision and formed the National Front (Muso, 1948 [1953]:19-20). Later, Muso and Amir led the Madiun affair for three months from 18 September 1948, opposing Sukarno-Hatta's leadership (Kahin et.al, 1985: 15-16). The aim was to correct the direction of Sukarno-Hatta who was off track from the national revolution (in the view of Marxism) (Department of Agitprop CC PKI: 1953; Kahin, [1952] 1959: 298). President Sukarno responded by an ultimatum to the people of Madiun to join Sukarno-Hatta or elect Amir-Muso. The people elected Sukarno-Hatta (Hatta, 1982: 531), a sign of a failed uprising.

Other upheavals also occurred throughout the late 1945s and early 1950s. Among others in North Sumatera, Surakarta, Pekalongan, Tegal, and Salatiga (Lucas, [1989] 2004), Banten, 1945-1946 (ulama-PKI conflict), East Sumatra, West Sumatra (against the Dutch), Jakarta (1945-1949), and South Sulawesi (against the Dutch) (Kahin et.al, 1985). The structure was so unlucky the colonial legacy is trying to be destroyed. In Sumatra, the royal structure that was suspected to be part of the Colonial was destroyed, replaced by the leadership of people from among the commoners. In Aceh, Pekalongan, and West Sumatra, religion played a role in the revolt. The people under the leadership of the santri group collapsed the civil service positions (usually among the priyai) (Reid, 1974: 61-65). Upheavals generally occur based on ideology and responses to local problems. Some researchers see dissatisfaction with Government policies as a common cause of upheaval (Feith, 2007; Kahin, [1952] 1959; Sjamsuddin, 1990; Kahin et.al, 1985: 286).

The ideological aspirations of the community exploded, breaking the old order, as well as carrying seeds of conflict that were often destructive (Simatupang, 1988: 72). The situation is described as "upheaval and violence that creates a revolutionary atmosphere in accordance with the depiction of revolutionary situations in other countries" (Kartodirdjo, in Lucas, [1989] 2004: v). The uncertain atmosphere made the local elite mobilize and gave the ideological foundation to the masses. The "law of the jungle" prevails, and the strong side wins. On the other hand, revolution means the loss of the old central power, while the new power is not yet complete (Onghokham, 1983: 147), thus providing an opportunity for the masses to attack the official rulers and the rich class (Kartodirdjo, in Lucas, [1989] 2004: v-vi). The atmosphere was most visible in Java from October 1945 to February 1946, as well as in Sumatra a few months later (Reid, 1974: 60). Upheavals are often violent, accompanied by kidnappings, killings, etc., with the spirit of anticolonialism, antifeudalism, nationalism, radicalism, idealism and heroism (Suyatno, 1989: 1-2). Mochtar Lubis called it an uncontrolled flood. The revolution follows its own path, regardless of the Indonesian nation that created it (Lubis, in Reid, 1974: 59). The same impression can be seen from the memories of two former perpetrators of the upheaval in East Sumatra (Northern Sumatra rebellion).

"Between 1945 and 1950 we entered a new world. We are freed from and forced out of childhood and into an adult world full of opportunity, freedom, uncertainty, and strength. We must find our own identity and survive while trying to build a new, civilized order. We all know we have experienced a revolution. We must now accommodate the Indonesian nation in our souls." (Langenberg, da lam Kahin et.al, 1985: 113).

Some historians refer to the atmosphere as a 'social revolution', not in the sense of Marxism, but as the dynamics of society resulting from the atmosphere of revolution. This is the face of the revolution in Indonesia. The NII upheaval is the only one, which is related to views on the development of the nation, state, and army (Simatupang, 1988: 73).

⁷ Exist the different roles of ideology in the three upheavals of the PKI in Indonesia. PupheavalErtama (1926-1927) was purely anticolonialism in the name of communism. Many scholars, especially in Banten (Islamism) participated. Ideology began to play a role in the 1948 Madiun uprising, but only among its elite. This movement is more about whom who should lead the country; Amir-Muso or Sukarno-Hatta. Unlike in 1965, the ideology looks stronger. (Surjomihardjo, 1988: 23).

The above description indicates the presence of two important things, which in Hegel's language as *zeitgeist* and *volksgeist*. Hegel emphasized the importance of both concepts in reading history. *Volksgeist* is a nation's view of reality, which characterizes the individual. While the *zeitgeist* is the logic of man in his time. The revolution that occurred in Indonesia after 1945 contained a *zeitgeist* as well as a *volksgeist*. His *zeitgeist* was the overturning of all order, tension, immediacy, and mutual suspicion. Sartono refers to it as:

"The atmosphere is full of tension because the conflict and conflict between the factions is perceived as a political crisis, a situation that contains the danger of chaos and the breakdown of social order." (Kartodirdjo, in Lucas, [1989] 2004: v).

While the *volksgeist* (which is present in the *zeitgeist*) is the ideologues as the basis of Indonesian human action. Understanding *volksgeist* and *zeitgeist* is key to reading NII more clearly, given that the audience's view of it seems simplistic, merely as rebellion, separatism, and radicalism, which seems similar to today's extreme Islamic groups.

Islamic State of Indonesia: the upheaval of the Republic's biological children

As a result of the Renville Agreement, West Java was separated from Indonesia. Dutch Military Aggression I also made West Java physically and politically isolated (Formichi, 2012: 97), followed by Dutch Military Aggression II which arrested Indonesian leaders. Therefore, Kartosuwiryo considered Indonesia finished (NII, Declaration No. II/7), so he proclaimed NII, on August 7, 1949 (NII, 1949a8). There are several other events that precede it. On February 10, 1948, some Priangan Muslim elites established the Islamic Council, (NII, Qanun Azasy, art. 34, transitional period no. 2). By the end of February, 4000 Hezbollah and Sabilillah West Java fighters who had not been integrated with the (Simatupang, 1988: 77) refused to hijra and committed to defending West Java from Dutch occupation (Kahin, [1952] 1959: 234).

The Cisayong Conference on February 10-11, 1948 was attended by 500 delegates⁹ from several branches of Masyumi, Islamic Union, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyah in West Java. The conference formulated a policy in West Java based on Islam, formed a military force and elected Kartosuwiryo as the leader. The Cipendeuy Conference, Cirebon, March 1, 1948, formed a military sister structure, as well as an Islamic state plan that would be implemented if the Pasundan State was formed, or if Indonesia dissolved (Confrontie Tjipeundeui, 1948).¹⁰ The Islamic Oemat Council (MOI) was formed in March 1948, to coordinate Masyumi, Sabilillah, Hezbollah, and the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (GPPI) around West Java and Central Java. At that time, the Indonesian Police Service still considered the MOI pro-RI. Then MOI became the representative of NII before being officially proclaimed a year later (Formichi, 2012: 117-118). Only on December 8, 1950, the TNI declared the militias associated with NII as a banned organization (West Java TT III Commander Regulation No. 25/1950).

The Baturajeg Rensi Conference, Majalengka in May 1948 formed a government cabinet (priestly assembly). The MOI turned into a government, with the territory covering all of Priangan. The Central Islamic Council (MIP) was established. At its meeting on July 8, 1948, MIP declared that it was fighting against the Dutch not only for West Java, but also for the entire archipelago. The decree that Kartosuwiryo (Kalipaksi) signed showed the desire to create an Islamic state (Madjlis Islam Pusat, 1948). Kartosuwiryo formulated the draft constitution on August 27, 1948, as well as the structure of government a few months later (Formichi, 2012: 121-123).

Kartosuwiryo et al at that time had not expressly declared their separation from Indonesia. They still consider their struggle to maintain Indonesia's independence. The head of MOI Ciamis asked for weapons assistance to Indonesia through a letter dated October 3, 1948 (Formichi, 2012: 125). Prime

⁸ Some The party mentioned that this proclamation was the second. The first occurred on August 14, 1945, a few days before the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia (KH Jusuf Taziri, in *Republic of Indonesia: West Java Province*, 1953: 215). Kyai Jusuf Taziri is ulama Tasikmalaya that used to be close to Kartosuwiryo. Even Kartosuwiryo was suspected to have studied with him. However, Kyai Jusuf parted ways with Kartosuwiryo when NII was formed. Kyai Jusuf chose to stand in the ranks of RI, so he and his followers became the target of the NII attack.

⁹ Historian Dengel, said there were 160 representatives representing Islamic organizations in West Java who supported Kartosuwiryo (Dengel, in Gemini & Sofianto, 2015: 395).

¹⁰ Contents in the form of Muslim Political Programs, Quick Business List, the Indonesian Muslim Army Plan, as well as the cessation of Masyumi activities in West Java.

Minister Hatta promised to provide unofficial assistance in the form of budget, food, and other social assistance, if Kartosuwiryo went to Yogyakarta (Natsir, 2008: 28-29). But after Kartosuwiryo considered Indonesia to have collapsed, he merged all Islamic warriors in West Java into the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) (NII, Military Declaration No. 1). He also gave an ultimatum for the TNI to leave West Java or enter the NII. The exit of the TNI from West Java made it easy for the militias to consolidate (Simatupang, 1988: 77). TII officially operated in West Java in April 1949 (Formichi, 2012: 127-130). Kartosuwiryo called for sabil war jihad against the Dutch on 20 December, with himself as the Imam of the NII Government (NII, Imam Declaration No. 3; Imam Declaration No. 5). Until August 7, 1949, Kartosuwiryo officially proclaimed NII. Since then, NII's territory has continued to expand, not only in its main areas around Garut, Bandung, Sumedang, and Tasikmalaya, but also in Cirebon, Bogor, Banten, and Central Java (Pekalongan, Brebes, and Tegal) (van Dijk, 1981: 100; Formichi, 2012: 134).

Kartosuwiryo then sent envoys to Palembang, Bengkulu, Lampung, Jambi, and Tapanuli in mid-April 1949, to create NII bases (Formichi, 2012: 130), until finally reaching Aceh in 1950. In 1955 Indonesia had to face an expanding NII that already included Aceh, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi (van Dijk, 1981: 120; Formichi, 2012: 159). At least in addition to West Java (Kartosuwiryo), there are also in Central Java (Amir Fatah and Battalion 426), South Sulawesi (Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar), South Kalimantan (Ibnu Hajar), and Aceh.

The NII upheaval in Sulawesi began with the RERA issue. Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar with his army consisting of Bugis and Makassar tribes was not accepted into APRIS. Even though Qahhar had a role in fighting for Indonesian independence in Java in the army, as well as in the formation of the Indonesian military. He had escorted President Sukarno during a speech at Merdeka Square, on September 19, 1945. With a machete, Qahhar protected Sukarno and Hatta from the bayonets of Japanese soldiers (van Dijk, 1981: 156).

Qahhar who was born in Lanipa Village, Palopo (part of Luwu kingdom) on March 24, 1921, came from a lowly Bugis priyai family. Qahhar graduated from the Muhammadiyah Islamic College in Surakarta in 1941. Then he became a teacher at a Muhammadiyah school in Palopo and became a member of the Muhammadiyah Youth and Muhammadiyah Scouts, Hizbul Wathan. Qahhar returned to Surakarta in 1942, due to conflict with King Luwu (van Dijk, 1981: 55). Since then Qahhar took part in the struggle to defend Indonesia until 1952.

Qahhar co-founded the Sulawesi Indonesian Youth Movement (GEPIS) in Java. On 21 October 1945, he joined the Indonesian Sulawesi Youth Force. He was the first secretary of the Sulawesi Indonesian People's Service (KRIS), until the end of 1945. He also formed the Indonesian Unitary Battalion (BKI).¹² On the orders of General Sudirman, on 24 March 1946, Qahhar formed the Indonesian Army of Sulawesi Preparatory Republic (TRIPES), with BKI as its core (van Dijk, 1981: 155-158). On March 25, 1947, TRIPES changed its name to Lasykar Sulawesi. Qahhar also formed the elite Barisan Berani Mati (van Dijk, 1981: 160-161; Gonggong, 1992: 94).

Qahhar commanded the II.X Brigade, which was merged with J.F. Warouw's I.X Brigade to become XVI/Seberang Brigade in 1948. The brigade consisted of former KRIS, TNI Hasanuddin Regiment, and ALRI Division X/Sulawesi Preparation (Leirissa, 1997: 72-73). Warouw as his commander, Qahhar as his deputy commander, and Ventje Sumual his chief of staff (van Dijk, 1981: 161). Qahhar was then appointed commander of the Seberang Group Command (KGS) with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel Acting, to coordinate guerrillas in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara. Qahhar sent two of his staff, Saleh Sjahban and Bahar Mattaliu to South Sulawesi (Gonggong, 1992: 94; van Dijk, 1981: 166). Qahhar had previously organized armies from 1946 to 1947, but his efforts collapsed due to Westerling's actions (van Dijk, 1981: 161-162). In South Sulawesi, on August 17, 1949 the guerrillas held the Maros Conference. They decided to form the South Sulawesi Guerrilla Unit (KGSS) with a force of 10 battalions commanded by Saleh, with Bahar as its secretary. Another decision, KGSS was made into the organic army of the republic in the form of Hasanuddin Division. Qahhar was appointed as the commander of the

¹¹ Some Most of its members from the Minahasa and Manado tribes are Christians, generally ex-KNIL. KRIS is here to break the stigma that Minahasans support Belanda. In fact, the role of the ex-KNIL made KRIS reputable as a well-organized and highly disciplined army (van Dijk, 1981: 156-157). KRIS once joined the coalition of Benteng Republik Tan Malaka in rejecting the Linggadjati Agreement (Kahin, 1952 [1959]: 199).

¹² BKI contains inmates outside Java from Nusakambangan and Cilacap prisons. Qahhar released them, and gave them brief military training. BKI once escorted President Sukarno when he moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta due to a decision Renville, also served as a special shock force in the Khusus Military Investigation led by Colonel Zulkifli Lubis in Yogyakarta (van Dijk, 1981: 157).

Division, considering his services against the invaders in Java, as well as in improving the economy of South Sulawesi (Gonggong, 1992: 94-95).

After 1949, Indonesia and the Netherlands made a ceasefire. But militants continued to fight the KNIL. At the same time, when many ex-KNIL entered the TNI through RERA. Qahhar and his army opposed it, so conflict was inevitable. Their discontent grew with the disbandment of the XVI Brigade in January 1950. Since then, Qahhar has been unable to do any more activities in the TNI. He is suspected to have written a letter to the Central Government and Army Command on April 30, 1950, acknowledging him as an unemployed hero (van Dijk, 1981: 167).

Qahhar returned to Ujungpandang on June 22, 1950. There he persuaded TT/VII Commander Wirabuana AE Kawilarang to form the Hasanuddin Division. Kawilarang refused. On 1 July, Kawilarang issued a decree on the dissolution of KGSS and the prohibition of reactivating it, in a meeting that Qahhar attended (Gonggong, 1992: 96). Then Qahhar toured South Sulawesi, persuading ex-KGSS to accept RERA's decision. But when he returned to Ujungpandang, he actually brought the demands of ex-KGSS, so that some of them were accepted into the Army in the form of the Hasanuddin Brigade. Kawilarang still refused, so Qahhar resigned from his military post (van Dijk, 1981: 167-169). Actually, the Government has appointed the National Tjadangan Corps (CTN), as a forum for warriors who are not accepted in the TNI/TRI, with certain conditions. Those who do not qualify will be returned to society. But Qahhar and his group still rejected it (Leirissa, 1997: 72).

The KGSS brought Qahhar into the jungle in July 1950 and made him the leader. Since then, KGSS with the TNI began armed contact. On 6 August, the KGSS attacked Ujungpandang, but the TNI repelled the KGSS. The TNI attacked the KGSS in Siwa again, and on 12 October, Qahhar and his troops managed to escape. The government tried to resolve the dispute, forming a committee on August 18, but did not resolve the issue. Even though Qahhar actually opened a compromise, the government was still authorized to screen KGSS members in their acceptance into the TNI (van Dijk, 1981: 169-174).

Around 1951-1952, Qahhar sent two close men, Haji Abdul Qadir and his mother Haji Andi Risaju to meet Kartosuwiryo in Java. The two are two prominent PSII figures in Luwu (Gonggong, 1992: 46). Kartosuwiryo welcomed it, then on August 7, 1953, Qahhar proclaimed South Sulawesi as part of NII (van Dijk, 1981: 120; Gonggong, 1992: 109). Qahhar also took advantage of the Bugis social structure, by marrying Andi Halia, grandson of the Luwu king, Andi Jemma. The hope is that Qahhar can get more cultural support from the Bugis community because it is related to the highest Bugis elite (Gonggong, 1992: 71).

NII Aceh has a different background. At the beginning of Indonesia's independence, the ulama (teungku) led the people in the national revolution. The scholars ordered the Acehnese people to expel the Dutch, in order to maintain Indonesian independence as well as Islam (Beureueh & Kroeng Kale, 1945). Rakyat managed to prevent the Dutch from entering Aceh. This success is due to the people's adherence to the ulama, and Islam as the unity of their cultural roots (Reid, 2011: 326-327; Kahin, 1952 [1959]: 179). The national revolution also made the Acehnese people gain their autonomous rights covering the social, economic, and political fields. The central government was unable to interfere with the government in Aceh, also the victory against the Dutch increased the confidence of the Acehnese people to live autonomously (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 2). Anthony Reid said that because of this Aceh is difficult to cohere with Indonesia (Reid, 2011: 327).

In the national revolution in Aceh, uleebalang (Acehnese nobles) were targeted by revolutionaries. In the past, most uleebalang were part of the colonial government (Reid, 1974: 65-66). As for a small number of other uleebalang who were pro-people and ulama, the Dutch removed their positions and expelled them from Aceh (Ismuha, 1983: 14). In the Aceh War, many uleebalang secretly opposed effort Teungku Chik Di Tiro with the people against the Dutch. These uleebalang also often left Acehnese Islamic and customary law, so that Aceh's social order was damaged (Hoesin, 1970: 161). After independence, they were seen as opposed to Indonesia, and wanted the Dutch to re-colonize Indonesia, so that they could return to power as before. The Cumbok War proved this uleebalang view, so they faced PUSA scholars and the people (Aceh Regional Government of Indonesia, 1948). The revolution undermined the central position of uleebalang, replaced by PUSA scholars (Reid, 2011: 324-327; Sjamsuddin, 1990). Teungku Daud Beureueh himself was appointed as Governor of Militer Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo.

In December 1949, Deputy Prime Minister Sjafruddin Prawiranegara established Aceh as an autonomous province, under the leadership of Governor Teungku Daud Beureueh, through the Deputy Prime Minister Regulation In lieu of Government Regulation No. 8/Dec/WKPM of 1949, effective January 1, 1950 (El-Ibrahmy, 1982: 23). Sjafruddin mentioned that Prime Minister Hatta agreed to it. But the

decision was considered invalid, because the Hatta Cabinet had ended on December 2, 1949, so that Sjafruddin was no longer authorized to make decisions (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 35-36). When Natsir became Prime Minister, his cabinet was also unable to pass the people's hopes for Aceh to become a province (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 49).

Finally, Perpu No. 5 of 1950 was issued which included Aceh into the Province of North Sumatra (North Sumatra) (Perpu No. 5 of 1950; El-Ibrahimi, 1982: 56). The decision hurt the hearts of the people of Aceh. The people see that the government considers Aceh's role as the capital of the revolution deserted. Aceh has given his life and property to defend Indonesia's independence. The community also considered Sukarno to have reneged on his promise to Acehnese community leaders in 1948 to allow Aceh to implement Islamic law (El-Ibrahimi, 1982: 64-65; Sjamsuddin, 1990: 32).

The elite of Acehnese society continues to fight for Aceh as an autonomous province, considering that its culture based on Islam is different from other regions in North Sumatra (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 43). These demands came from the Aceh DPRD (ANRI, SetNegKab PM, No. 957 (h)), alim ulama (ANRI, SetNegKab PM, No. 957 (f); SetNegKab PM, No. 957 (g)). But the Centre still rejected it. The centre was difficult to accommodate the wishes of the Acehnese people because at that time Indonesian politicians generally supported an intergalactic state, especially President Sukarno himself (Feith, [1962] 2007: 76). According to Sjamsuddin, the policy of incorporating Aceh into North Sumatra was for the sake of obtaining votes for the 1955 election. North Sumatran politicians do not want to lose 1.2 million potential people as voters, some others do not want any province controlled by Masyumi (7 out of 8 Aceh DPRD members from Masyumi) (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 37). Daud Beureueh refused to submit to the new Acting Governor of North Sumatra (Beureueh, 1950).

Several Acehnese envoys visited Jakarta several times in August 1950. Daud Beureueh himself also had time to go to Jakarta to lobby the Center. But his efforts failed (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 44-46). Then he sent a telegram of resignation as Military Governor of Aceh to Kabinet Natsir on December 31, 1950. Natsir when Sjamsuddin was interviewed on February 2, 1974, actually wanted to appoint Daud Beureueh as Vice Governor of North Sumatra (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 48-49).

On the other hand, there are elements of Acehnese society who oppose the establishment of the Prov inside. One of them is T Hanafiah in his writing in Indonesia Raja, August 11, 1950. He is considered to have attacked the cleric who demanded Aceh Province (ANRI, SetNegKab PM, No. 957 (f)). PUSA demanded that the Government take action against it (PUSA, 24 December 1950). The chaos happened, even at the district level, such as in Aceh Besar (ANRI, SetNegKab PM, No. 957 (f)). Hanafiah was part of the uleebalang who did not like the ulama. After Cumbok, uleebalang moved his conflict with clerics from Aceh to Jakarta. They indirectly influenced the Central policy towards Aceh, as stated in Mr Assat's promise to Abdul Wahab and Ayah Gani to come to Aceh (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 46-47).

In between, Daud Beureueh and Kartosuwiryo began contact in early 1952. Kartosuwiryo sent Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati (aka Mustafa) to Aceh. Mustafa brought some of Kartosuwiryo's writings, among them the NII Political Manifesto, to invite Acehnese scholars to join him. Daud Beureueh sent PUSA Pemud a member Jahja Sulaiman and Mustafa to meet Kartosuwiryo. Mustafa also tented Daud Beureueh and PUSA members until early 1953 (Aisyah et.al, 2008: 82-84). On 20 September 1953, Daud Beureueh officially declared Aceh part of NII (Beureueh, 1953), with a commanded (military) government structure. The Batee Kureeng Congress of 23 September 1955 changed Aceh's status to Aceh State, the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII-NBA) with the NBA having its own cabinet (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 4-5; 167).

Conflict with the Republic

It is known that the first incident of conflict between TII and the TNI Siliwangi Division occurred in Antralina, near Malangbong, Garut, on January 25, 1949 (van Dijk, 1981: 91). As time goes by, the conflict becomes more tense. Around Garut and Tasikmalaya, the sounds of gunfire are heard almost every day. This atmosphere continued until mid-1951 (van Dijk, 1981: 104). The strong resistance of the NII made

¹³ Governor Acting (PLT). Appointed not with a regular mechanism, only to run the government administratively, has no authority to make political policies.

¹⁴ Four the contributing factors were (1) Natsir's government wanted Nkan efficiency, simplification of government is the way. (2) deviate from the RIS and RI agreement will endanger the government and Masyumi in front of its political opponents. (3) Masyumi believes that the people of Aceh can accept the policy, because of doormats (4) Masyumi's internal conflict, between Natsir who accommodated Aceh's interests, and Sukiman who wanted to be close to PNI who opposed Aceh province (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 45-46).

Captain Dodong Hamidjaja of the West Java TNI ceasefire with NICA in March 1949, to jointly face the NII (van Dijk, 1981: 92). Battle after battle between TII and TNI continues. On April 12, 1949, the TNI faced TII gunfire and managed to shoot dead dozens of NII members on the Tasikmalaya Cirebon connecting road (Formichi, 2012: 132). In June 1951, many TII officials began to be arrested or killed (van Dijk, 1981: 124).

Interestingly, there is one unique view from the Commander of the West Priangan Third Division TNI Major Ardlwinata as stated in his letter to TII. As a Muslim, he was proud to see Islam stirring in the breasts of TII members. He also mentioned that the purpose of the TNI with TII is actually the same, namely to establish a government that Allah SWT has mercy on, so he regretted the clash between the TNI and TII (Formichi, 2012: 141-142).

During the conflict with the Republic, Kartosuwiryo also had time to work with ex-KNIL who participated in the Ratu Adil Army (APRA) movement led by Westerling. He admitted to openly cooperating with those he said had converted to Islam. NII received complete and modern weapons from ex-APRA (Jusuf Taufiri, in the Republic of Indonesia: West Java Province, 1953: 216).

Conflict comes at the expense of society. Many villages were targeted by NII members. Murder, burning villages, mobilizing, and attacking trains and other motorists (Republic of Indonesia: West Java Province, 1953: 258-262). People are hobbled by poverty and loss of livelihood. Many people fled to safe places (migration). Food productivity declined because rice fields and fields were rarely cultivated, even ignored, due to public fear of NII (Republic of Indonesia: West Java Province, 1953: 212-213). In fact, people in some places in West Java, call NII strombolian, a Sundanese vocabulary that means gang of robbers.¹⁵

In Aceh, after the proclamation of NII Aceh on 21 September 1953, Daud Beureueh's forces attacked the TNI. Students, teachers and villagers attacked TNI posts in Lhokseumawe City. The community also disarmed TNI troops in Aceh Besar. Because the TNI on the ground was in crisis, the Center sent the Air Force to help them. Air Force planes bombed and opened fire on David Beureueh's followers, particularly in Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, and Sigli. The situation was revolutionary, as if the Acehnese people were prang sabi (sabil war) against the Dutch, as in the past. TNI nicknamed *teuntra kaphee* (infidel soldiers), NII mobs attacked TNI posts accompanied by *takbir*. (Sjamsuddin, 1990: 83-85).

The conflict disrupted people's lives, so the Center made Aceh a military stand, on October 24, 1953. A coordinating body to suppress the rebellion in Aceh was formed, consisting of SM Amin (Governor of North Sumatra), Colonel Simbolon (TNI Division I), Darwis Karim (Chief of North Sumatra Police), and Sutan Machudum (Chief of the North Sumatra Prosecutor's Office) (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 157).

Then in the late 1950s, there were talks between NII and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Universal Struggle (PRRI/Permesta) which at that time was also facing the PKI and the Sukarno Government. At that time, only two NII exponents were clearly seen working with PRRI/Permesta, namely NII South Sulawesi, and NII-NBA. NII South Sulawesi cooperated with PRRI/Permesta in an agreement on March 2, 1957. PRRI/Permesta does not make religion its political ideology. However, PRRI/Permesta wants an autonomous regional government based on the religious, economic, and cultural character of each place (van Dijk, 1981: 210). Here lies the meeting point of the two groups. On 15 February 1958, Qahhar became one of the members of his government's cabinet. NII-NBA also began to interact with PRRI/Permesta, even cooperating in a military operation, Operation Sabang-Merauke to guard the Aceh-Sumatra border. It is alleged that PRRI also provided arms assistance to NII-NBA (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 202).

The December 1958 Geneva Agreement involving representatives of PRRI/Permesta and NII represented by Hasan Ali (Prime Minister of NII-NBA) and Hasan Muhammad Tiro (NII Ambassador to the US (later Hasan founded the Free Aceh Movement/GAM), agreed on the establishment of a new state; Republic of the Union of Indonesia (RPI). RPI was officially proclaimed on February 8, 1960, so Aceh declared no longer part of NII, officially through a letter from the Wali NII-NBA Aceh to the Supreme Leadership of NII Kartosuwiryo, November 1960. The government of Daud Beureueh changed its name to the Islamic Republic of Aceh (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 205). RPI was designed as a formal forum for resistance against the Indonesian Government of Sukarno, as well as to prevent the entry of factors that could pollute the struggle (HN Sumual & Ahmad Husein, in Leirizza, 1997: 196). RPI is in the federal form to

¹⁵ NII Become a frightening scourge of society in writer's village, Tigaherang, Rajadesa District, Ciamis Regency. The writer (born in 1961) had fled several times with villagers to avoid *hordes* NII often takes all foodstuffs from people's homes at night. PeRnah took refuge in a relative's house in a remote place, once hiding in a dry well by the pond.

get support from other regions in Indonesia. Some important articles contained in the RPI Constitution are faith in God Almighty and living according to their respective religious laws; its territory covers the territory of Indonesia (proclamation of August 17, 1945); and against opinions that insult religion, (communism, and other ideas that are considered dangerous). The core areas of RPI include Aceh, Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, South and North Maluku (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 203-204).

Political perception of each figure

The birth of rebellion cannot be separated from the perception of the perpetrators. Therefore, the perceptions of Kartosuwiryo, Daud Beureueh, and Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar about the Indonesian Government and ideal politics are important to discuss, to get a more complete picture of the reality of the NII rebellion.

Kartosuwiryo considered the Republic of Indonesia and its national revolution to have failed (Sukarno, in Feith & Castles, 1988: 99-100). He rejected all Indonesian-Dutch negotiations, both Linggarjati, Renville and Roem-Royen. He mentioned that Sutan Sjahrir had sold Indonesian independence to Bel Anda in the Linggadjati Agreement and Amir Sjarifuddin in the Renville Agreement (van Dijk, 1981: 92; Formichi, 2012: 131). After the Renville agreement which made West Java no longer part of Indonesia, Kartosuwiryo saw that Indonesia had been, coupled with the arrest of republican leaders in the Dutch military aggression II on December 19, 1949, (NII, Imam Declaration No. 6, article 3). For him, the phase of the struggle for Indonesian independence has returned from scratch again (NII, A Brief History of the Struggle for Independence for 4 Years (1945-1949) no. 15). The Indonesian National Revolution turned into an Islamic revolution/holy war (NII, 1949b).

Kartosuwiryo did not like communist ideological groups which he considered to have been present in the Indonesian government. He disliked Amir Sjarifuddin whom he called the 'middleman of the state', and 'agent of Dutch imperialism' (NII, A Brief History of the Struggle for Independence for 4 Years (1945-1949) no. 8). Kartosuwiryo's bitter experience with the PKI has been long, starting from the split of PSII since 1921. Kemudian communism tried to 'Moscow' Indonesia. Therefore, Kartosuwiryo called Pancasila a 'hodgepodge' ideology: a synthesis of Japanese Shintoism, Nusantara animism, and leftist nationalism (NII, Political Manifestation of the Islamic State of Indonesia No. V/7, chapter II I, no. 2; chapter VIII, no. 5, part B),

Kartosuwiryo himself believes that only Islamism (pan-Islam) can withstand communism (NII, Political Manifestation of the Islamic State of Indonesia No. V/7, chapter IX, no. 11, part B), which is also 100% anticolonial. His idea has long been contained in many of his writings since ancient times, including in the concept of hijra that he carried. Kartosuwiryo saw that the purpose of a Muslim should be to perform acts of worship solemnly and as perfectly as possible as the Prophet Muhammad SAW exemplified. And Muslims must istiqomah to carry it out (Kartosuwiryo, 1936a). Hijra will not be valid without jihad (earnestly making good), both from an economic, social, and political point of view (Kartosuwiryo, 1936b).¹⁶

Hijra for Kartosuwiryo is a transfer of patterns from all the interests of human life and its mentality to what revelation commands, both small (individual) to large (society). The goal is to apply, seek, and gain the pleasure of Allah SWT. Hijra is divided into four: hijra fi-llah (abandoning worldly passions, towards the pleasure of Allah), hijra fi as-sabilillah, (hijra fi-llah shown in deeds), hijra ila-llah (like the universe belongs to Allah), and hijra ila-llah wa ila-rasulihi (following the commands of Allah SWT and the path of the Prophet SAW). In the Hidjra List, it is stated that Hijra is not a movement from one place to another, but in the form of a change of faith to high faith, and actions that show it (Kartosuwiryo, 1940).

Kartosuwiryo translated this idea into the form of NII, as described in the previous section. He was able to do it because there was a vacuum of power in West Java due to Renville), and the condition of the possibility of the Dutch entering West Java. In such an atmosphere of revolution, making local strong men must eventually come forward to take the initiative.

¹⁶ At Here lies one of the differences between Kartosuwiryo's concept of jihad and the current transnational radical Islamic group. The last groupThis r only sees jihad as war, while Kartosuwiryo sees it with its original meaning as earnest effort. For him, war is a small part of jihad, while there are many other aspects of jihad (Kartosuwiryo, 1936b; 1940).

David Beureueh was also sead. When leading the Acehese against the Dutch in 1945, he mentioned that the Dutch would wipe Islam from the hearts of the Acehese people, so the Dutch had to be resisted (Beureueh & Kroeng Kale, 1945). This indicates that Islam is essential in the eyes of David Beureueh. In 1947, when T Mansur (Wali Negara Sumatera Timur / NIT) invited Aceh to participate in conferences throughout Sumatra (to strengthen the NIT), David firmly rejected it. According to him, the Sumatran Congress was Belada's dictation to Mansur to divide Indonesia (North Sumatra Province, 1953: 292-293). Then when he led the Congress of Alim Ulama throughout Indonesia in Medan in April 1953, he and other ulama participants in the congress decided to fight for an Islamic state (Gelanggang, 1956: 10-11). This congress was a reaction to President Sukarno's speech in Amuntai which rejected Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state (Formichi, 2012: 158). After the speech, banners were spread in Aceh 'We love the president, but we love religion more' (Feith, 1962 [2007]: 346).

Daud Beureueh views that Indonesia has deviated from the agenda of the Proclamation of August 17, 1945. Indonesia is seen as a "Hindu government that is not national and very similar to the Communists" who are overtly anti-Islam and God. The Indonesian government is also considered to have tormented the Acehese people, by arresting Acehese men who were not TII, burning villages, raping the honour of Acehese women, hunting people in the mountains, to torturing people who were caught cruelly (Beureueh, 1954b). He also pointed out that Indonesia had played tricks on the Acehese people, wasted its sacrifices in the physical revolution, and did not fulfil the promise that Aceh could implement Islamic law (El-Ibrahimi, 1982: 64-65; Sjamsuddin, 1990: 32).

Since the time of the kingdom, Aceh has had a distinctive political structure, successively from the smallest to the largest are gampong (villages), mukim (collection of villages), ulee balang (district), sagoe (group of several mukim), to the sultan's area (Syamsuddin, in Koentjaraningrat, 1971 [1984]: 234; Hasjmy, 1983: 77; Takeshi, 1984: 78-82). Similar to the trias politica of modern democracy, Aceh's power structure consists of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. This pattern is present both at the royal level and up to the level of kampung gampong. The legislature contains ingenious figures of cleverness and clergy, the judiciary is held by the clergy.

All of these institutions work according to Islamic law which not only regulates religion, but also Acehese customs/qanun (statehood), and reusam (society) (Di Mulek, 1868 [2010]: 26-29; Hasjmy, 1983: 69). Acehese customs are derived from sharia, which is the embodiment of 'urf from the fiqh of the Shafi'i school adopted by the Acehese people (Di Mulek, 1868 [2010]: 102). One of the Acehese proverbs states that customary (law) with Law (Islam) is never divorced, like substances with properties (Wildan et.al, 2002). At the smallest level (gampong) even adat and reusam are pillared with sharia (Takeshi, 1984: 191). Therefore, Acehese culture is synonymous with Islam (Feith & Castle, 1988: 209).

The Acehese government ini that Daud Beureueh fought for through NII (Beureueh, 1954b; Beureueh & Aly, no year). David was indeed a modernist who tended to be different from the traditionalists. However, he views the values and culture that take root in Aceh as relatively completely Aslami.

"Adat jang is concluded in the growth of Atjeh jang customs have been passed down from generation to generation and do not have the Law and Sjari'at even though jang has been a qanun and resam custom, 17including in 1. Megow custom (performing). 2. Adat hareukat (economy). 3. Adat Utoih Pandee (industrial)." (Beurueh, 1961a).

Qahhar Mudzakkar's position was quite different from that of the previous two figures in the early days of his rebellion. Bugis culture has a central position in the perception of Qahhar and political reality. Qahhar is the kind of person who is stubborn and upholds honour. While in the army, he had several conflicts with his colleagues. While in the I.X Brigade, he came into conflict with Ventje Sumual. Qahhar was appointed commander of the Seberang Group Command (KGS) to defuse the conflict. He also had conflicts with his superiors in Central Java, Lieutenant Colonel Suharto (who later became the second President of Indonesia), so Qahhar and his troops were banned from entering Yogyakarta when the TNI was reoccupied in the First General Offensive of March 1949 (van Dijk, 1981: 161).

In the early days of independence, Qahhar was still loyal to Pancasila. He even founded the Indonesian Pantjasila Party, and the Marhaen Cooperative (Gonggong, 1992: 123; 137-138). However, when the Government did not grant his request to include him and his followers in the Indonesian military, Qahhar began looking for other channels.

The government's refusal to demand Qahhar and his followers (KGSS militia) was a violation of the honour of Qahhar, a Bugis who lived in a siri' and pesse culture that highly valued honour and self-

¹⁷ *Reusam*, is local local law. *Reusam* usually present at the level *Gampong*

respect. *Siri* and *pesse* are the core culture of the Sulawesi people. *Siri* is the same culture of the Bugis and Makassar people, which is their motive for action, as well as present in their actions. 18 The Bugis and Makassar people are willing to die, even willing to resort to violence in order to maintain their series (Mattulada, in Gonggong, 1992: 71-72. Not infrequently *siri* can make emotions uncontrollable which results in acts that degrade humanity (Gonggong, 1992: 73), such as murder to maintain self-esteem. While *pesse* is the local value of solidarity of the Bugis-Makassar community that is present in the series. Individuals who have the same series are united in the group and help each other for the common good. *Siri* and *Pesse* create a social structure within the group, which governs the rights and obligations of each member (Gonggong, 1992: 74-75; Pelras, 1996: 206-208). The values of *siri* and bubonic plague have been deeply rooted in the culture of the people of South Sulawesi for a long time (Pelras, 1996).

As the leader of the group, Qahhar must protect the interests of his group. The value of *pesse*, namely the spirit of brotherhood, made Qahhar have to fulfil the request of his follower, to be accepted as an official soldier. Qahhar had to fulfil his duty as a father who defended his children. Otherwise, his envy will be smeared. In addition, some members of the Qahhar army were a high social class group of the Bugis and Makassar (Daeng) people. This further burdened Qahhar to defend his honour in front of the public. In addition, Qahhar also saw his resistance as an attempt to restore his *siri*, for the punishment that King Luwu inflicted on him (Gonggong, 1992: 76-77).

The culture and people of the Bugis and Makassar who were intimate with Islam made Qahhar find another alternative: the politics of an Islamic state. For him liberalism and communism have corrupted the world, and Islam is the way out. In his letter to President Sukarno, Qahhar mentioned that fighting for world peace without morals and religion is futile. He also asked Sukarno to replace Pancasila with a divine philosophy, namely the philosophy of Islam and other religions that Indonesian people profess (Gonggong, 1992: 139-141). Qahhar's view of Indonesia was so harsh, that when the Indonesian government called for peace, Qahhar rejected it. Therefore, the TNI must fight the NII of South Sulawesi.

Parallels with Islamic Parties in the Republic

The Indonesian Police Report (1952) stated that the roots of the NII upheaval came from Islamic parties. In it emerged Islamic intellectuals who wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The number is small, but it has a large influence on Islamic parties. It is also mentioned that the efforts of these intellectuals took advantage of the situation of the Indonesian agreement with the Dutch carried out by the left group (Amir Sjarifuddin with his Renville). Therefore, these intellectuals incited the public that this leftist group was controlling Indonesia (ANRI, SetNegKab PM, No. 480).

Islam as the basis of the state of Indonesia is not new among Indonesian Muslims. Masyumi fought for it, both in modern and traditional factions. Islamic parties at that time did want a state within the framework of religion. Herein lies the parallel of Islamic parties with NII. The connection between Indonesia and religion is contained in the seven words of the Jakarta Charter; Divinity with the obligation to observe Islamic law for its adherents. The comprehension of these seven words does not necessarily make Islam impossible to be present in the life of the country. Because the Jakarta Charter is called animating Pancasila. The Islamic parties (which had previously belonged to one Masyumi party) still believed in it, through constitutional struggle. This is what distinguishes it from NII. Masyumi's agreement on Pancasila departed from the idea that the Jakarta Charter animates Pancasila, after the abolition of seven words. This problem is not only shared by politicians of Islamic parties but also present in the minds of Muslim figures who are not affiliated with any Islamic party. For example, in the political views of R.A.A. Wiranata Koesoema (Feith & Castles, 1988: 220-226).

Masyumi firmly rejected the actions of the NII, which resulted in the establishment of a state within the state (Formichi, 2012: 148), which was contained in its official statement (Masyumi Party Leadership Council, 1950). Wahid Hasjim (Masyumi) stated that every Muslim is obliged to fight to establish an Islam

¹⁸ Anhar Gonggong explained that the Bugis and Makassar communities classify people from *Siri* Embodied in Perbhis strength. People with *Siri* perfect (*Matanre'-Siri*) if high regard for morality and others. While those who behave badly are called less *Siri* His (*makurang-siri*). Actions that contain *Siri* occurs due to the behavior of the person (*Siri* *Masiri*) dAn external cause (*Siri* *Ripakasiri*). For the latter context, Gonggong illustrates as follows. "*Siri* *ripakasiri* It happened because an unknown young man deliberately nudged one of the body parts of a woman. Such a shock may provoke the wrath of one of his family members, or *to-masiri'na*, and perform action kHarshness against a nudging man who has been considered a humiliation of his family." (Gonggong, 1992: 73-74).

state, but disagrees with NII for using Islam to create separatism (Berita Indonesia, December 12, 1949, in Formichi, 2012: 147-148). Nevertheless, in 1954 the PKI spread issues associating Masyumi with NII (Feith, 1962 [2007]: 359).

End of upheaval

The government (at that time the United States of Indonesia Republic / RIS) used military means to solve the NII problem. Masyumi criticized him, saying the government ignored his demand to resolve the NII conflict in peace and dialogue. Masyumi accused the Government of secretly using great military force, and giving great authority to the military which more often endangers civilians (Formichi, 2012: 151). On July 10, 1950, the Government established the Committee for the Settlement of Military and Political Arrests (Presidential Decree RIS No. 210/1950).

Previously, the Government had made a peaceful approach with Kartosuwiryo. On the eve of the NII proclamation, Hatta sent Natsir and Hamengkubuwono IX to Bandung, to persuade Kartosuwiryo to abandon his intentions. The day before the proclamation, August 6, 1949, Natsir sent a letter to Kartosuwiryo which the great figure of the Islamic Union Ustad Ahmad Hassan (Hassan Bandung) brought. Kartosuwiryo knew Hassan well. He and Natsir together had studied with Hassan. But Kartosuwiryo's bodyguards intercepted Hassan because they did not know him. The mail could not arrive on time. Only three days after that Kartosuwiryo received it. But he refused the request in the letter, because for him he did not lick the spit that had come out (Natsir, 2008: 27-28).

The RIS government sent Central Javanese Masyumi leader Wali Alfatah to meet Kartosuwiryo in June 1950. Kartosuwiryo was unwilling to meet him, even TNI took Wali captive until the end of June. Wali mentioned that Kartosuwiryo was reluctant to make peace, so NII could only be resolved militarily. Immediately Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX ordered APRIS to act, by cutting off NII's logistics supply line (Formichi, 2012: 152). But afterwards, PSII and Masyumi appeared to bring a peaceful settlement. RIS stated that the Government respects the ideology that NII promotes, but the Government must act if NII creates chaos in the midst of society (Formichi, 2012: 153). The RIS dissolution on August 17, 1950 and Nusantara returned to Indonesia under the leadership of Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir on September 6, the cabinet continued its peaceful efforts by forming a team consisting of representatives of several ministries (SK PM RI No. 1 1/1950).

Peace efforts with NII West Java went tough and ultimately unsuccessful. In July 1959 Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly and made a decree to return to the 1945 Constitution. Simultaneously, Sukarno brought the system of Guided Democracy and the ideological unity of Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). Therefore, Kartosuwiryo strengthened his efforts against the Republic of Indonesia (Kartosuwiryo, 1959). In the same year, the TNI under the command of AH Nasution changed tactics from passive-defense to active attack. The TNI together with the community made Operation Pagar Betis, by besieging Mount Geber (Mount Rakutak), the hiding place of Kartosuwiryo and his followers (Formichi, 2012: 168). Kartosuwiryo was caught in an ambush by TNI led by Ibrahim Adjie in 1962. Kartosuwiryo declared surrender and ordered his followers to lay down their weapons, "stop firing, return to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia" (interview with Sardjono Kartosoewirjo, May 30, 2015).¹⁹ He was later tried in Jakarta. The trial was decided in the form of a shooting penalty because Kartosuwiryo was found guilty. The sentence was carried out on September 23, 1962 (Formichi, 2012: 169). While his followers signed a pledge to return to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia (Joint Pledge, August 1, 1962).

The effort was successful against the NII-NBA. Initially, the Central Government accommodated the expectations of the people, by establishing Aceh Province (Law No. 24 of 1956). In 1959 the Government created the Hardi Mission program to continue peace steps, by making Aceh a 'special region' (Prime Minister Decree No. 1/Missi/1959). Hardi is the Deputy Prime Minister of the Djuanda Cabinet, and also a member of the PNI. His appointment as head of mission was a political move by Aceh Governor Ali Hasjmy, so the PNI faction in parliament would support him (Hardi, 1994: 59).

Peace efforts began long ago. In 1954 Daud Beureueh mentioned the possibility of making peace with Indonesia (Beureueh, 1954a). On the other hand, the Acehnese people also expected it, such as the ex-Divcontents of Gajah I who gathered in Yogyakarta in October 1956, as well as the meeting of Acehnese clever minds in Medan in September 1956. In 1957 the Lam Teh Pledge was born between NII-NBA and RI, to make a truce (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 164). At the beginning of the NII proclamation in Aceh,

¹⁹ Sardjono is Kartosuwiryo's youngest of 12 children. Sardjono was five years old when Kartosuwiryo was arrested.

Vice President Hatta had met Daud Beureueh to discontinue his intention. But the attempt was unsuccessful, especially because Masyumi was expelled from the government policy (Feith, 1962 [2007]: 346).

Commander Iskandar Muda Colonel M Jassin also continued the effort. Jassin through his letter to Daud Beureueh mentioned the Government's hope that David Beureuh would return to his lap RI (Jassin, 1961). Daud replied by mentioning that his struggle was the will of the Muslims of the Acehnese people (Beureueh, 1961d). Jassin himself met David Beureueh on November 2, 1961 (Beureueh, 1961c). Then Beureueh explained that peace of mind could occur if Aceh was allowed to observe Islamic law. He related his intention to the Presidential Decree, that the Jakarta Charter animates the 1945 Constitution (Beureueh, 1961c). The statement was welcomed by Minister of State Security AH Nasution (Nasution, 1961). David Beureueh's view of the decree was positive, in contrast to Kartosuwiryo's negative.

Daud Beureueh still questioned whether or not Indonesia could accept the desire of Aceh Province to implement Islamic law (Beureueh, 1961b). He then sent his son M Hasballah to meet Nasution (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 182-183). Daud was not satisfied with the decision of the Hardi Mission which only gave Aceh 'special' status but still referred to Law No. 1 of 1957 concerning Regional Government. He wanted Aceh to be truly 'special' by having the right to implement Islamic law (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 184-185).

Once deadlocked, Muhammad Nur el-Ibrahimi of Masyumi met David Beureueh at his headquarters to continue peace talks for five days and five nights (el-Ibrahimi, 1982: 210-211). Until finally Jassin as the War Ruler of the Special Region of Aceh officially decided Aceh could implement Islamic law (Jassin, 1962). David Beureueh welcomed the decision (Beureueh, 1962). Until finally he and his followers returned to the lap of Mother Earth in the Acehnese People's Harmony Conference at Blangpadang Square, Kutaraja (Banda Aceh) on December 21, 1962 (Blangpadang Charter, 1962). The emotional atmosphere is recorded in poetry (Atjeh, tt).

Unlike Qahhar, he continued his struggle. After the death of Kartosuwiryo and Daud Beureueh, Qahhar tried to establish the Islamic Republic of Indonesia (RPII) in the form of a union government and appointed himself president (Gonggong, 1992: 168-181). Finally, his efforts stopped when he was shot dead by TNI troops in an ambush in 1965.

CONCLUSION

The face of the Indonesian revolution in the early days of its independence besides being heroic also displays chaos and uncertainty. This second face generally fills the movements of the Indonesian revolution. The old value, social, and political order was overhauled, but the new order was unable to improve the situation. The economy is difficult, and so is politics and security. The state administration was chaotic, the cabinet was ups and downs, and there were also many mobs robbing the people.

The same face is present in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi. The economy and politics of West Java are in full swing, plus when it is released from Indonesia. In Aceh, the central government is considered to be paying less attention to its people. Similarly, the new social order and values that entered collided with Aceh's strong culture of Islam. Sukarno is considered to have reneged on his promise to allow Aceh to implement Islamic law. Meanwhile, economic and military problems occurred in South Sulawesi. The soldiers could not fit into the new army structure, making them very difficult.

This situation makes some people dissatisfied and do not believe in the new order. There were rejections, until the rebellion. The NII rebels consider that the order fails in the welfare of the community because they themselves see the chaos and uncertainty of life in Indonesia. Therefore, they lose trust in the legitimate government, withdraw political support, and suspect the policies of the state. This is what Kartosuwiryo, Qahhar Mudzakkar and David Beureueh understand.

Kartosuwiryo and Daud Beureueh sought other political alternatives, which were considered capable of clearing up the chaos of Indonesia; the Islamic state. At that time, one of the other facial features of the Indonesian revolution was ideological politics. Each political element in the Republic tried to answer the problems through its own ecological id. Similarly, the behaviour of the three figures.

They took up the idea of an Islamic state. This idea departs from Pan-Islamism built by Jamaludin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, seen in addition to the idea of religion as State Baseline, also in the form of statehood in the form of *jumhuriyah* (republic), not the Ottoman Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid II understand (empire *daulah khilafah*). The anti-colonialism of the three NII figures is another proof of the Pan-Islamism of al-Afghani and Abduh, although for Qahhar it is somewhat distant. This idea was brought in by modernist Islamists to Indonesia. One that carried it in its early days was PSII. Kartosuwiryo is one

of the prominent figures of Sarekat Islam. Meanwhile, Daud Beureueh is one of the prominent modernist Islamic figures in Aceh, through PUSA.


Another thing is Qahhar, who is less steeped in political Islam, but his background is that he attended the Muhammadiyah Solo school, making him more or less familiar with Pan-Islamism. He was also close to Sarekat Islam figures in South Sulawesi. So, the three believed that the offer of Islamic politics could answer Indonesia's problems at that time. Although at the beginning of his protest he still adhered to Pancasila, but he turned to the Islamic state.

Their political views were not very philosophical, because they were all made quickly and in short readings. Although the main idea is strong, the political system and structure are not yet strong, changing several times, adjusting to changing circumstances. In fact, most of the NII's life span is military rule, as it is read as martial law. The new ideal political system is limited to concepts.

Their efforts are also intertwined with the culture of the local community. The three figures used the 'structure' in their environment, in the form of religion, local values, and social structure, to gain mass support. In West Java, Kartosuwiryo used the structure of the clergy to gain public sympathy. Daud Beureueh was part of the ulama group, the highest social structure in Aceh after the collapse of the Kingdom of Aceh Darussalam. While Qahhar uses the Bugis priyai group (Andi), as well as scholars. In addition to it, all three also use military structures.

Daud Beureueh brought back the Acehnese political order in the form of religion, Acehnese customs, and reusam. Elements of the locality are also present in Qahhar Mudzakkar's politics. The culture of siri' and pesse typical of South Sulawesi became the main nilai he used in perceiving reality, as well as one of the motives of his movement. To a certain degree, the political concept of NII also raised the old structure, which was previously replaced by a new structure.

Using Anthony Giddens' structuring theory, the above explanation shows the importance of reading the interaction between agents and 'structures' in an attempt to create new 'structures'. The socio-political reality of the atmosphere of revolution is a structure that agents read and internalize, then it becomes a reference for action. The ideological political views of the Indonesian nation at that time were the agent's 'mental structure', which it used to read political reality in an atmosphere of revolution. The diversity of political ideologies was a volksgeist nation at the time. The atmosphere of revolution in the form of confusion, anxiety, feelings of suffocation, a tendency to suspicion, and a tendency to use violence, also affects the views of agents. All of this shape the perception of each agent (as well as his followers) to try to change the 'structure', that is, rebel. The upheaval in fact occurred due to the chaotic political, social, and economic conditions of the Republic of Indonesia, thus opening up opportunities for all groups to channel any ideological aspirations, including changing the basis and structure of the Indonesian state. This was the zeitgeist of Indonesia in that era, and the diversity of political ideologies was the spirit of the volksgeist. Both are the 'structure' of his mentality. An illustration can be seen in the following chart:



Hatta and Natsir's (and Masyumi's) efforts to resolve the NII case by means of dialogue can be seen as

the awareness of the two figures towards the atmosphere of revolution that necessitated the NII upheaval. Apart from all of them, the political alternative of NII is seen as threatening the existence of Indonesia, because it has implications for a complete overhaul of the system and state policy. Indonesia reacted dynamically, between the military and the negotiations. Despite this, civil wars between Republican elements persisted. Unfortunately, the victims are the community, the real parties of both RI and NII want to defend and protect.

The work of van Dijk (1981) and Sjamsuddin (1990) has not clearly demonstrated this zeitgeist and volksgeist. They do not see that chaos and uncertainty play a role in giving rise to NII. Neither emphasizes ideology as an inner aspect of rebellion, such as Horikoshi's critique of van Dijk who did not see religion as an epistemological factor of human action (Horikoshi, 1984). Formichi (2012) although revising it by showing the ideological background of pan-Islamism in NII, it is synonymous with the transnational movement that exists today. Nor did Formichi read the zeitgeist of revolution as the cause.

Formichi also does not read the character of Muslim communities in Indonesia that tend to be moderate in politics, for example, Muslim politicians do not rigidly raise the system of Islamic government by eliminating other systems (Indonesian government). This can be seen from the Masyumi Party, Nahdlatul Ulama, and PSII which recognize the Indonesian government system, and enforce sharia constitutionally, not through violence that destroys the political order. This moderate character in politics is actually seen also in Kartosuwiryo, Daud Beureueh, and Qahhar Muzakkar who before rebelling still held Pancasila as the basis of statehood. Then they turned to attack Pancasila because it was considered to have been interpreted from the point of view of communism. In their turmoil, they still view positively the Indonesian nationality, even though they view the Indonesian Government negatively.

At the end of the uprising, the three failed to change Indonesia's political structure. Kartosuwiryo surrendered and ordered his followers to lay down their arms. He was sentenced to death. Daud Beureueh wanted to reconcile with the Indonesian government, only requesting that the central government allow Aceh to implement Sharia law in its government. Qahhar Muzakkar was shot dead by TNI forces during a siege in 1965.

If using the logic of Islamic extremist groups today, Kartosuwiryo should choose to die in his struggle (martyrdom). Likewise, Daud Beureueh should not be allowed to make peace by simply asking Aceh to implement Islamic law. Because by looking at the ideas of Islamic extremists, it must not compromise with infidel governments. Somewhat different from Qahhar, who died in the struggle. But the more prominent value is precisely in the series and its pesse. In the author's view, Azyumardi Azra's question to Formichi, about why ideas, movements, struggles and attempts to form political units such as the NII are usually fail, is actually a rhetorical question. Azra seemed to want to show that Formichi had used an improper method in reading NII.

Formichi concluded Kartosuwiryo's political concept as a daulah khilafah, because he wanted to establish a council of Khalifatullah fi-al'ardi in federal form (Formichi, 2012: 66). But the organization seems more worthy of being matched with the commonwealth or such as the Non-Aligned Organization, or perhaps also the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Because the federation itself is in conflict with the idea of a caliphate (empire) that extremist Islamic groups promote.

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