IRAN'S ANTI-COMMUNIST RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOVIET IRANIAN RELATIONS 1979-1989

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Abstract
This research sheds light on the study of the role of religious ideology in Iranian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, and how Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to export the principles of his Islamic revolution towards all countries of the world, including the Soviet Union with a communist orientation, according to the issue velayat-e faqih, until 1989.

Keywords:-Khomeini, Afghanistan, Iranian foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION:
The Iranian leadership, represented by the clerics, considered that the establishment of the Islamic government in Iran is only a first step towards the idea of forming a global state, and at the same time refused to recognize the geographical borders between countries, and recognized only what called ideological borders, so it sought to strengthen its relations with all countries of the world, including the Soviet Union.

On this basis, we chose to involve into writing the research entitled: "Iran's Anti-Communist Religious Principles and Their Impact on Iranian-Soviet Relations 1979-1989", to give the reader a clear picture of the importance of the role of religion in foreign policy between Iran and the Soviet Union, which differed in ideological orientations during that period.

The time limit for the research was set in 1979, being the year in which the establishment of an Islamic Republic was announced in Iran, led by the Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, and with his accession to power, he announced a boycott of the Soviet Union as it has a communist orientation, contrary to what the Islamic Revolution called for, which has Islamic ideas The Twelvers, calling for "support for the weak and the oppressed", while the year 1989 was chosen as the end of the subject of the study because it was the year in which Khomeini died, and with his death, the strategy of Iranian foreign policy changed.

The research relied on a variety of sources with different translations, including documents known as the Imam newspaper, issued by the Foundation for Organizing and Publishing the Imam Khomeini Legacy - International Affairs, which are (speeches, appeals, interviews, judgments, legal agencies, and personal letters) that benefited Searching a lot with very important information, in addition to the various Arabic, Arabized and English sources.

Ayatollah Khomeini (1), was keen on strengthening his country's relations with the Soviet Union, in order to achieve what he aspired to according to the theory of velayat-e faqih aimed at exporting the Islamic revolution to the countries of the whole world, especially since the Soviet Union, as soon as learned of the formation of a new Islamic government in Iran, hastened to recognize it on the 15th of February 1979 (2), because he was not in agreement with the previous Iranian government during the reign of the Shah, so he looked at the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran with an "optimistic view"; to win her to his favor against the United States of America (3).

Since the Soviet Union followed the Marxist ideology (4), that is why Mehdi Bazargan (5) indicated on 18th of February 1979, during an interview with the New York Times, about the Marxist activity
represented by the communist Tudeh Party (6), saying: "Left groups can operate freely and form communist parties, but if they cause a disturbance in the security situation, we will repel them." Then the Soviet Union focused strongly on the need to strengthen cooperation between the Tudeh Party and the new religious forces, desiring a transformation of this relationship later to an alliance through which he can extend his influence inside Iran (7).

Accordingly, the Soviet media focused strongly on ensuring that the Islamic character of the new regime in Iran does not cause tension in relations between them, as it was keen to show the internal policy of the Soviets as being based on "freedom of belief", and that the Muslims in their country enjoy great freedom in terms of religious side, emphasizing that "there is no contradiction between communism and Islam," and that everyone has "a sufficient degree of equality and freedom there," and thus aimed to win the favor of the Iranian government, which has emerged on the regional scene, according to a new religious ideology (8). It seems that the Soviet Union wanted, to be closer to the new Iranian government as well, to achieve its own interests, represented by its access to warm waters and the Arabian gulf region, which is its first pillar on the one hand, and Iran-backed Afghanistan is its second pillar on the other hand (9). Therefore, Iran became a region of great importance to the Soviet Union (10).

Thus, the Soviet Union wanted to prove its "good intentions" to win over the Iranian regime, as it sought to strengthen the bonds of cooperation, interdependence and friendship between them, and in light of that, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev (11), made a welcoming and formal statement on 3rd of March, 1979, with the victory of the Iranian revolution, expressing his hope for the strengthening and development of good-neighborly relations between the two countries (12), and when the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran was announced on the first of April of the same year, Brezhnev sent a congratulatory message to Khomeini on this occasion(13 ), on the fourth of April of the year 1979 (14 ), in which he emphasized that his country's policy towards the new Iranian government is based on friendship and good neighborliness, desiring to attract the Iranian regime through the feelings of courtship it showed. Thus, the Soviet Union would be one of the first countries to recognize this system (15), and officially (16).

On the other hand, the Iranian side expressed its “satisfaction” with that rapprochement, so the Iranian President, Mehdi Bazargan, sent in May 1979, Dr. Muhammad Makri (17), to be the first ambassador of the Iranian Republic in Moscow, in a good and encouraging gesture in terms of the development of relations between the two countries (18), But the situation did not last long. During the same month, statements were made by some Iranian clerics, in which they denounced the Marxist ideology, including Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (19), the head of the Iranian Shura Council, as he indicated that “communism is not Islamic, and the Soviet Union is tyrannical” (20).

Despite these statements by some Iranian clerics, the Iranian government had a different point of view, as it sought to win over all the internal opposition parties to its side, given its knowledge of the existence of ties linking that opposition to the Soviet Union, including the Tudeh Communist Party, is loyal to the Soviets, so it allowed to this party to exercise its activities openly, after it practiced its activities secretly during the Pahlavi rule. Accordingly, the party expressed its support for the revolution, despite its ideological differences related to principles and ideas (21), but the party’s public activity did not last long, as the Iranian government issued on August 20, 1979, a decision to close the offices of the Tudeh Party and ban it, because of his criticism of the Islamic manifestations, which emerged at the time, but it is remarkable that the Soviet government did not defend or denounce that measure that was taken against the party, and that all it did was direct the Soviet media to call for lifting the ban on the party, so that it would return to its activities in a calm manner and extreme caution, by asking Khomeini to intervene personally, so the latter ordered on November 1, 1979 to allow the Tudeh Party to resume its activities (22).
The Soviet Union continued its policy of not causing problems with the Iranian regime, especially when the Soviets ignored the declaration issued by the Iranian government on the fifth of November 1979, which stipulates the abolition of Article VI of the 1921 Agreement (23), which was concluded between the two countries (24). However, the Soviet attempt to approach the Iranian regime did not last, as a result of the political-religious discourse, which had a great impact in creating a rift between them, as Khomeini focused strongly on some slogans, including: "Neither East nor West" (25), and "Exporting the Revolution", a goal of during which he promoted his revolutionary model to apply it all over the world (26), and most important, the Iranian regime viewed the Soviet Union as a threat to its security and independence. Despite the difference between the two ideologies, they share one point, which is the desire to expand that ideology and spread it around the world (27), so the Iranian government worked to emphasize the rejection of tyranny, and the right of peoples to express their opinions and determine their own destiny (28), as well as that Khomeini called the Soviet Union the "Little Satan" (29), because of the atheistic ideology he embraced, and he tried hard to spread it in the western and eastern world (30). Accordingly, Khomeini believed that it was an atheist state, and a danger to Islam, in addition to the presence of opposition to the Iranian government represented by the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, all of which led to strained relations between the two countries (31).

Iranian-Soviet relations deteriorated dramatically after the latter's occupation of Afghanistan (32), in late December 1979 (33), as the Iranian government considered the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan a direct threat to its security (34), especially since the nascent Islamic Republic was suffering from political chaos, due to the impact of the changes it witnessed at the time, and its anxiety increased because it believed that it might be the second target after Afghanistan in light of the requirements of security protection, to ensure the borders of the Soviet Union (35), as well as its goal to reach the warm waters in the Indian Ocean (36), as a result of the desire that was it is trying to gain a foothold in the region (37), and perhaps the main reason behind that invasion is due to the fear of the Soviet Union from the dangers of internal ideological instability in its areas of influence (38), especially after the victory of the Iranian revolution, which began to affect its neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, which it has common historical and border ties, as well as the internal conditions of Afghanistan itself, which were more suitable for the spread of Islamic revolutionary thought in it (39), and then the Iranian government found itself facing a direct threat from the impact of the presence of a superpower on its borders (40). Since Afghanistan is an Islamic country, and the Afghans use the Persian language, which they consider an important language, especially among those who are educated among them (41), so the Iranian government considers it as a part of its regional integration. It is linked with it religiously, culturally and economically, and in light of this the Islamic Republic of Iran considered that what happened to Afghanistan might happen to her (42).

Based on that view, the Iranian regime launched anti-Soviet speeches, and "questioned the legitimacy of the occupation regimes," stressing the necessity of establishing a global Islamic government in accordance with Islamic law (43), as well as condemning this occupation of a Muslim country (44). On the 28th of December 1979 (45). In the same context, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Qutbzadeh issued a strongly worded statement about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 29, 1979, in which he said: "The Islamic government in Iran cannot agree to any country in the world to intervene militarily in the territory of a country.” especially if a major country did so in a small country... As Afghanistan is a Muslim country neighboring Iran, the government of Iran considers the invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghan lands as a hostile act not only against the people of Afghanistan but against all the Muslims of the world” (46.).

As a result of the Soviet persecution of the Muslims of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran took on a new religious dimension in its foreign policy against the Soviet Union, as it supported all Islamic movements in Afghanistan (47), and the Iranian Republic saw in the occupation an important
opportunity to implement its revolutionary model by exporting its religious principles there, to combat arrogance represented by Soviet occupation of Muslim land (48). Khomeini considered the Soviet Union as his enemy, because the latter issued orders to his army to invade Afghanistan, the Islamic country. Khomeini, for his part, called on all segments of Afghan society, including the armed forces, police, and civil employees, to unite and stand up to what he called "the atheists and the corrupt," who "target to sabotage the culture of the Islamic country," which is represented by the Soviet Union, with the elements of the communist Afghan government, and as a natural response the Republic of Iran witnessed a large number of Afghans residing there, with the support of some of their Iranian supporters, moving towards the Soviet embassy building in Tehran in protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, demanding the necessity of their withdrawal from it in early January 1980 (49). It can be said that the Iranian Islamic Revolution and its revolutionary ideology succeeded in spreading its ideas to the Afghans, this is evident from their movement, as it seems that it motivated them and pushed them to stand up against the Soviet occupation of their country.

The matter did not stop at that, but the Iranian regime tried to seek to promote the principles of its religious revolution, by encouraging Iranian immigration to the Afghan regions close to its borders (50), and it appears that the Iranian government wanted to create a wall of repulsion, to prevent the penetration of communist ideology coming from Afghanistan. After that, the Iranian regime followed other methods to transfer concepts and ideas, in order to work to stir up religious feelings, through the clergy, as they played a key role in exporting the revolution, and worked to develop of Afghan resistance that controlled large parts of Afghanistan, in the center, west, and areas that it is located near the Iranian border, especially near the holy city of Mashhad, as that city was of great importance to the Shiites, because it contains the shrine of Imam Ali bin Musa al-Ridha (PBUH), who is the eighth imam of the Shiites, so that the city of Mashhad became an important point of contact between the Afghan Mujahideen and the Iranians. Many of the clerics residing in this city had an important role in urging and attracting them, through their promotion of the principles of their religious revolution (51), and they succeeded in strengthening their ideological, ethnic and linguistic ties with the Afghan Shiite scholars, who responded to them greatly, because most of them studied side by side along with the Iranians in Najaf, during Khomeini's presence in Iraq, so they were in agreement with them (52).

The inhabitants of the city of Hazaras, located in central Afghanistan (53), were more homogeneous, and had religious, cultural, ethnic, sectarian and linguistic ties with Iran, which made it a fertile ground for the expansion of Iranian influence, by following one of its soft tools that is based on demographic expansion across Hazaras Shiite support for that matter (54). Many of them were followers of Khomeini and spoke Persian. In addition, the Iranian government supported the city of Herat, located in western Afghanistan (55), due to its strategic importance to the Iranian border area, since western Afghanistan was considered an important vein of supplies and transit between Iran and the Mujahideen all over Afghanistan, so Iran sought to fill the void in western Afghanistan, however, the Iranian government's interest in these two regions does not depend only on its relationship with the Mujahideen, but stems from religious, cultural and ethno-linguistic relations with them as well. The goal of the Iranian regime in strengthening these relations was to promote its religious ideology and export its revolutionary principles (56).

Moreover, the Iranian government supported some Sunni Afghan resistance groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to export the Iranian revolution to Sunni Muslims, based on common areas between them, whether it was ethno-linguistic, security, or in terms of Islamic religious leanings, this agreement came between two sides different in terms of Sunnis and Shiites tends to the unity of the goal of hating communism, as well as the unity of their political rhetoric hostile to the United States of America (57).
On the official level, the Afghan crisis continued as a source of tension in Iranian-Soviet relations. After the inauguration of Bani Sadr as President of the Republic of Iran on February 4, 1980, he rejected all of Moscow’s claims about its interference in Afghanistan (58), in addition to that, he indicated the need for the Soviet army to withdraw without restriction or condition thereof, what strengthened that refusal was that Khomeini, the next day, during his response to the congratulatory letter he received from Brezhnev on the occasion of the first anniversary of the victory of the revolution, rejected the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and issued an order to boycott the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in the summer of 1980, but it is remarkable It should be noted that Brezhnev did not move a finger, rather his reaction was characterized by calmness, and he did not touch Khomeini’s person directly, in order to avoid raising tensions between them (59), but Khomeini did not think about Brezhnev’s reaction, which was directed against him, and against the Soviet Union in general, as he was provoking the feelings of Muslims in his speeches to stand against the actions of the Soviet Union, and this is clear when he referred in his speech declared on the occasion of the New Year, on the twenty-first of March 1980, to the danger of communist forces, with an emphasis on the importance of Islam, which urged to support the oppressed, and the need to support all resistance movements, which struggle for liberation, from the great powers of the left and the right, in addition, he criticized the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and expressed his hope that the “Muslim people” in Afghanistan would achieve victory and independence as soon as possible (60), in addition, on the thirtieth of June of the same year, the Iranian government ordered the expulsion of some Soviet Union diplomats from Tehran on charges of espionage, as was claimed at the time, the Iranian government accused the Soviet Union of aiding the Tudeh Communist Party as its “agent” inside the Iranian Republic, which resulted in the closure of the Soviet consulate in Rasht, and the number of Soviet diplomats in Iran was reduced, in spite of all that, matters did not reach the point of rupture in the relations between the two countries, given the position of the Soviet Union, which was neutral (61), regarding the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war on the twenty-second of September 1980 (62).

Although the Iranian government was preoccupied with the war, but it was keen to follow up the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it actively continued its foreign policy to provide support and assistance for the Afghan Islamic liberation movements, by allowing them to open offices for it in Tehran, and its support for its publications, backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, being the main device through which communication takes place, the revolution is exported, and the Islamic resistance movements are supported, to expand Iranian influence in the direct neighborhood (63), based on its religious ideology aimed at exporting its revolutionary model to those regions, based on the Shiite doctrine according to velayat-e faqih (64).

When the Islamic Republic of Iran witnessed the third anniversary of the victory of its revolution in 1982, it received many congratulatory telegrams, including a telegram sent from Brezhnev. Khomeini responded to it with a reply telegram on the 14th of February of the same year, in which he indicated his thanks for that telegram sent from him, saying: “We thank you for your congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the third anniversary of the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. I pray to God Almighty to save the deprived and oppressed in the world from the domination of the oppressors and the arrogant, and I hope that the great revolution of the honorable Iranian people will be an example for them.(65) It is useful to mention that the reply telegram contained an explicit reference to Khomeini’s rejection of the domination of arrogance over the weak peoples of the world, by which he meant the Soviet Union, with his reference to the need for these peoples to witness a religious revolution that bears the character and model of the Iranian revolution.

In any case, the tension in the Iranian-Soviet relations increased greatly, as a result of the Iranian government’s deportation of eighteen Soviet diplomats in April 1983, along with the arrest of the leaders of the communist Tudeh Party, which is linked to the Moscow government, as a result of
information that indicated his involvement in counter-revolutionary activities, including espionage, in favor of the Soviet Union (66), in addition to the fact that the Iranian intelligence service was able to arrest five hundred Iranians and execute them on charges of espionage for the Soviet Union as well, and close the offices of Tudeh Party. In light of this, Khomeini indicated by saying: “We thank God for this miracle” (67), while praising the role of the security services (68). On the fourth of May of the same year, the Iranian government issued a decision banning the Tudeh Party to work inside the Islamic Republic of Iran in final form (69).

Accordingly, the Iranian media launched an attack on the Soviet government, with the Iranian regime pursuing and liquidating the Iranian communists, and urging the Soviet Muslims to seize power, but the Soviet regime justified this behavior, as a result of its fear of some opposition groups within the Iranian government, especially the communists, moreover, the Soviet Union justified its dissatisfaction with these behaviors through the media, as a result of these developments, the Soviets revised their policy towards Iran, and began to lean more towards Iraq (70).

Accordingly, Khomeini showed his great interest in the Muslims of the southern republics of the Soviet Union, through his focus on directing a radio station to all the Muslims of those republics in 1983, as the news included its strong focus on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the desire to spread communism with an ideology contrary to him, with the focus of the invasion trying to prevent the spread of the Islamic revolutionary tide to the southern republics, which contained a Muslim majority (71), especially with the republics that are associated with it by religion and ethnicity, especially Tajikistan with Persian origins, and Azerbaijan with a Shiite majority (72). It is worth mentioning that in the midst of tensions related to ideological differences, and the point of disagreement over Afghanistan, the two countries focused on the continued prosperity of economic relations between them (73).

The Soviet Union responded in 1984 using the same method used by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the Soviet government strongly rejected the principle of exporting the Islamic revolution to its republics in general, and to Afghanistan in particular, because it was working to “develop of Afghan resistance against her” there (74), so the Soviet media took attacked the Iranian government, as it was broadcast daily in the Persian language along with Soviet newspapers, such as Pravda, which is the official government newspaper, the reason for these attacks came as a result of Iran's support for the Afghan Mujahideen, and its suppression of the Iranian communists loyal to Moscow, including the banned Tudeh Party, and relations continued to deteriorate during the period 1985-1986, and did not witness any noticeable improvement (75).

After that, the number of Afghan refugees to the Islamic Republic of Iran increased, and their number reached nearly one and a half million Afghan refugees in the mid-eighties, then the attacks of the Afghan opposition intensified in Afghanistan, as a result of their influence on the platform of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and these developments portended a great danger to the Soviet Union (76), and then the Soviet leadership tried to adopt a new method in its foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to move away from providing support to Afghanistan on the one hand, and to restore normal relations with Iran on the other hand, and this was evident during a meeting with Andrei Gromyko (77), Chairman of the Permanent Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet Council, with Hirani Nobari, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, in October 1986. During the meeting, he tried to draw Iran's attention to the fact that the Soviet Union was calling for a peace initiative with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Gromyko told the Iranian ambassador that the Soviet leadership considered the Iranian media “working to stir up propaganda hostile to them in Iran,” adding that such activities “were not useful for the development of Normal relations between neighboring countries such as the Soviet Union and Iran. At the same time, the strained relations will, from his point of view, undermine the important volume of trade exchange between Tehran and Moscow (78).
It seems that the Iranian government, for its part, also preferred the restoration of relations between it and the Soviet Union, and the evidence for this is that it sent Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati on February 12, 1987 to Moscow, and he met there with Andrei Gromyko to discuss matters pertaining to the restoration and improvement of relations between the two countries. But it is controversial that the Moscow government, and although it thought so, and it sought to return, and when the Iranian government was convinced, and sent her foreign minister, Gromyko took a strict stance on Velayati, as he strongly criticized the Iranian government, because of its continuation in the Gulf War, and its assistance to the Afghans (79).

There is no doubt that this behavior worked to increase the complexity of matters between the two parties, and as a result of that criticism, the Afghan refugees took control of the Soviet consulate in Isfahan on the 26th of December of the same year, which was reflected negatively on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government announced its protest against that behavior of the Afghan refugees inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, and then the Iranian-Soviet relations were strained, and the Soviet Union had no opportunity to think about restoring relations again, but when it issued its statement on the 8th of February 1988 regarding the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (80), this development counted as a turning point in the policy of the Soviet Union towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in particular and the Middle East in general. Three days after the announcement, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky (81), traveled to Tehran to explain the situation to the Iranian leadership, and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Shura Council, tried to seize the opportunity to improve relations with the Soviet Union (82).

On the 17th of November 1988, a new development took place that had a great impact on the Soviet-Iranian relations, as a demonstration took place in Baku, the capital of the Muslim-majority Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, in front of the government council, and demanded that many reforms be carried out, but the important thing that must be mentioned to the Iranian leadership is that the demonstrators who went out raised green flags, which symbolize Shiite Islamic feelings, and during their demonstrations they raised pictures of Khomeini, here the Iranian leadership in general and Khomeini in particular saw that the demonstration in Baku confirmed the success of exporting the Islamic revolution, which is what Khomeini aspires to in particular, as the latter succeeded in arousing the feelings of Muslims in Baku to go out and stand up to injustice and tyrants (83). This is what the Soviet Union was afraid of hearing the same demands that were echoing in Iran among its Muslims as well (84).

In light of this, Khomeini decided to take advantage of the internal turmoil in the Islamic republics in the Soviet Union, relying on his revolutionary principles and Islamic aspirations, so he made a call for comprehensive change in the Soviet Union in early January 1989, by sending him a representative to Moscow, carrying a message A personal message from him to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (85), which is the first message of its kind to a head of a foreign country sent by Khomeini, in which he called on him to convert to Islam, and suggested that he must send their experts to the holy city of Qom to study the principles of Islamic economics to find an Islamic solution for social, ideological and economic relations of the Soviet Union and what they were suffering at the time (86). That letter not only carried sharp criticism against communism and former communist leaders, but also blamed Gorbachev, as it stated in its text: "It is possible that the improper policies and practices of the former communist leaders with regard to the Soviet economy helped the Western world to appear more attractive.” But, the truth lies elsewhere. If you want to end the economic problems of socialism and communism, by simply resorting to Western capitalism, you will not only relieve the pains prevailing in Soviet society, but you will also invite others to make up for the mistakes you have made, because if Marxism stagnates in its economic involvement in the same problems, but only of a different description, as well as other problems....” The long letter went on to claim, until he asserted: "It is
absolutely clear to all and to everyone else that from now on one must look for communism in the museums of world political history, because Marxism can satisfy nothing of the real needs of human beings.” Then he blamed Gorbachev, saying: “It is possible that in some respects you have not convincingly turned your back on Marxism, and in the future, you may express your sincere belief in Marxism in public interviews; but you yourself may well realize that in reality things are different” (87). He added, “I ask you to investigate carefully and reflect on Islamic thought, and this is not because Muslims and Islam need you, but rather the lofty universal values of Islam, whose place is to save all peoples and make them happy”(87).

It was expected that this message would have a negative impact on the relations between the two countries, but that did not happen, because Gorbachev received the message with respect, but he pointed out that geography and history had determined that the Soviet Union and Iran should live in peace as “good neighbors” and cooperate with each other. As for religion, he said: “We are different religiously, and we adhere to different political principles as well. world views and traditions. Although the Soviet leadership did not take the religious content of the message seriously, it considered it a gesture of goodwill and a new basis for improving its relations with Iran (89).

CONCLUSION:

It is clear from the foregoing that the issue of exporting the revolution haunted the Iranian regime throughout Khomeini’s career. He was emphasizing on exporting it by various means and in direct and indirect forms, using many methods in order to deliver his revolutionary model to the countries of the Islamic world, but it seems that this time he took a new path represented in raising divine issues in the world of material politics. One of the most prominent soft forces in the field of exporting the revolution and its principles was to invite others to enter Islam on the international level.

-------------------------------------------- Footnotes ---------------------------------------------

(1)Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989): An Iranian scholar and political religious leader, his real name is Ruhollah bin Mustafa bin Ahmed Al-Musawi Khomeini, he was born in the village of Khomein near Qom and to which he is related. He studied the literature of the Arabic language, grammar, rhetoric, morphology and logic, he went to the city of Qom in 1921, which was founded by Al-Haeri, and he worked in teaching in 1928. He moved from one school to another until 1945, when he worked in the Faydiyya school in the city of Qom. He was exiled to Turkey in 1964. He stayed for one year, then moved after that to Iraq, to reside at the time in the city of Najaf, where he stayed until 1978, then moved to France in the same year, and after the Shah left Iran on the 16th of January 1979, he returned to Tehran on the first of February of the same year, and then founded the Republic of Iran ,he was the leader of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that saw the overthrow of the rule of Shah Mohammad Redha Pahlavi, and after the revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini became the supreme leader of the country in the period from (1979-1989), a position that was created in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the highest political and religious authority of the nation . Khomeini died on the 4th of June 1989, and his body was buried in (Bisht al-Zahra) in southern Tehran. For more, see: Mohammad Wasfi Abu Mughli, A Guide to Contemporary Iranian Personalities, Publications of the Center for Arabian Gulf Studies, Persian Studies Division, Iran and the Arabian Gulf Series (16), University of Basrah, 1983, pp. 58-60; Mohammed Yahya Subhi Skaik, Khomeini’s Creed - An Analytical Critical Study, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion, Islamic University - Gaza, Palestine, 2014, pp. 6-19.


(4) Marxist ideology: In Marx's early writings, ideology carried the meaning of an inverted (false) awareness that overturns the relationship between the predicate and the predicate to it, and promised that ideas develop self-evolving throughout history, and they determine social reality. As historical materialism represented by the Communist Manifesto, it is purely ideological. For more, see: Fahima Bouhafs, The Concept of Ideology in Karl Marx, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Algeria 2- Abul-Qasim Saadallah, 2017

(5) Mahdi Barzakan (1906-1995): An Iranian politician, born in Tehran. He was an opponent of the rule of Shah Mohammed Redha Pahlavi, and he was the first prime minister in Iran after the fall of the Shah. He headed the interim government from 1979 to 1980. He studied primary and secondary school in Iran, then completed his studies in Paris, and obtained a doctorate degree in engineering sciences from the Central School of Arts and Industries there. After returning from France at the end of the forties of the twentieth century, he was appointed head of the Engineering Department at the University of Tehran. After Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the oil facilities in 1951 from Britain, Bazargan was appointed head of the National Iranian Oil Company. After the British, in cooperation with the United States of America, overthrew Mossadegh's government and restored the Shah to his throne, he joined the secret national resistance movement founded by Zanjabi, but withdrew from it and established in 1961 the Iranian Liberation Movement, a liberal opposition movement with Islamic leanings. Shah Mohammad Redha Pahlavi arrested him many times and imprisoned him. After the mass demonstrations of the Iranian people in a number of cities with the encouragement of Khomeini, the Shah arrested Bazargan in June 1963, and sentenced him to imprisonment, so he stayed for a few years and was released. For more, see: Mohammed Abdullah Al-Azzawi, Reflections on the Iranian Revolution (Bazarkan and the Difficult Labor): A Study in the Struggle for Power in Iran, 1st Edition, The New National House, Damascus, 2010; Abd al-Latif Abd al-Rahman Abdullah al-Hassan, The Political Relationship between Iran and the Arabs: Its Roots, Stages and Phases, 1st edition, Obeikan, Saudi Arabia, 2018, p. 199; John H. Lorentz, Historical Dictionary of Iran Second Edition, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland • Toronto • Plymouth, UK, 2007, Pp. 56-57.

(6) The Tudeh Party: It was one of the most prominent political parties that emerged in Iran at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution in Tsarist Russia in 1917, that revolution whose ideas and principles spread among many countries, and Iran comes among the most important countries that these ideas reached it in the 1920, when groups of workers, including Iranians, were working in the Baku oil fields in Azerbaijan, adjacent to Iran, as the latter was a place for spreading communist ideas, by virtue of its location close to Russia, so these workers helped establish the first Iranian Communist Party in 1920, and the party carried out its political activity in secret, and after Redha Shah Pahlavi ascended the throne in Iran, following the "whale coup" on the twenty-first of February 1921, the party stopped its activities after Redha Shah Pahlavi chased him, but it returned to its political activity in 1941. The impact of the demise of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule, under the name "Tudah Party", which had a clear impact on Iranian political life, including the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951. the party showed a decisive position on the issue, and stood by Dr. Muhammad Mosaddegh, but after the overthrow of the latter's government in 1953, members of the Tudeh Party were subjected to arrest and physical liquidation, so the party disappeared from the Iranian political arena. For more, see: Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Encyclopedia of

7) Citing: Nadhim Yunis Othman and Farhad Muhammad Ahmad, Iranian-Soviet Relations During the Period of Mehdi Bazargan's Interim Government (February 12, 1979-November 5, 1979), Zakho University Journal, Volume III (B), Issue 1, Zakho University, Kurdistan Region, 2014, p. 75.

(8) Alaa Razazak Fadel Al-Najjar, previous source, p. 395.

(9) Mazen Ismail Al-Ramadany, Soviet policy towards Iran, from the book of International Relations of Iran, Part 1, Center for Third World Studies, College of Political Science, Baghdad, 1988, p. 138.


(11) Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982): Soviet statesman and Communist Party official for eighteen years, after being a land surveyor in the 1920s, he became a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1931. After graduation in 1935 he worked as an engineer, and by 1939 he became secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee. During World War II, he worked as a political commissar in the Red Army, rising in rank to major general in 1943, and chief of political commissars on the Ukrainian front. In 1952 he applied to become a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and a candidate member of the Politburo. He rose to be First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 1955, and in 1956 he was re-elected to his position in the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in the Politburo. And in 1960 he became the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, that is, the honorary president. Thus, he became the only other party leader after Stalin to hold the highest military rank. The system of collective leadership ended with his dismissal of Podgorny as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1977, and Brezhnev was elected to this position after which he assumed the leadership of the party and the state at the same time. And in 1979 he reached an agreement with US President Jimmy Carter on a new bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), but the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and soon after that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. For more see:

MLA Style: "Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich.". Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013


(14) Ruhollah Amenabadi, Iran, after the Islamic coup, Rokhdadahai Bahman 1357 Ta Khordad 13, volume 1, first chapter, Persian news reporter, assistant professor and employee, administration of each department; Tabestan, Tehran, 1392, p. 232

(15) Alaa Razak Fadel Al-Najjar, previous source, p. 397.


(17) Muhammad Makri (1921-2017): writer, researcher, linguist, historian, and poet. He was born in the city of Kermanshan in Eastern Kurdistan. He obtained a doctorate in Persian literature. He was imprisoned and prosecuted during the reign of the Shah. During the period (1940-1945), he became the cultural director of the General Administration of Authorship in the Ministry of Culture, and in the period (1943-1944) he took over the Directorate of Knowledge in the Kurdistan Province. In the period (1945-1949) he became one of the founders of the Department of Tribes and Clans Affairs in Iran and its first president. And in 1946 he became the preparer of plans for instructions for compulsory and
public education in Iran. In the period (1950-1953) he became a professor of history and literature at the Officers College. In 1951 he became the Director General of the Iranian Ministry of Culture. In 1952 he became the responsible director of Mad and Boghistan magazine. During the period (1951-1953) he became a professor of Persian language and Persian literature, and the Pahlavi-Sasanian language at the University of Tehran. In the same period, he became a professor of mythology at the College of Fine Arts. In 1965, he won the National and Literary Arts and Monuments Complex Award from France. In 1979 he returned to Iran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and during the period (1979-1983) he became Iran's ambassador to Moscow and Mongolia. In the period (1985-1986) he became the first advisor to the Iranian Minister of Oil, and in 1988 he left Iran for France. In 2005 he became a professor at the French Sorbonne University, and was a member of most European scientific societies. He wrote in French, Kurdish, English, Arabic and Persian. He has published more than 100 books and more than 700 articles and research papers. Among his books: The Hamidian Gift in the Kurdish Language - achieved. Kurdish Singing.

Kardipedia website;
https://www.kurdipedia.org/?q=20220721122653424137&lng=11


19) Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934-2017): Iranian politician, one of the most powerful politicians in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He was elected president of the republic in the summer of 1989, and previously held the position of the influential head of the Islamic Consultative Assembly since the convening of the first assembly of the Islamic Republic in 1980. He was born in the Rafsanjan region near Kerman. He left for Qom at the age of fourteen to receive religious education. There he met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with whom he studied. He did not complete a high level of formal religious education, which explains his religious title at the level of Hujjat al-Islam, a religious rank lower than that of an ayatollah. However, his association with Khomeini and the credentials obtained through his long record of anti-Pahlavi political activism, which landed him in prison on four separate occasions (1963-1964, 1967, 1972, 1975-1977), qualified him to be a member of the inner circle of Khomeini. Khomeini. He played a key role in the revolutionary activity that brought down the regime of Mohammad Redha Shah, as the main organizer of the group of militia clerics with ties to Khomeini in exile. After the fall of the Shah and Khomeini's assumption of power, Rafsanjani was appointed to the Revolutionary Council, after which he was elected Speaker of Parliament during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). He participated in the founding of the Islamic Republican Party, and assumed the task of heading the armed forces in the period (1988-1989). He headed the country during the period (1989-1997). Conservatives criticized him for his positions on opposition leaders, and the unrest that occurred in Iran after the 2009 presidential elections. See: Hussein Karim Hammoud and Wafaa Abdul-Mahdi Al-Shammar, Men of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 1st Edition, Al-Nibras for Printing and Publishing, Baghdad, 2019, pp. 77-79; Widad Jaber Ghazi, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and his political role in Iran: a historical and political study, Al-Mustansiriya Journal for Arab and International Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, Volume Fourteen, No. 60, Al-Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2018.


(22) Alaa Razak Fadel Al-Najjar, previous source, pp. 397-398.
(23) The 1921 agreement was concluded on the twenty-sixth of February of the same year between the Iranian government and the Soviet Union. The Caspian Sea, and recognized Iranian sovereignty, with the evacuation of Soviet forces from northern Iran, in exchange for that Iran committed itself not to establish military bases for another party on its territory that would become a source of threat to the security of the Soviet Union, and the sixth item of it included: allowing the Soviet Union to enter its forces into Iranian territory In the event that a third party uses these lands against its security and the security of its allies. See: Tawfiq Najm, The development of Russian-Iranian relations and their impact on strengthening the effectiveness of Iran's regional policy towards the Arab Gulf region since 1979, Anbar University Journal of Legal and Political Sciences, Volume One, No. 11, University of Anbar, 2016, p. 141; Mazen Ismail Al-Ramadan, p. 128;
24) Alaa Razak Fadel Al-Najjar, previous source, p. 400.
Fahd Mazban Khazar Khazar, previous source, p. 39.
(31) Nadhim Younes Othman and Farhad Mohammed Ahmed, previous source, pp. 70-75.
(34) Kamal Yassin Jassim, American Policy towards the Arab Gulf between the Nixon Administration and the Reagan Era, unpublished master's thesis, College of Law and Politics for Postgraduate Studies,

(35) Akram Abdullah Al-Jumaili, previous source, p. 286.


(41) Fred Holiday, previous source, p. 67.


(44) Tali R Glumet, New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia And Iran’s Rivalry, A Thesis Presented to In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree, Master of Arts, The Faculty of the Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2015, P. 69.

(45) Ahmed Jamil Zughair Al-Husseinawi, previous source, p. 80.

(46) Quoted from: Alvin Z. Rubinstein, previous source, p. 20.


(49) Akram Abdullah Al-Jumaili, previous source, p. 294; Raghda Abbas Kamel, previous source, p. 324; Ahmed Jamil Zughair Al-Husseinawi, previous source, p. 90.

(50) Akram Abdullah Al-Jumaili, previous source, p. 292


(52) Heather Macleod Robinson, Iran’s Role in Afghanistan in the Modern Era: Leveraging Influence for Regional Supremacy, This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University of St Andrews, 2020, Pp. 165-166.


(55) The reason for that support is due to the influence of the people of Herat on the ideas of the Iranian revolution since its outbreak in 1979, when that city witnessed a major uprising on the twenty
fourth of March, a month after the success of the Islamic Iranian revolution, as the people of Herat believed that they could confront the regime Kabul has a Marxist orientation, which led to strained relations between the Afghan and Iranian governments, as a result of the Afghan government's suspicions of Iran's support for the uprising, which led to an extension of the state of disobedience and the occurrence of uprisings in other Shiite regions in Afghanistan. For more information, see: Ahmed Jamil Zughair Al-Husseinawi, previous source, pp. 58-62.


(57) Ibid., Pp. 132-133.

(58) Bani al-Sadr indicated that the main reason for that invasion was "the fear of the spread of the ideas and principles of the Iranian revolution to the Islamic republics of the Soviet Union close to the Iranian borders or Afghanistan, in addition to the visits of some Iranian clerics to the areas of the Soviet Union neighboring the Islamic Republic of Iran, With the aim of promoting the principles of their religious revolution, according to the principle of exporting the revolution" - according to Bani al-Sadr's point of view. See: Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ibid., p. 20; Ahmed Jamil Zughair Al-Husseinawi, previous source, p. 71.

(59) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, previous source, pp. 20-21; Raghda Abbas Kamel Al-Atabi, previous source, p. 323.

(60) Eva Patricia Rakel, The Iranian Political Elite, State and Society Relations, and Foreign Relations since the Islamic Revolution, the University of Amsterdam, 2008, P. 150.

(61) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, the previous source, pp. 21-25.


(64) Safaa Jihad Nazim, Russian-Iranian relations between the challenges of ideological contradiction and the requirements of the national interest for the period from 1979-2017 AD, Scientific Journal of the Faculty of Economic Studies and Political Science, Volume VI, Issue 11, University of Alexandria, 2021, p. 352.

(65) A telegram from Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini to Lewind Brezhnev (Chief of the Presidency of the Soviet Union) entitled: Reply to a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the third anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, February 14, 1982, Al-Imam newspaper, part 16, p. 50.


(68) An appeal from Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini to the Iranian people entitled: Arresting the leaders of the Communist Party (Tudah) and appreciating the efforts of the unknown soldiers of Islam in the Ministry of Security and other security institutions, May 3, 1983, Al-Imam Newspaper, Part 17, pp. 343-344.


(73 ) Akram Abdullah Al-Jumaili, previous source, p. 298.


(77) Andrei Gromyko (1909-1989) was a Soviet politician and statesman. He was born in a Belarusian village, to a peasant father. He attended an agricultural school in Minsk, where he studied economics and agricultural engineering. After completing postgraduate studies in 1936, he worked as a senior research associate at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences and as a university lecturer (1936-1939). Following Joseph Stalin's purges, which drained the Foreign Service, Gromyko was appointed head of the United States Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 1939. While learning English, he was appointed Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. In 1943 he became ambassador to the United States (at the age of 34), and in 1946 he became representative on the United Nations Security Council. He was promoted to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1946, then became First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1949. In 1952 he became an appointed member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and was appointed ambassador to Britain. In 1953 he returned to Moscow as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and resumed his position as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1954. In 1956 he obtained full membership in the Central Committee, then he held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs for the period (1957-1985). Known for his extensive knowledge of international affairs and negotiating skills, he was entrusted with major diplomatic missions and policy statements. He often accompanied other Soviet leaders, and in 1985 he was relieved of his post, and he was appointed Chairman of the Standing Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet, which is an honorary position. Gromyko relinquished his position in 1988.


(80) The events that accompanied the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved that the Soviet Union had lost much of its international reputation, in addition to the losses it suffered in terms of equipment and numbers, and its loss in the Central Asia and the Middle East, because the Soviets had abandoned many of the slogans that they raised, before their entry To Afghanistan, the US government took advantage of that, in order to erase their defeat in Vietnam and expose the Soviet regime when its interest required it to intervene, and it did not hesitate to do so. On the other hand, the Afghan resistance sought to obtain a seat (for the Afghan government) within the United Nations, and the leaders of the organized resistance demanded that a fact-finding committee be sent to Afghanistan in order to support with documents what they called the war crimes and atrocities committed by the Soviet forces and the forces of the regime in Kabul since Their invasion of their country in 1979, and thus the Soviet presence in Afghanistan became an unjustified presence, and it is subjected to constant attacks from the Afghan resistance, which developed its methods in a way that adapts to the success of its operations against the Soviets and their advanced capabilities, so it contributed in addition to the internal factors, represented by the weakness of the economic situation in the Soviet Union, With daily spending on this war amounting to forty million dollars, and the weakness of the Soviets' confidence in their soldiers, especially those who belonged to the Soviet republics, as well as the elements of the

(81) Vladimir Petrovsky (1933-2014), Russian diplomat and ambassador, served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the era of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1992 he became the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in New York. During the period (1993-2002) he was the Director General of the United Nations Office in Geneva. During this time he was also the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament. After his retirement from the United Nations, he established the NGO “Comprehensive Dialogue among Civilizations.” He died in 2014 after a long illness.


(84) Nader Talebi, State Power and Revolution: Toward a Strategic-Relational Analysis of the 1979 Revolution in Iran, This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Lancaster, 2018, P. 236.


(88) Hamid Helmizadeh, previous source, p. 526.


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